From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.4 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_MED,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CB945C2BB57 for ; Wed, 11 Mar 2020 14:56:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 936EA2072F for ; Wed, 11 Mar 2020 14:56:36 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="Xc7KTwBm" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729927AbgCKO4g (ORCPT ); Wed, 11 Mar 2020 10:56:36 -0400 Received: from mail-ot1-f68.google.com ([209.85.210.68]:35482 "EHLO mail-ot1-f68.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729844AbgCKO4f (ORCPT ); Wed, 11 Mar 2020 10:56:35 -0400 Received: by mail-ot1-f68.google.com with SMTP id k26so2267639otr.2 for ; Wed, 11 Mar 2020 07:56:34 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=ouxKLWRXOtqbKDl0q+UmOju78v5owF0LnUPYL3Cn3Kg=; b=Xc7KTwBmSvnyR04w7xAsoM4QolF0XcaryYGGSqywW6r0XlqYx9XvikGX4w7bLlxxLJ 7Q9AwD+7i/TJ2mStAI9eb2ob9VCt6KgwBw+LR3gAYpgM3S9uQWoNLD+xlKhWnCsJiDsd gQ/4BkYOpVHRSRCowJu6XRQFruet41lwL6gwC6z3ZSErV3n8O+X2f+eZSuo5E01C3UV8 tyeHf9B1wPr69eyCIlYMAQR5+WIsB75Z+R5FBKu1iRw02ws17iiqnH3dVPNo9lJU7J88 tpacvkSbf6Ri5ZPR6z68IF56hdGSxpTT8rbI4/vpexPf/ozipoU+b1l6PAcyKYZfa7Y6 rVAg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=ouxKLWRXOtqbKDl0q+UmOju78v5owF0LnUPYL3Cn3Kg=; b=ECgrNNrokvCC60LQlAu9vDHmzCaX6ucC7bMoTOWR84bHqENDvjcSbaE9hwE/ycdRVq 5a+AbIXvSAn0JUkXZben9DQQ5bY1GkhAsBCJoBniFoy2DQijuO+NbPBSvAM7kszvCAVJ uyDW/25WBAkeiSqvqMblvAaJH/DAENIl6fnqwJ2pfnqSd3Gsm1b18Hi4EMkBYNtJhpZH lZiwTeJATxLnwUvzgxC3rNIDugqsRDolVum1OoMyCPLSHUYUsnpPK1QBk3NpxeMByvfV G62yoySO8DHQL2cKMYzoAiwLqlo9HOKMkSafQCTl5hRARUoIOYyTK7+DmikuUZrSA/CS Cwtg== X-Gm-Message-State: ANhLgQ0ZBiFiOL1YcOlZxMT3wZuCGieGjdv6hIvkCsPGoRe6u71OEQtH DEjRFbMniE9y2Hi1JXl8XT5f13wgoUYB/6E8nYAlbQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ADFU+vsoVPEYUzYAEvw3qgsbNcHFvKCUWY2EnYgxb3/1wEn7Xj5CByupWPUTgv6N0jalxR0NpVo1qN7c0CgaHTbYtAA= X-Received: by 2002:a4a:a8c6:: with SMTP id r6mr553536oom.21.1583938593523; Wed, 11 Mar 2020 07:56:33 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <87r1y8dqqz.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87tv32cxmf.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87v9ne5y4y.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87eeu25y14.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20200309195909.h2lv5uawce5wgryx@wittgenstein> <877dztz415.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20200309201729.yk5sd26v4bz4gtou@wittgenstein> <87k13txnig.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20200310085540.pztaty2mj62xt2nm@wittgenstein> <87wo7svy96.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87k13sui1p.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <5a8b2794-b498-af33-1327-ff2861cff83f@hotmail.de> In-Reply-To: <5a8b2794-b498-af33-1327-ff2861cff83f@hotmail.de> From: Jann Horn Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2020 15:56:07 +0100 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH] pidfd: Stop taking cred_guard_mutex To: Bernd Edlinger Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" , Christian Brauner , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Alexander Viro , Andrew Morton , "adobriyan@gmail.com" , Thomas Gleixner , Oleg Nesterov , Frederic Weisbecker , "avagin@gmail.com" , Ingo Molnar , "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" , "duyuyang@gmail.com" , David Hildenbrand , Sebastian Andrzej Siewior , Anshuman Khandual , David Howells , James Morris , "gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" , Shakeel Butt , Jason Gunthorpe , "christian@kellner.me" , Andrea Arcangeli , Aleksa Sarai , "Dmitry V. Levin" , "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-mm@kvack.org" , "stable@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-api@vger.kernel.org" , Arnd Bergmann , "sargun@sargun.me" Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-doc-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 7:12 AM Bernd Edlinger wrote: > On 3/10/20 9:22 PM, Bernd Edlinger wrote: > > On 3/10/20 9:10 PM, Jann Horn wrote: > >> On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 9:00 PM Jann Horn wrote: > >>> On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 8:29 PM Eric W. Biederman wrote: > >>>> Jann Horn writes: > >>>>> On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 7:54 PM Eric W. Biederman wrote: > >>>>>> During exec some file descriptors are closed and the files struct is > >>>>>> unshared. But all of that can happen at other times and it has the > >>>>>> same protections during exec as at ordinary times. So stop taking the > >>>>>> cred_guard_mutex as it is useless. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Furthermore he cred_guard_mutex is a bad idea because it is deadlock > >>>>>> prone, as it is held in serveral while waiting possibly indefinitely > >>>>>> for userspace to do something. > >> [...] > >>>>> If you make this change, then if this races with execution of a setuid > >>>>> program that afterwards e.g. opens a unix domain socket, an attacker > >>>>> will be able to steal that socket and inject messages into > >>>>> communication with things like DBus. procfs currently has the same > >>>>> race, and that still needs to be fixed, but at least procfs doesn't > >>>>> let you open things like sockets because they don't have a working > >>>>> ->open handler, and it enforces the normal permission check for > >>>>> opening files. > >>>> > >>>> It isn't only exec that can change credentials. Do we need a lock for > >>>> changing credentials? > >> [...] > >>>> If we need a lock around credential change let's design and build that. > >>>> Having a mismatch between what a lock is designed to do, and what > >>>> people use it for can only result in other bugs as people get confused. > >>> > >>> Hmm... what benefits do we get from making it a separate lock? I guess > >>> it would allow us to make it a per-task lock instead of a > >>> signal_struct-wide one? That might be helpful... > >> > >> But actually, isn't the core purpose of the cred_guard_mutex to guard > >> against concurrent credential changes anyway? That's what almost > >> everyone uses it for, and it's in the name... > >> > > > > The main reason d'etre of exec_update_mutex is to get a consitent > > view of task->mm and task credentials. > > > The reason why you want the cred_guard_mutex, is that some action > > is changing the resulting credentials that the execve is about > > to install, and that is the data flow in the opposite direction. > > > > So in other words, you need the exec_update_mutex when you > access another thread's credentials and possibly the mmap at the > same time. Or the file descriptor table, or register state, ... > You need no mutex at all when you are just accessing or > even changing the credentials of the current thread. (If another > thread is doing execve, your task will be killed, and wether > or not the credentials were changed does not matter any more) Only if the only access checks you care about are those related to mm access.