From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 871AEC43215 for ; Thu, 21 Nov 2019 10:39:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5F2B920714 for ; Thu, 21 Nov 2019 10:39:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726454AbfKUKjd (ORCPT ); Thu, 21 Nov 2019 05:39:33 -0500 Received: from mga18.intel.com ([134.134.136.126]:62455 "EHLO mga18.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726170AbfKUKjd (ORCPT ); Thu, 21 Nov 2019 05:39:33 -0500 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga005.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.32]) by orsmga106.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 21 Nov 2019 02:39:31 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.69,224,1571727600"; d="scan'208";a="407148659" Received: from jsakkine-mobl1.tm.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.237.50.162]) by fmsmga005.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 21 Nov 2019 02:39:25 -0800 Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2019 12:39:25 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Sean Christopherson Cc: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Peter Zijlstra , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Mark Rutland , Alexander Shishkin , Jiri Olsa , Namhyung Kim , Paolo Bonzini , Radim =?utf-8?B?S3LEjW3DocWZ?= , Vitaly Kuznetsov , Wanpeng Li , Jim Mattson , Joerg Roedel , Tony Luck , Tony W Wang-oc , Shuah Khan , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-edac@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 04/19] x86/intel: Initialize IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR at boot Message-ID: <20191121103925.GB20907@linux.intel.com> References: <20191119031240.7779-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> <20191119031240.7779-5-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20191119031240.7779-5-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-edac-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-edac@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Nov 18, 2019 at 07:12:25PM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote: > Opportunistically initialize IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR to enable VMX when > the MSR is left unlocked by BIOS. Configuring IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL at > boot time paves the way for similar enabling of other features, e.g. > Software Guard Extensions (SGX). > > Temporarily leave equivalent KVM code in place in order to avoid > introducing a regression on Centaur and Zhaoxin CPUs, e.g. removing > KVM's code would leave the MSR unlocked on those CPUs and would break > existing functionality if people are loading kvm_intel on Centaur and/or > Zhaoxin. Defer enablement of the boot-time configuration on Centaur and > Zhaoxin to future patches to aid bisection. > > Note, Local Machine Check Exceptions (LMCE) are also supported by the > kernel and enabled via IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, but the kernel currently > uses LMCE if and and only if the feature is explicitly enabled by BIOS. > Keep the current behavior to avoid introducing bugs, future patches can > opt in to opportunistic enabling if it's deemed desirable to do so. > > Always lock IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL if it exists, even if the CPU doesn't > support VMX, so that other existing and future kernel code that queries > IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL can assume it's locked. > > Start from a clean slate when constructing the value to write to > IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, i.e. ignore whatever value BIOS left in the MSR so > as not to enable random features or fault on the WRMSR. > > Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov > Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson > --- > arch/x86/Kconfig.cpu | 4 +++ > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile | 1 + > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 4 +++ > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feature_control.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 2 ++ > 5 files changed, 46 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feature_control.c > > diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpu b/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpu > index af9c967782f6..aafc14a0abf7 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpu > +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpu > @@ -387,6 +387,10 @@ config X86_DEBUGCTLMSR > def_bool y > depends on !(MK6 || MWINCHIPC6 || MWINCHIP3D || MCYRIXIII || M586MMX || M586TSC || M586 || M486SX || M486) && !UML > > +config X86_FEATURE_CONTROL_MSR > + def_bool y > + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL > + > menuconfig PROCESSOR_SELECT > bool "Supported processor vendors" if EXPERT > ---help--- > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile > index 890f60083eca..84e35e762f76 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile > @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ obj-y += umwait.o > obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o > obj-$(CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES) += capflags.o powerflags.o > > +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_CONTROL_MSR) += feature_control.o > ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL > obj-y += intel.o intel_pconfig.o tsx.o > obj-$(CONFIG_PM) += intel_epb.o > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h > index 38ab6e115eac..a58e80866a3f 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h > @@ -80,4 +80,8 @@ extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void); > > extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void); > > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_CONTROL_MSR > +void init_feature_control_msr(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); > +#endif > + > #endif /* ARCH_X86_CPU_H */ > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feature_control.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feature_control.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..33c9444dda52 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feature_control.c > @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > +#include > + > +#include > +#include > +#include > + > +void init_feature_control_msr(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) > +{ > + u64 msr; > + > + if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, &msr)) > + return; > + > + if (msr & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED) > + return; > + > + /* > + * Ignore whatever value BIOS left in the MSR to avoid enabling random > + * features or faulting on the WRMSR. > + */ > + msr = FEAT_CTL_LOCKED; > + > + /* > + * Enable VMX if and only if the kernel may do VMXON at some point, > + * i.e. KVM is enabled, to avoid unnecessarily adding an attack vector > + * for the kernel, e.g. using VMX to hide malicious code. > + */ > + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM)) { > + msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX; Add empty line here. > + if (tboot_enabled()) > + msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX; > + } Add empty line here. > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, msr); > +} > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c > index 4a900804a023..b7c6ed0b40b6 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c > @@ -755,6 +755,8 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) > /* Work around errata */ > srat_detect_node(c); > > + init_feature_control_msr(c); > + ... similarly as you do here and earlier when first initializing 'msr'. > if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX)) > detect_vmx_virtcap(c); > > -- > 2.24.0 > /Jarkko