From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 091ACC433FE for ; Thu, 7 Oct 2021 06:19:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E81396105A for ; Thu, 7 Oct 2021 06:19:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S240221AbhJGGVD (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 Oct 2021 02:21:03 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:37398 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S240206AbhJGGVC (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 Oct 2021 02:21:02 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098404.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 19760pg4019114; Thu, 7 Oct 2021 02:18:46 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ibm.com; h=from : to : cc : subject : date : message-id : in-reply-to : references : mime-version : content-transfer-encoding; s=pp1; bh=mSMhS5KuMYXSCCHFWTjt0J4W3hRXJ0JBE2fkifaGDT8=; b=S9thM2fBstQ1dV8TTl2IEO1jyhAWp0kv2ctbccncOmHdW/a04TzGzqUwa1QcJxV0/VA3 Tsk9S3cTwCS+4DIb6pwjSwrz0mKsKZvZe3HeUH8BPUmkt9y3oR4F8J/zCDAX86b5LOnD X37DisBTELK7qVVSPjd1W/FIXir43mhoo8vlbpTupqucKAvi4p7TZkv3scwFO/iU2FUA X+J9xp05QGFswKqv43T9StxTgE0HppzpXBMM8CSzISl2C4ORrL7rLUvj/9TYnrJR8V7M GnGAC52lkaV/b/hCvO2pKuhFIw3EZC7ML7Kh/3K6HsclqUK5sPc2IIBi4wziAxHHrvM3 fA== Received: from pps.reinject (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 3bhu8j8e7d-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Thu, 07 Oct 2021 02:18:45 -0400 Received: from m0098404.ppops.net (m0098404.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by pps.reinject (8.16.0.43/8.16.0.43) with SMTP id 19761QwB024728; Thu, 7 Oct 2021 02:18:45 -0400 Received: from ppma04dal.us.ibm.com (7a.29.35a9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [169.53.41.122]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 3bhu8j8e6y-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Thu, 07 Oct 2021 02:18:45 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma04dal.us.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma04dal.us.ibm.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 1976I7x5031350; Thu, 7 Oct 2021 06:18:44 GMT Received: from b01cxnp23032.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01cxnp23032.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.198.27]) by ppma04dal.us.ibm.com with ESMTP id 3bef2cyknu-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Thu, 07 Oct 2021 06:18:44 +0000 Received: from b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.199.110]) by b01cxnp23032.gho.pok.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 1976IgUm54133066 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 7 Oct 2021 06:18:42 GMT Received: from b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id F095BAE05F; Thu, 7 Oct 2021 06:18:41 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8E9F8AE064; Thu, 7 Oct 2021 06:18:41 +0000 (GMT) Received: from amdrome3.watson.ibm.com (unknown [9.2.130.16]) by b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 7 Oct 2021 06:18:41 +0000 (GMT) From: Dov Murik To: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dov Murik , Borislav Petkov , Ashish Kalra , Brijesh Singh , Tom Lendacky , Ard Biesheuvel , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Andi Kleen , Greg KH , Andrew Scull , "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" , James Bottomley , Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum , Jim Cadden , Daniele Buono , linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2 2/4] efi/libstub: Copy confidential computing secret area Date: Thu, 7 Oct 2021 06:18:36 +0000 Message-Id: <20211007061838.1381129-3-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20211007061838.1381129-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> References: <20211007061838.1381129-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-GUID: aXPd9KLgSM6987QEM81IlMJW7PW4i6Gx X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: DCueUGmmh6tIu1B6G7fscqprUCAqstzE X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.182.1,Aquarius:18.0.790,Hydra:6.0.391,FMLib:17.0.607.475 definitions=2021-10-06_04,2021-10-07_01,2020-04-07_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 mlxscore=0 suspectscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 bulkscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 phishscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 priorityscore=1501 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 malwarescore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2109230001 definitions=main-2110070039 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows a guest owner to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. Firmware support for secret injection is available in OVMF, which reserves a memory area for secret injection and includes a pointer to it the in EFI config table entry LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_TABLE_GUID. However, OVMF doesn't force the guest OS to keep this memory area reserved. If EFI exposes such a table entry, efi/libstub will copy this area to a reserved memory for future use inside the kernel. A pointer to the new copy is kept in the EFI table under LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID. Signed-off-by: Dov Murik --- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/coco.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c | 2 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h | 2 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 2 + include/linux/efi.h | 6 +++ 6 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/coco.c diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile index d0537573501e..d77690b7dfb9 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o \ file.o mem.o random.o randomalloc.o pci.o \ skip_spaces.o lib-cmdline.o lib-ctype.o \ - alignedmem.o relocate.o vsprintf.o + alignedmem.o relocate.o vsprintf.o coco.o # include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64 efi-deps-y := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/coco.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/coco.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..bf546b6a3f72 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/coco.c @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Confidential computing (coco) secret area handling + * + * Copyright (C) 2021 IBM Corporation + * Author: Dov Murik + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "efistub.h" + +#define LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_TABLE_GUID \ + EFI_GUID(0xadf956ad, 0xe98c, 0x484c, 0xae, 0x11, 0xb5, 0x1c, 0x7d, 0x33, 0x64, 0x47) + +/** + * struct efi_coco_secret_table - EFI config table that points to the + * confidential computing secret area. The guid + * LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_TABLE_GUID holds this table. + * @base: Physical address of the EFI secret area + * @size: Size (in bytes) of the EFI secret area + */ +struct efi_coco_secret_table { + u64 base; + u64 size; +} __attribute((packed)); + +/* + * Create a copy of EFI's confidential computing secret area (if available) so + * that the secrets are accessible in the kernel after ExitBootServices. + */ +void efi_copy_coco_secret_area(void) +{ + efi_guid_t linux_secret_area_guid = LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID; + efi_status_t status; + struct efi_coco_secret_table *secret_table; + struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area *secret_area; + + secret_table = get_efi_config_table(LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_TABLE_GUID); + if (!secret_table) + return; + + if (secret_table->size == 0 || secret_table->size >= SZ_4G) + return; + + /* Allocate space for the secret area and copy it */ + status = efi_bs_call(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA, + sizeof(*secret_area) + secret_table->size, (void **)&secret_area); + + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { + efi_err("Unable to allocate memory for confidential computing secret area copy\n"); + return; + } + + secret_area->size = secret_table->size; + memcpy(secret_area->area, (void *)(unsigned long)secret_table->base, secret_table->size); + + status = efi_bs_call(install_configuration_table, &linux_secret_area_guid, secret_area); + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + goto err_free; + + return; + +err_free: + efi_bs_call(free_pool, secret_area); +} diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c index 26e69788f27a..18b3acd15c85 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c @@ -205,6 +205,8 @@ efi_status_t __efiapi efi_pe_entry(efi_handle_t handle, efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(); + efi_copy_coco_secret_area(); + /* Ask the firmware to clear memory on unclean shutdown */ efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(); diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h index cde0a2ef507d..d604c6744cef 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h @@ -858,4 +858,6 @@ efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(void) { } void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(void); +void efi_copy_coco_secret_area(void); + #endif diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c index f14c4ff5839f..4ad85e1b6191 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c @@ -793,6 +793,8 @@ unsigned long efi_main(efi_handle_t handle, efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(); + efi_copy_coco_secret_area(); + setup_graphics(boot_params); setup_efi_pci(boot_params); diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index 6b5d36babfcc..9021dd521302 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -359,6 +359,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void); #define LINUX_EFI_MEMRESERVE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x888eb0c6, 0x8ede, 0x4ff5, 0xa8, 0xf0, 0x9a, 0xee, 0x5c, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xc2) #define LINUX_EFI_INITRD_MEDIA_GUID EFI_GUID(0x5568e427, 0x68fc, 0x4f3d, 0xac, 0x74, 0xca, 0x55, 0x52, 0x31, 0xcc, 0x68) #define LINUX_EFI_MOK_VARIABLE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xc451ed2b, 0x9694, 0x45d3, 0xba, 0xba, 0xed, 0x9f, 0x89, 0x88, 0xa3, 0x89) +#define LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID EFI_GUID(0x940ed1e9, 0xd3da, 0x408b, 0xb3, 0x07, 0xe3, 0x2d, 0x25, 0x4a, 0x65, 0x16) /* OEM GUIDs */ #define DELLEMC_EFI_RCI2_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x2d9f28a2, 0xa886, 0x456a, 0x97, 0xa8, 0xf1, 0x1e, 0xf2, 0x4f, 0xf4, 0x55) @@ -1282,4 +1283,9 @@ static inline struct efi_mokvar_table_entry *efi_mokvar_entry_find( } #endif +struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area { + u32 size; + u8 area[]; +}; + #endif /* _LINUX_EFI_H */ -- 2.25.1