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From: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
To: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization
Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2022 15:57:15 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <875yr0xwac.fsf@meer.lwn.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211230171940.27558-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>

Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com> writes:

> The config RANDOMIZE_SLAB does not exist, the authors probably intended to
> refer to the config RANDOMIZE_BASE, which provides kernel address-space
> randomization. They probably just confused SLAB with BASE (these two
> four-letter words coincidentally share three common letters), as they also
> point out the config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM as further randomization within
> the same sentence.
>
> Fix the reference of the config for kernel address-space randomization to
> the config that provides that.
>
> Fixes: 6e88559470f5 ("Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre")
> Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
> ---
>  Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
> index ab7d402c1677..a2b22d5640ec 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
> @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ Spectre variant 2
>     before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits
>     using the firmware.
>  
> -   Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y
> +   Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y
>     and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes
>     attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.

Makes sense to me...applied, thanks.

jon

      reply	other threads:[~2022-01-03 22:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-12-30 17:19 [PATCH] Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization Lukas Bulwahn
2022-01-03 22:57 ` Jonathan Corbet [this message]

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