From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 22:41:30 +0200 Message-ID: <20161122224005-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> References: <20161110003426.3280.2999.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> <20161110003723.3280.62636.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> <20161115171443-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> <4d97f998-5835-f4e0-9840-7f7979251275@amd.com> <20161122113859.5dtlrfgizwpum6st@pd.tnic> <20161122171455-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> <20161122154137.z5vp3xcl5cpesuiz@pd.tnic> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20161122154137.z5vp3xcl5cpesuiz-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org> Sender: linux-efi-owner-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org To: Borislav Petkov Cc: Tom Lendacky , linux-arch-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, linux-doc-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org, linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, kasan-dev-/JYPxA39Uh5TLH3MbocFFw@public.gmane.org, linux-mm-Bw31MaZKKs3YtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org, iommu-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org, Rik van Riel , Radim =?utf-8?B?S3LEjW3DocWZ?= , Arnd Bergmann , Jonathan Corbet , Matt Fleming , Joerg Roedel , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , Paolo Bonzini , Larry Woodman , Ingo Molnar , Andy Lutomirski , "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrey Ryabinin List-Id: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Nov 22, 2016 at 04:41:37PM +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Tue, Nov 22, 2016 at 05:22:38PM +0200, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > The issue is it's a (potential) security hole, not a slowdown. > > How? Because the bounce buffers will be unencrypted and someone might > intercept them? Or even modify them. Guests generally trust devices since they assume they are under their control. > > To disable unsecure things. If someone enables SEV one might have an > > expectation of security. Might help push vendors to do the right thing > > as a side effect. > > Ok, you're looking at the SEV-cloud-multiple-guests aspect. Right, that > makes sense. > > I guess for SEV we should even flip the logic: disable such devices by > default and an opt-in option to enable them and issue a big fat warning. > I'd even want to let the guest users know that they're on a system which > cannot give them encrypted DMA to some devices... > > -- > Regards/Gruss, > Boris. > > Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.