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From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 13/18] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2016 12:27:58 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160429162757.GA1191@char.us.oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <572379ED.9050404@amd.com>

On Fri, Apr 29, 2016 at 10:12:45AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 04/29/2016 02:17 AM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 05:58:12PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> >> Since DMA addresses will effectively look like 48-bit addresses when the
> >> memory encryption mask is set, SWIOTLB is needed if the DMA mask of the
> >> device performing the DMA does not support 48-bits. SWIOTLB will be
> >> initialized to create un-encrypted bounce buffers for use by these devices.
> >>
> > 
> > 
> > I presume the sme_me_mask does not use the lower 48 bits?
> 
> The sme_me_mask will actually be bit 47. So, when applied, the address
> will become a 48-bit address.
> 
> > 
> > 
> > ..snip..
> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> >> index 7d56d1b..594dc65 100644
> >> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> >> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> >> @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
> >>  
> >>  #include <linux/init.h>
> >>  #include <linux/mm.h>
> >> +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
> >> +#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
> >>  
> >>  #include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
> >>  #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
> >> @@ -168,6 +170,25 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void)
> >>  }
> >>  
> >>  /* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
> >> +void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
> >> +{
> >> +	if (!sme_me_mask)
> >> +		return;
> >> +
> >> +	/* Make SWIOTLB use an unencrypted DMA area */
> >> +	swiotlb_clear_encryption();
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +unsigned long swiotlb_get_me_mask(void)
> >> +{
> >> +	return sme_me_mask;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +void swiotlb_set_mem_dec(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
> >> +{
> >> +	sme_set_mem_dec(vaddr, size);
> >> +}
> >> +
> >>  void __init *efi_me_early_memremap(resource_size_t paddr,
> >>  				   unsigned long size)
> >>  {
> >> diff --git a/include/linux/swiotlb.h b/include/linux/swiotlb.h
> >> index 017fced..121b9de 100644
> >> --- a/include/linux/swiotlb.h
> >> +++ b/include/linux/swiotlb.h
> >> @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ int swiotlb_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs, int verbose);
> >>  extern unsigned long swiotlb_nr_tbl(void);
> >>  unsigned long swiotlb_size_or_default(void);
> >>  extern int swiotlb_late_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs);
> >> +extern void __init swiotlb_clear_encryption(void);
> >>  
> >>  /*
> >>   * Enumeration for sync targets
> >> diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
> >> index b3c6e36..1013d1c 100644
> >> --- a/init/main.c
> >> +++ b/init/main.c
> >> @@ -458,6 +458,10 @@ void __init __weak thread_info_cache_init(void)
> >>  }
> >>  #endif
> >>  
> >> +void __init __weak mem_encrypt_init(void)
> >> +{
> >> +}
> >> +
> >>  /*
> >>   * Set up kernel memory allocators
> >>   */
> >> @@ -597,6 +601,8 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
> >>  	 */
> >>  	locking_selftest();
> >>  
> >> +	mem_encrypt_init();
> >> +
> >>  #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
> >>  	if (initrd_start && !initrd_below_start_ok &&
> >>  	    page_to_pfn(virt_to_page((void *)initrd_start)) < min_low_pfn) {
> > 
> > What happens if devices use the bounce buffer before mem_encrypt_init()?
> 
> The call to mem_encrypt_init is early in the boot process, I may have
> overlooked something, but what devices would be performing DMA before
> this?

I am not saying that you overlooked. Merely wondering if somebody re-orders these
calls what would happen. It maybe also good to have a comment right before
mem_encrpyt_init stating what will happen if the device does DMA before the function
is called.

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  reply	other threads:[~2016-04-29 16:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-04-26 22:55 [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:00 ` Pavel Machek
     [not found]   ` <20160322130058.GA16528-5NIqAleC692hcjWhqY66xCZi+YwRKgec@public.gmane.org>
2016-04-27 14:05     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:30       ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:39         ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]           ` <20160427143951.GH21011-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-04-27 14:58             ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:47           ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:21   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/18] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for AMD processors Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20160426225604.13567.55443.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-04-27 14:33     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:44       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:47         ` Andy Lutomirski
     [not found]           ` <CALCETrV+JzPZjrrqkhWSVfvKQt62Aq8NSW=ZvfdiAi8XKoLi8A-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-04-27 15:05             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:12               ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:31                 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 15:34                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:01   ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:17     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:30       ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:41         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 16:41           ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 17:07             ` Robin Murphy
2016-04-27 17:12             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:03   ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 16:20     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/18] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/18] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/18] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/18] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/18] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/18] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20160426225740.13567.85438.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-05-10 13:43     ` Matt Fleming
     [not found]       ` <20160510134358.GR2839-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
2016-05-10 13:57         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-12 18:20           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-24 14:54             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-25 16:09               ` Daniel Kiper
2016-05-25 19:30               ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-26 13:45                 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-08 10:07                   ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-09 16:16                     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 12:03                       ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 12:34                         ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 15:16                         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-08 11:18     ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-09 18:33       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 13:51         ` Matt Fleming
     [not found]           ` <20160613135110.GC2658-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
2016-06-15 13:17             ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]               ` <57615561.4090502-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-06-16 14:38                 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-17 15:51                   ` Matt Fleming
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/18] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/18] x86: Access device tree in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/18] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-04-29  7:17   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-04-29 15:12     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-29 16:27       ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [this message]
     [not found]         ` <20160429162757.GA1191-he5eyhs8q0BAdwtm4QZOy9BPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
2016-04-29 23:49           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/18] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/18] x86: Enable memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-05-01 22:10   ` Huang, Kai
     [not found]     ` <f37dd7de-23ad-f70f-c32d-a32f116215ce-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>
2016-05-03 15:59       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/18] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/18] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:59 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/18] x86: Add support to turn on Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20160426225904.13567.538.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-03-22 13:13     ` Pavel Machek
     [not found] ` <20160426225553.13567.19459.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-04-27 14:39   ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 20:10     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-02 18:31       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-09 15:13         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-09 21:08           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-10 11:23             ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-10 12:04               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-30  6:13 ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
     [not found]   ` <94D0CD8314A33A4D9D801C0FE68B402963918FDA-wwDBVnaDRpYSZAcGdq5asR6epYMZPwEe5NbjCUgZEJk@public.gmane.org>
2016-05-03 15:55     ` Tom Lendacky

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