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From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
	Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	tony.luck@intel.com, marcorr@google.com,
	sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH Part1 v5 30/38] x86/compressed/64: store Confidential Computing blob address in bootparams
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 2021 14:09:55 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210827190955.fc5eyvk2mmtuawwz@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YSjzcgQDubOY1pGI@zn.tnic>

On Fri, Aug 27, 2021 at 04:15:14PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 20, 2021 at 10:19:25AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> > From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> > 
> > When the Confidential Computing blob is located by the boot/compressed
> > kernel, store a pointer to it in bootparams->cc_blob_address to avoid
> > the need for the run-time kernel to rescan the EFI config table to find
> > it again.
> > 
> > Since this function is also shared by the run-time kernel, this patch
> 
> Here's "this patch" again... but you know what to do.
> 
> > also adds the logic to make use of bootparams->cc_blob_address when it
> > has been initialized.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
> >  1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
> > index 651980ddbd65..6f70ba293c5e 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
> > @@ -868,7 +868,6 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_rdtsc(struct ghcb *ghcb,
> >  	return ES_OK;
> >  }
> >  
> > -#ifdef BOOT_COMPRESSED
> >  static struct setup_data *get_cc_setup_data(struct boot_params *bp)
> >  {
> >  	struct setup_data *hdr = (struct setup_data *)bp->hdr.setup_data;
> > @@ -888,6 +887,16 @@ static struct setup_data *get_cc_setup_data(struct boot_params *bp)
> >   *   1) Search for CC blob in the following order/precedence:
> >   *      - via linux boot protocol / setup_data entry
> >   *      - via EFI configuration table
> > + *   2) If found, initialize boot_params->cc_blob_address to point to the
> > + *      blob so that uncompressed kernel can easily access it during very
> > + *      early boot without the need to re-parse EFI config table
> > + *   3) Return a pointer to the CC blob, NULL otherwise.
> > + *
> > + * For run-time/uncompressed kernel:
> > + *
> > + *   1) Search for CC blob in the following order/precedence:
> > + *      - via linux boot protocol / setup_data entry
> 
> Why would you do this again if the boot/compressed kernel has already
> searched for it?

In some cases it's possible to boot directly to kernel proper without
going through decompression kernel (e.g. CONFIG_PVH), so this is to allow
a way for boot loaders of this sort to provide a CC blob without relying
on EFI. It could be relevant for things like fast/virtualized containers.

> 
> > + *      - via boot_params->cc_blob_address
> 
> Yes, that is the only thing you need to do in the runtime kernel - see
> if cc_blob_address is not 0. And all the work has been done by the
> decompressor kernel already.
> 
> >   *   2) Return a pointer to the CC blob, NULL otherwise.
> >   */
> >  static struct cc_blob_sev_info *sev_snp_probe_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp)
> > @@ -897,9 +906,11 @@ static struct cc_blob_sev_info *sev_snp_probe_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp)
> >  		struct setup_data header;
> >  		u32 cc_blob_address;
> >  	} *sd;
> > +#ifdef __BOOT_COMPRESSED
> >  	unsigned long conf_table_pa;
> >  	unsigned int conf_table_len;
> >  	bool efi_64;
> > +#endif
> 
> That function turns into an unreadable mess with that #ifdef
> __BOOT_COMPRESSED slapped everywhere.
> 
> It seems the cleanest thing to do is to do what we do with
> acpi_rsdp_addr: do all the parsing in boot/compressed/ and pass it on
> through boot_params. Kernel proper simply reads the pointer.
> 
> Which means, you can stick all that cc_blob figuring out functionality
> in arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c instead.

Most of the #ifdef'ery is due to the EFI scan, so I moved that part out
to a separate helper, snp_probe_cc_blob_efi(), that lives in
boot/compressed.sev.c. Still not pretty, but would this be acceptable?

/*
 * For boot/compressed kernel:
 *
 *   1) Search for CC blob in the following order/precedence:
 *      - via linux boot protocol / setup_data entry
 *      - via EFI configuration table
 *   2) If found, initialize boot_params->cc_blob_address to point to the
 *      blob so that uncompressed kernel can easily access it during very
 *      early boot without the need to re-parse EFI config table
 *   3) Return a pointer to the CC blob, NULL otherwise.
 *
 * For run-time/uncompressed kernel:
 *
 *   1) Search for CC blob in the following order/precedence:
 *      - via boot_params->cc_blob_address
 *      - via linux boot protocol / setup_data entry
 *   2) Return a pointer to the CC blob, NULL otherwise.
 */
static struct cc_blob_sev_info *sev_snp_probe_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp)
{
        struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info = NULL;
        struct cc_setup_data *sd;

#ifndef __BOOT_COMPRESSED
        /*
         * CC blob isn't in setup_data, see if boot kernel passed it via
         * boot_params.
         */
        if (bp->cc_blob_address) {
                cc_info = (struct cc_blob_sev_info *)(unsigned long)bp->cc_blob_address;
                goto out_verify;
        }
#endif

        /* Try to get CC blob via setup_data */
        sd = get_cc_setup_data(bp);
        if (sd) {
                cc_info = (struct cc_blob_sev_info *)(unsigned long)sd->cc_blob_address;
                goto out_verify;
        }

#ifdef __BOOT_COMPRESSED
        cc_info = snp_probe_cc_blob_efi(bp);
#endif

out_verify:
        /* CC blob should be either valid or not present. Fail otherwise. */
        if (cc_info && cc_info->magic != CC_BLOB_SEV_HDR_MAGIC)
                sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);

#ifdef __BOOT_COMPRESSED
        /*
         * Pass run-time kernel a pointer to CC info via boot_params for easier
         * access during early boot.
         */
        bp->cc_blob_address = (u32)(unsigned long)cc_info;
#endif

        return cc_info;
}

> 
> Thx.
> 
> -- 
> Regards/Gruss,
>     Boris.
> 
> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fpeople.kernel.org%2Ftglx%2Fnotes-about-netiquette&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cmichael.roth%40amd.com%7C1c87c1e207d64d80bae308d9696503b4%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637656704870745741%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=R3pm8Xf3f5B%2Fm7IDpL%2BiFS0kUdCMmUlhtJFXCROh4YA%3D&amp;reserved=0

  reply	other threads:[~2021-08-30 15:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-20 15:18 [PATCH Part1 v5 00/38] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:18 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 01/38] x86/mm: Add sev_feature_enabled() helper Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:18 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 02/38] x86/sev: Shorten GHCB terminate macro names Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:18 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 03/38] x86/sev: Get rid of excessive use of defines Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:18 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 04/38] x86/head64: Carve out the guest encryption postprocessing into a helper Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 05/38] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 06/38] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 07/38] x86/sev: Add support for hypervisor feature VMGEXIT Brijesh Singh
2021-08-23  9:47   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-23 18:25     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-23 18:34       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 08/38] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 09/38] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 10/38] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 11/38] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage Brijesh Singh
2021-08-23 14:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-23 18:55     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 12/38] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 13/38] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2021-08-23 17:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-23 18:56     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-23 19:45       ` [PATCH] x86/sev: Remove do_early_exception() forward declarations Borislav Petkov
2021-08-23 20:06         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 14/38] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 15/38] x86/kernel: Make the bss.decrypted section shared in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 16/38] x86/kernel: Validate rom memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 17/38] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit Brijesh Singh
2021-08-25 11:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-25 13:54     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-25 14:00       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 17:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 18/38] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 19/38] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 20/38] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB " Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 21/38] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 22/38] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 23/38] x86/head/64: set up a startup %gs for stack protector Brijesh Singh
2021-08-25 14:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-25 15:18     ` Michael Roth
2021-08-25 16:29       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 13:38         ` Michael Roth
2021-08-31  8:03           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-31 23:30             ` Michael Roth
2021-08-25 15:07   ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-25 17:07     ` Michael Roth
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 24/38] x86/sev: move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 25/38] KVM: x86: move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs " Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 26/38] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI config table access to common code Brijesh Singh
2021-08-25 15:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-25 17:14     ` Michael Roth
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 27/38] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 28/38] x86/compressed/64: enable SEV-SNP-validated CPUID in #VC handler Brijesh Singh
2021-08-25 19:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 16:46     ` Michael Roth
2021-08-31 10:04       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-09-01  1:03         ` Michael Roth
2021-09-02 10:53           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 29/38] x86/boot: add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams Brijesh Singh
2021-08-27 13:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 18:48     ` Michael Roth
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 30/38] x86/compressed/64: store Confidential Computing blob address " Brijesh Singh
2021-08-27 14:15   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 19:09     ` Michael Roth [this message]
2021-08-31 10:26       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 31/38] x86/compressed/64: add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob Brijesh Singh
2021-08-27 14:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 32/38] x86/sev: enable SEV-SNP-validated CPUID in #VC handlers Brijesh Singh
2021-08-27 15:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 15:47     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-27 16:56       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 18:39       ` Michael Roth
2021-08-27 18:32     ` Michael Roth
2021-08-30 16:03       ` Michael Roth
2021-08-31 16:22       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-09-01  1:16         ` Michael Roth
2021-09-02 11:05           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 33/38] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs Brijesh Singh
2021-08-27 17:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 18:07     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-27 18:13       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 18:27         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-27 18:38           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 19:57       ` Tom Lendacky
2021-08-27 20:17         ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 20:31           ` Tom Lendacky
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 34/38] x86/sev: Add snp_msg_seqno() helper Brijesh Singh
2021-08-27 18:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-30 15:07     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-02 11:26       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-09-02 15:27         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-31 20:46   ` Dov Murik
2021-08-31 21:13     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-09 14:54   ` Peter Gonda
2021-09-09 15:26     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-09 15:43       ` Peter Gonda
2021-09-09 16:17         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-09 16:21           ` Peter Gonda
2021-09-09 19:26             ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 35/38] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device Brijesh Singh
2021-08-31 11:37   ` Dov Murik
2021-08-31 16:03     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-02 16:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-09-02 19:58     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-03  8:15       ` Dov Murik
2021-09-03 12:08         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 36/38] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Brijesh Singh
2021-09-06 17:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-09-07 13:35     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-08 13:44       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 37/38] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key Brijesh Singh
2021-08-31 18:59   ` Dov Murik
2021-08-31 21:04     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01  5:33       ` Dov Murik
2021-09-08 14:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-09-08 21:44     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 38/38] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report Brijesh Singh
2021-08-31 20:22   ` Dov Murik
2021-08-31 21:11     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01  8:32       ` Dov Murik
2021-09-08 17:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-09-15 11:46     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-15 10:02   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-09-15 11:53     ` Brijesh Singh

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