From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.7 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 77A90C433DF for ; Thu, 9 Jul 2020 14:56:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 56C3A20663 for ; Thu, 9 Jul 2020 14:56:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726762AbgGIOzk (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Jul 2020 10:55:40 -0400 Received: from mx0b-002e3701.pphosted.com ([148.163.143.35]:21856 "EHLO mx0b-002e3701.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726806AbgGIOzj (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Jul 2020 10:55:39 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0134424.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-002e3701.pphosted.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 069Es8Rn025036; Thu, 9 Jul 2020 14:54:53 GMT Received: from g4t3425.houston.hpe.com (g4t3425.houston.hpe.com [15.241.140.78]) by mx0b-002e3701.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 325k3hfgfk-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Thu, 09 Jul 2020 14:54:52 +0000 Received: from stormcage.eag.rdlabs.hpecorp.net (stormcage.eag.rdlabs.hpecorp.net [128.162.236.70]) by g4t3425.houston.hpe.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3E49B9D; Thu, 9 Jul 2020 14:54:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: by stormcage.eag.rdlabs.hpecorp.net (Postfix, from userid 200934) id F18B520203305; Thu, 9 Jul 2020 09:54:48 -0500 (CDT) Message-ID: <20200709145448.883565568@hpe.com> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2020 09:54:58 -0500 From: steve.wahl@hpe.com To: Steve Wahl , Jonathan Corbet , Ard Biesheuvel , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Darren Hart , Andy Shevchenko , Mauro Carvalho Chehab , Andrew Morton , Greg Kroah-Hartman , "Paul E. McKenney" , Pawan Gupta , Juergen Gross , Mike Kravetz , Oliver Neukum , Mike Travis , Dimitri Sivanich , Benjamin Thiel , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , James Morris , David Howells , Kees Cook , Dave Young , Dan Williams , Logan Gunthorpe , Alexandre Chartre , "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" , Austin Kim , Alexey Dobriyan , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Russ Anderson Subject: [patch v2 11/13] x86: Remove references to no-longer-used efi_have_uv1_memmap() References: <20200709145447.549145421@hpe.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-HPE-SCL: -1 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.235,18.0.687 definitions=2020-07-09_08:2020-07-09,2020-07-09 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 suspectscore=2 clxscore=1015 malwarescore=0 priorityscore=1501 phishscore=0 spamscore=0 mlxscore=0 bulkscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2006250000 definitions=main-2007090111 Sender: linux-efi-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org In removing UV1 support, efi_have_uv1_memmap is no longer used. Signed-off-by: Steve Wahl --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 9 --------- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 14 +++----------- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 38 +++----------------------------------- arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c | 8 -------- 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-) --- linux.orig/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c 2020-07-07 10:49:49.933510781 -0500 +++ linux/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c 2020-07-07 10:56:15.393045519 -0500 @@ -170,15 +170,6 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *para if (!current_ei->efi_memmap_size) return 0; - /* - * If 1:1 mapping is not enabled, second kernel can not setup EFI - * and use EFI run time services. User space will have to pass - * acpi_rsdp= on kernel command line to make second kernel boot - * without efi. - */ - if (efi_have_uv1_memmap()) - return 0; - params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot; ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature; ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab; --- linux.orig/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c 2020-07-07 10:49:49.933510781 -0500 +++ linux/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c 2020-07-07 10:56:15.401045510 -0500 @@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ static inline void *efi_map_next_entry_r */ static void *efi_map_next_entry(void *entry) { - if (!efi_have_uv1_memmap() && efi_enabled(EFI_64BIT)) { + if (efi_enabled(EFI_64BIT)) { /* * Starting in UEFI v2.5 the EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE * config table feature requires us to map all entries @@ -777,11 +777,9 @@ static void __init kexec_enter_virtual_m /* * We don't do virtual mode, since we don't do runtime services, on - * non-native EFI. With the UV1 memmap, we don't do runtime services in - * kexec kernel because in the initial boot something else might - * have been mapped at these virtual addresses. + * non-native EFI. */ - if (efi_is_mixed() || efi_have_uv1_memmap()) { + if (efi_is_mixed()) { efi_memmap_unmap(); clear_bit(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES, &efi.flags); return; @@ -832,12 +830,6 @@ static void __init kexec_enter_virtual_m * has the runtime attribute bit set in its memory descriptor into the * efi_pgd page table. * - * The old method which used to update that memory descriptor with the - * virtual address obtained from ioremap() is still supported when the - * kernel is booted on SG1 UV1 hardware. Same old method enabled the - * runtime services to be called without having to thunk back into - * physical mode for every invocation. - * * The new method does a pagetable switch in a preemption-safe manner * so that we're in a different address space when calling a runtime * function. For function arguments passing we do copy the PUDs of the --- linux.orig/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c 2020-07-07 10:49:49.933510781 -0500 +++ linux/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c 2020-07-07 10:56:15.405045505 -0500 @@ -74,9 +74,6 @@ int __init efi_alloc_page_tables(void) pud_t *pud; gfp_t gfp_mask; - if (efi_have_uv1_memmap()) - return 0; - gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO; efi_pgd = (pgd_t *)__get_free_pages(gfp_mask, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER); if (!efi_pgd) @@ -115,9 +112,6 @@ void efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(void) pud_t *pud_k, *pud_efi; pgd_t *efi_pgd = efi_mm.pgd; - if (efi_have_uv1_memmap()) - return; - /* * We can share all PGD entries apart from the one entry that * covers the EFI runtime mapping space. @@ -206,9 +200,6 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigne unsigned npages; pgd_t *pgd = efi_mm.pgd; - if (efi_have_uv1_memmap()) - return 0; - /* * It can happen that the physical address of new_memmap lands in memory * which is not mapped in the EFI page table. Therefore we need to go @@ -315,9 +306,6 @@ void __init efi_map_region(efi_memory_de unsigned long size = md->num_pages << PAGE_SHIFT; u64 pa = md->phys_addr; - if (efi_have_uv1_memmap()) - return old_map_region(md); - /* * Make sure the 1:1 mappings are present as a catch-all for b0rked * firmware which doesn't update all internal pointers after switching @@ -420,12 +408,6 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings( { efi_memory_desc_t *md; - if (efi_have_uv1_memmap()) { - if (__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX) - runtime_code_page_mkexec(); - return; - } - /* * Use the EFI Memory Attribute Table for mapping permissions if it * exists, since it is intended to supersede EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE. @@ -474,10 +456,7 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings( void __init efi_dump_pagetable(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_PGT_DUMP - if (efi_have_uv1_memmap()) - ptdump_walk_pgd_level(NULL, &init_mm); - else - ptdump_walk_pgd_level(NULL, &efi_mm); + ptdump_walk_pgd_level(NULL, &efi_mm); #endif } @@ -849,21 +828,13 @@ efi_set_virtual_address_map(unsigned lon const efi_system_table_t *systab = (efi_system_table_t *)systab_phys; efi_status_t status; unsigned long flags; - pgd_t *save_pgd = NULL; if (efi_is_mixed()) return efi_thunk_set_virtual_address_map(memory_map_size, descriptor_size, descriptor_version, virtual_map); - - if (efi_have_uv1_memmap()) { - save_pgd = efi_uv1_memmap_phys_prolog(); - if (!save_pgd) - return EFI_ABORTED; - } else { - efi_switch_mm(&efi_mm); - } + efi_switch_mm(&efi_mm); kernel_fpu_begin(); @@ -879,10 +850,7 @@ efi_set_virtual_address_map(unsigned lon /* grab the virtually remapped EFI runtime services table pointer */ efi.runtime = READ_ONCE(systab->runtime); - if (save_pgd) - efi_uv1_memmap_phys_epilog(save_pgd); - else - efi_switch_mm(efi_scratch.prev_mm); + efi_switch_mm(efi_scratch.prev_mm); return status; } --- linux.orig/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c 2020-07-07 10:56:15.209045740 -0500 +++ linux/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c 2020-07-07 10:56:15.409045500 -0500 @@ -381,14 +381,6 @@ static void __init efi_unmap_pages(efi_m u64 va = md->virt_addr; /* - * To Do: Remove this check after adding functionality to unmap EFI boot - * services code/data regions from direct mapping area because the UV1 - * memory map maps EFI regions in swapper_pg_dir. - */ - if (efi_have_uv1_memmap()) - return; - - /* * EFI mixed mode has all RAM mapped to access arguments while making * EFI runtime calls, hence don't unmap EFI boot services code/data * regions.