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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, matthew.garrett@nebula.com,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2016 18:11:13 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <147931987366.16460.12891767069975068260.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147931984418.16460.6639993676886095760.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

Allow keys to be added to the system secondary certificates keyring during
kernel initialisation in an unrestricted fashion.  Such keys are implicitly
trusted and don't have their trust chains checked on link.

This allows keys in the UEFI database to be added in secure boot mode for
the purposes of module signing.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---

 certs/internal.h       |   18 ++++++++++++++++++
 certs/system_keyring.c |   33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 certs/internal.h

diff --git a/certs/internal.h b/certs/internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5dcbefb0c23a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/certs/internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/* Internal definitions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * system_keyring.c
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+extern void __init add_trusted_secondary_key(const char *source,
+					     const void *data, size_t len);
+#endif
diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
index 50979d6dcecd..dfddcf6e6c88 100644
--- a/certs/system_keyring.c
+++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
 #include <keys/system_keyring.h>
 #include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include "internal.h"
 
 static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
@@ -242,3 +243,35 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_pkcs7_signature);
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+/**
+ * add_trusted_secondary_key - Add to secondary keyring with no validation
+ * @source: Source of key
+ * @data: The blob holding the key
+ * @len: The length of the data blob
+ *
+ * Add a key to the secondary keyring without checking its trust chain.  This
+ * is available only during kernel initialisation.
+ */
+void __init add_trusted_secondary_key(const char *source,
+				      const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	key_ref_t key;
+
+	key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(secondary_trusted_keys, 1),
+				   "asymmetric",
+				   NULL, data, len,
+				   (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+				   KEY_USR_VIEW,
+				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+				   KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(key))
+		pr_err("Problem loading %s X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
+		       source, PTR_ERR(key));
+	else
+		pr_notice("Loaded %s cert '%s' linked to secondary sys keyring\n",
+			  source, key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-11-16 18:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-11-16 18:10 [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load David Howells
2016-11-16 18:10 ` [PATCH 1/9] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring David Howells
2016-11-16 18:10 ` [PATCH 2/9] X.509: Allow X.509 certs to be blacklisted David Howells
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 3/9] PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificates David Howells
2016-11-16 18:11 ` David Howells [this message]
2016-11-17  6:41   ` [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring Petko Manolov
2016-11-17  9:56   ` David Howells
2016-11-17 11:18     ` David Howells
     [not found]     ` <26349.1479376560-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 10:22       ` Petko Manolov
2016-11-21 14:04       ` Mimi Zohar
2016-11-21 15:17     ` David Howells
2016-11-21 16:24       ` Mimi Zohar
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 5/9] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions David Howells
2016-11-21 16:07   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 6/9] efi: Add EFI signature data types David Howells
2016-11-16 23:43   ` Mat Martineau
     [not found]   ` <alpine.OSX.2.20.1611161535590.67352-zaFMaa3cLiZe6KzckbbZvYT4S9po1h25@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17  9:44     ` David Howells
     [not found]       ` <26198.1479375840-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 16:08         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 7/9] efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser David Howells
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot David Howells
2016-11-21 16:16   ` Ard Biesheuvel
     [not found]     ` <CAKv+Gu_QVyd1Jx7ZdnBzYmZzUnH4ZuhQgiGO-zx-JPViWosjXQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 16:25       ` Josh Boyer
     [not found]         ` <CA+5PVA6dWw-p3q9SBmJwQvuru4k7JZAraRZeb2=VDf8E=c=SmA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-24 19:22           ` James Bottomley
2016-11-24 19:17       ` James Bottomley
2016-12-02 18:57         ` James Bottomley
2016-12-02 20:18           ` Mimi Zohar
2016-11-16 18:11 ` [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed David Howells
     [not found]   ` <147931990959.16460.3038875071067540418.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 16:18     ` Ard Biesheuvel
     [not found]       ` <CAKv+Gu96ihE7pHrCCeCpy78man-r821b3Vs4Tn_RsYyzY4HV2Q-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 16:26         ` Josh Boyer
     [not found]           ` <CA+5PVA7SivAegwxdxuiAFL41Apie4JLK5KbtGGHLr1fP0p3MsQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 16:42             ` Ard Biesheuvel
     [not found]               ` <CAKv+Gu__wAnOawWZWVF6NF3En0suuFTBrFwwZ5KosqBU8LVHMA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 19:05                 ` Peter Jones
2016-11-21 19:06                   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 19:18                     ` Peter Jones
2016-11-21 19:33                       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-03-06 14:05 ` [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load Jiri Slaby
2018-03-07 13:18   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-07 15:28     ` James Bottomley
2018-03-11  3:20       ` joeyli
2018-03-19 14:12         ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-27 11:08           ` joeyli

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