From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
To: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa <akiyks@gmail.com>,
Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Andrea Parri <parri.andrea@gmail.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>,
Daniel Lustig <dlustig@nvidia.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Jade Alglave <j.alglave@ucl.ac.uk>,
Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Luc Maranget <luc.maranget@inria.fr>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
Linux Kbuild mailing list <linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2020 13:46:57 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CANpmjNOC2PYFsE_TK2SYmKcHxyG+2arWc8x_fmeWPOMi0+ot8g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <BAB5F853-95FA-4623-A067-4E62B90721D3@lca.pw>
On Fri, 3 Jan 2020 at 06:13, Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Nov 14, 2019, at 1:02 PM, 'Marco Elver' via kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> > +static noinline void kcsan_setup_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr,
> > + size_t size, bool is_write)
> > +{
> > + atomic_long_t *watchpoint;
> > + union {
> > + u8 _1;
> > + u16 _2;
> > + u32 _4;
> > + u64 _8;
> > + } expect_value;
> > + bool value_change = false;
> > + unsigned long ua_flags = user_access_save();
> > + unsigned long irq_flags;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Always reset kcsan_skip counter in slow-path to avoid underflow; see
> > + * should_watch().
> > + */
> > + reset_kcsan_skip();
> > +
> > + if (!kcsan_is_enabled())
> > + goto out;
> > +
> > + if (!check_encodable((unsigned long)ptr, size)) {
> > + kcsan_counter_inc(KCSAN_COUNTER_UNENCODABLE_ACCESSES);
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Disable interrupts & preemptions to avoid another thread on the same
> > + * CPU accessing memory locations for the set up watchpoint; this is to
> > + * avoid reporting races to e.g. CPU-local data.
> > + *
> > + * An alternative would be adding the source CPU to the watchpoint
> > + * encoding, and checking that watchpoint-CPU != this-CPU. There are
> > + * several problems with this:
> > + * 1. we should avoid stealing more bits from the watchpoint encoding
> > + * as it would affect accuracy, as well as increase performance
> > + * overhead in the fast-path;
> > + * 2. if we are preempted, but there *is* a genuine data race, we
> > + * would *not* report it -- since this is the common case (vs.
> > + * CPU-local data accesses), it makes more sense (from a data race
> > + * detection point of view) to simply disable preemptions to ensure
> > + * as many tasks as possible run on other CPUs.
> > + */
> > + local_irq_save(irq_flags);
>
> Enabling KCSAN will now generate a warning during boot here.
>
> Config (need to deselect KASAN and select KCSAN):
>
> https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cailca/linux-mm/master/x86.config
Thanks, I'll look into KCSAN + lockdep compatibility. It's probably
missing some KCSAN_SANITIZE := n in some Makefile.
> [ 13.358813][ T0] Spectre V2 : Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch
> [ 13.361606][ T0] Speculative Store Bypass: Vulnerable
> [ 13.363254][ T0] TAA: Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode
> [ 13.366836][ T0] MDS: Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode
> [ 13.369877][ T0] debug: unmapping init [mem 0xffffffff8dd83000-0xffffffff8dd87fff]
> [ 13.415028][ T1] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> [ 13.416814][ T1] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!current->hardirqs_enabled)
> [ 13.416814][ T1] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4406 check_flags.part.26+0x102/0x240
> [ 13.416814][ T1] Modules linked in:
> [ 13.416814][ T1] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc2-next-20191220+ #4
> [ 13.416814][ T1] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL580 Gen9/ProLiant DL580 Gen9, BIOS U17 07/21/2016
> [ 13.416814][ T1] RIP: 0010:check_flags.part.26+0x102/0x240
> [ 13.416814][ T1] Code: bc 8d e8 51 a1 15 00 44 8b 05 2a a0 46 01 45 85 c0 0f 85 57 76 00 00 48 c7 c6 5d fa 7b 8d 48 c7 c7 b1 54 7b 8d e8 10 91 f5 ff <0f> 0b e9 3d 76 00 00 65 48 8b 3c 25 40 7f 01 00 e8 89 f0 ff ff e8
> [ 13.416814][ T1] RSP: 0000:ffff9d3206287ce8 EFLAGS: 00010082
> [ 13.416814][ T1] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8e5b8541e040 RCX: 0000000000000000
> [ 13.416814][ T1] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
> [ 13.416814][ T1] RBP: ffff9d3206287cf0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000ffff8dbcc254
> [ 13.416814][ T1] R10: 0000ffffffffffff R11: 0000ffff8dbcc257 R12: 0000000000000235
> [ 13.416814][ T1] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000246 R15: 000000000000001b
> [ 13.416814][ T1] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e61e3200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> [ 13.416814][ T1] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> [ 13.416814][ T1] CR2: ffff8e79f07ff000 CR3: 0000001284c0e001 CR4: 00000000003606f0
> [ 13.416814][ T1] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> [ 13.416814][ T1] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> [ 13.416814][ T1] Call Trace:
> [ 13.416814][ T1] lock_is_held_type+0x66/0x160
> [ 13.416814][ T1] ___might_sleep+0xc1/0x1d0
> [ 13.416814][ T1] __might_sleep+0x5b/0xa0
> [ 13.416814][ T1] slab_pre_alloc_hook+0x7b/0xa0
> [ 13.416814][ T1] __kmalloc_node+0x60/0x300
> [ 13.416814 T1] ? alloc_cpumask_var_node+0x44/0x70
> [ 13.416814][ T1] ? topology_phys_to_logical_die+0x7e/0x180
> [ 13.416814][ T1] alloc_cpumask_var_node+0x44/0x70
> [ 13.416814][ T1] zalloc_cpumask_var+0x2a/0x40
> [ 13.416814][ T1] native_smp_prepare_cpus+0x246/0x425
> [ 13.416814][ T1] kernel_init_freeable+0x1b8/0x496
> [ 13.416814][ T1] ? rest_init+0x381/0x381
> [ 13.416814][ T1] kernel_init+0x18/0x17f
> [ 13.416814][ T1] ? rest_init+0x381/0x381
> [ 13.416814][ T1] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
> [ 13.416814][ T1] irq event stamp: 910
> [ 13.416814][ T1] hardirqs last enabled at (909): [<ffffffff8d1240f3>] _raw_write_unlock_irqrestore+0x53/0x57
> [ 13.416814][ T1] hardirqs last disabled at (910): [<ffffffff8c8bba76>] kcsan_setup_watchpoint+0x96/0x460
> [ 13.416814][ T1] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8c6b697a>] copy_process+0x11fa/0x34f0
> [ 13.416814][ T1] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
> [ 13.416814][ T1] ---[ end trace 7d1df66da055aa92 ]---
> [ 13.416814][ T1] possible reason: unannotated irqs-on.
> [ 13.416814][ent stamp: 910
> [ 13.416814][ T1] hardirqs last enabled at (909): [<ffffffff8d1240f3>] _raw_write_unlock_irqrestore+0x53/0x57
> [ 13.416814][ T1] hardirqs last disabled at (910): [<ffffffff8c8bba76>] kcsan_setup_watchpoint+0x96/0x460
> [ 13.416814][ T1] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8c6b697a>] copy_process+0x11fa/0x34f0
> [ 13.416814][ T1] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
>
>
> The other issue is that the system is unable to boot due to endless of those messages.
Apart from fixing the data races, I can add a feature to KCSAN to
limit reporting too often (will send patch).
> [ 17.976814][ T578] Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
> [ 17.976814][ T578] CPU: 12 PID: 578 Comm: pgdatinit1 Tainted: G W 5.5.0-rc2-next-20191220+ #4
> [ 17.976814][ T578] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL580 Gen9/ProLiant DL580 Gen9, BIOS U17 07/21/2016
> [ 17.976814][ T578] ==================================================================
> [ 17.976814][ T578] ==================================================================
> [ 17.976814][ T578] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __change_page_attr / __change_page_attr
> [ 17.976814][ T578]
> [ 17.976814][ T578] write to 0xffffffff8dda0de0 of 8 bytes by task 577 on cpu 2:
> [ 17.976814][ T578] __change_page_attr+0xef7/0x16a0
> [ 17.976814][ T578] __change_page_attr_set_clr+0xec/0x4f0
> [ 17.97681pages_np+0xcc/0x100
> [ 17.976814][ T578] __kernel_map_pages+0xd6/0xdb
> [ 17.976814][ T578] __free_pages_ok+0x1a8/0x730
> [ 17.976814][ T578] __free_pages+0x51/0x90
> [ 17.976814][ T578] __free_pages_core+0x1c7/0x2c0
> [ 17.976814][ T578] deferred_free_range+0x59/0x8f
> [ 17.976814][ T578] deferred_init_maxorder+0x1d6/0x21d
> [ 17.976814][ T578] deferred_init_memmap+0x14a/0x1c1
> [ 17.976814][ T578] kthread+0x1e0/0x200
> [ 17.976814][ T578] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
> [ 17.976814][ T578]
> [ 17.976814][ T578] read to 0xffffffff8dda0de0 of 8 bytes by task 578 on cpu 12:
> [ 17.976814][ T578] __change_page_attr+0xed1/0x16a0
> [ 17.976814][ T578] __change_page_attr_set_clr+0xec/0x4f0
> [ 17.976814][ T578] __set_pages_np+0xcc/0x100
> [ 17.976814][ T578] __kernel_map_pages+0xd6/0xdb
> [ 17.976814][ T578] __free_pages_ok+0x1a8/0x730
> [ 17.976814][ T578] __free_pages+0x51/0x90
> [ 17.976814][ T578] __free_pages_core+0x1c7/0x2c0
> [ 17.976814][ T578] deferred_free_range+0x59/0x8f
> [ 17.976814][ T578] deferred_init_maxorder+0x1aa/0x21d
> [ 17.976814][ T578] deferred_init_memmap+0x14a/0x1c1
> [ 17.976814][ T578] kthread+0x1e0/0x200
> [ 17.976814][ T578] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
>
> # ./scripts/faddr2line vmlinux __change_page_attr+0xef7/0x16a0
> __change_page_attr+0xef7/0x16a0:
> static_protections at arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:528
> (inlined by) __change_page_attr at arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:1516
>
> # ./scripts/faddr2line vmlinux __change_page_attr+0xed1/0x16a0
> __change_page_attr+0xed1/0x16a0:
> cpa_inc_4k_install at arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:131
> (inlined by) __change_page_attr at arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:1514
Thanks,
-- Marco
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-01-06 12:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-11-14 18:02 [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure Marco Elver
2019-11-19 19:27 ` Qian Cai
2019-11-19 19:54 ` Marco Elver
2019-11-19 21:42 ` Qian Cai
2019-11-19 21:53 ` Marco Elver
2020-01-03 5:13 ` Qian Cai
2020-01-06 12:46 ` Marco Elver [this message]
2020-01-14 11:08 ` Qian Cai
2020-01-14 12:51 ` Marco Elver
2020-01-14 19:22 ` Paul E. McKenney
2020-01-14 20:30 ` Qian Cai
2020-01-14 21:34 ` Paul E. McKenney
2020-01-14 21:48 ` Qian Cai
2020-01-14 22:09 ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] include/linux/compiler.h: Introduce data_race(expr) macro Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] kcsan: Add Documentation entry in dev-tools Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] objtool, kcsan: Add KCSAN runtime functions to whitelist Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] build, kcsan: Add KCSAN build exceptions Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] seqlock, kcsan: Add annotations for KCSAN Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:03 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] seqlock: Require WRITE_ONCE surrounding raw_seqcount_barrier Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:03 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation for bitops Marco Elver
2019-11-15 11:55 ` Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:03 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] locking/atomics, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation Marco Elver
2019-11-14 18:03 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] x86, kcsan: Enable KCSAN for x86 Marco Elver
2019-11-14 19:50 ` [PATCH v4 00/10] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-14 21:33 ` Marco Elver
2019-11-14 22:15 ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-15 12:02 ` Marco Elver
2019-11-15 16:41 ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-15 17:14 ` Marco Elver
2019-11-15 20:43 ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-16 8:20 ` Marco Elver
2019-11-16 15:34 ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-16 18:09 ` Marco Elver
2019-11-16 18:28 ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-19 19:50 ` Qian Cai
2019-11-19 20:12 ` Qian Cai
2019-11-19 21:50 ` Marco Elver
2019-11-20 15:54 ` Marco Elver
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