From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
To: linux-arch-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
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Cc: "Rik van Riel" <riel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd-r2nGTMty4D4@public.gmane.org>,
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"Matt Fleming"
<matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Andrey Ryabinin"
<aryabinin-5HdwGun5lf+gSpxsJD1C4w@public.gmane.org>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp-Gina5bIWoIWzQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
"Paolo Bonzini"
<pbonzini-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Alexander Potapenko"
<glider-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Larry Woodman"
<lwoodman-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2016 18:35:13 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161110003513.3280.12104.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161110003426.3280.2999.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
When System Memory Encryption (SME) is enabled, the physical address
space is reduced. Adjust the x86_phys_bits value to reflect this
reduction.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 56f4c66..4949259 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -336,6 +336,8 @@
#define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM1 0xc001001a
#define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM2 0xc001001d
#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG 0xc0010010
+#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT 23
+#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT BIT_ULL(MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT)
#define MSR_K8_INT_PENDING_MSG 0xc0010055
/* C1E active bits in int pending message */
#define K8_INTP_C1E_ACTIVE_MASK 0x18000000
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 9bd910a..82c64a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -604,6 +604,35 @@ out:
#endif
}
+/*
+ * AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) can reduce the size of the physical
+ * address space if it is enabled, even if memory encryption is not active.
+ * Adjust x86_phys_bits if SME is enabled.
+ */
+static void phys_bits_adjust(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+ u64 msr;
+
+ if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
+ return;
+
+ if (c->extended_cpuid_level < 0x8000001f)
+ return;
+
+ /* Check for SME feature */
+ cpuid(0x8000001f, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ if (!(eax & 0x01))
+ return;
+
+ /* Check if SME is enabled */
+ rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, msr);
+ if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+ return;
+
+ c->x86_phys_bits -= (ebx >> 6) & 0x3f;
+}
+
static void get_cpu_vendor(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
char *v = c->x86_vendor_id;
@@ -736,6 +765,7 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
c->x86_virt_bits = (eax >> 8) & 0xff;
c->x86_phys_bits = eax & 0xff;
+ phys_bits_adjust(c);
c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0008_EBX] = ebx;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-10 0:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-10 0:34 [RFC PATCH v3 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:34 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 10:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-14 17:15 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:34 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 13:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-11 1:26 ` Kani, Toshimitsu
[not found] ` <1478827480.20881.142.camel-ZPxbGqLxI0U@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-14 16:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161110003610.3280.22043.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-16 10:46 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20161116104656.qz5wp33zzyja373r-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-16 19:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/20] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161110003620.3280.20613.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 12:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 14:39 ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 17:02 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <d5ebd13d-1278-8714-3f03-8ee7f04a2b38-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 18:17 ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 20:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 15:16 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
[not found] ` <20161115171443-mutt-send-email-mst-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 18:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 19:16 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 11:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 15:22 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 15:41 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20161122154137.z5vp3xcl5cpesuiz-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-22 20:41 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-10 0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-11-22 19:25 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20161122192526.vg63jjhwsbjwex7i-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-29 18:00 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161110003426.3280.2999.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-10 0:34 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-11-11 11:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10 0:35 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
[not found] ` <20161110003513.3280.12104.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 12:10 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Joerg Roedel
2016-11-15 12:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 14:40 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <a4cc5b07-89e1-aaa0-1977-1de95883ba62-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20161115153338.a2cxmatnpqcgiaiy-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 16:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 16:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 17:08 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161115121456.f4slpk4i2jl3e2ke-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 21:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 21:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 22:01 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161115121035.GD24857-zLv9SwRftAIdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 14:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/20] x86: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/20] x86: Add support to enable SME during early boot processing Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161110003543.3280.99623.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-14 17:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-14 18:18 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 20:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10 0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/20] Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-11-11 16:17 ` Kani, Toshimitsu
[not found] ` <1478880929.20881.148.camel-ZPxbGqLxI0U@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-14 16:24 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-17 15:55 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20161117155543.vg3domfqm3bhp4f7-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-19 18:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-20 23:04 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20161110003631.3280.73292.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-12-07 13:19 ` Matt Fleming
2016-12-09 14:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161110003655.3280.57333.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 17:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:48 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <6f1a16e4-5a84-20c0-4bd3-3be5ed933800-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 8:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10 0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161110003708.3280.29934.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 18:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/20] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:32 ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-14 16:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 16/20] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 17/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 18/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 19/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161110003826.3280.5546.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-24 12:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-29 18:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 20/20] " Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161110003838.3280.23327.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-22 18:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-26 20:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-29 18:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-29 19:56 ` Borislav Petkov
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