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From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
	jarkko@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com
Cc: eric.snowberg@oracle.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, weiyongjun1@huawei.com,
	nayna@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com, ardb@kernel.org,
	nramas@linux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@redhat.com, jason@zx2c4.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, pjones@redhat.com,
	konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Subject: [PATCH v7 05/17] KEYS: CA link restriction
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2021 19:15:33 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211116001545.2639333-6-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211116001545.2639333-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>

Add a new link restriction.  Restrict the addition of keys in a keyring
based on the key to be added being a CA.

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
---
v1: Initial version
v2: Removed secondary keyring references
v3: Removed restrict_link_by_system_trusted_or_ca
    Simplify restrict_link_by_ca - only see if the key is a CA
    Did not add __init in front of restrict_link_by_ca in case
      restriction could be resued in the future
v6: Unmodified from v3
v7: Check for CA restruction in public key
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/crypto/public_key.h       |  5 ++++
 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
index 84cefe3b3585..a891c598a2aa 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
@@ -108,6 +108,49 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
+ * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ * @trust_keyring: Unused.
+ *
+ * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
+ * certificate as being ok to link.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if the
+ * certificate is not a CA. -ENOPKG if the signature uses unsupported
+ * crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate but
+ * the signature check cannot be performed.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
+			const struct key_type *type,
+			const union key_payload *payload,
+			struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+	const struct public_key_signature *sig;
+	const struct public_key *pkey;
+
+	if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	sig = payload->data[asym_auth];
+	if (!sig)
+		return -ENOPKG;
+
+	if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	pkey = payload->data[asym_crypto];
+	if (!pkey)
+		return -ENOPKG;
+
+	if (!pkey->key_is_ca)
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	return public_key_verify_signature(pkey, sig);
+}
+
 static bool match_either_id(const struct asymmetric_key_ids *pair,
 			    const struct asymmetric_key_id *single)
 {
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index 61c66be80995..1e4fff6b7820 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -72,6 +72,11 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain(struct key *trust_keyring,
 						 const union key_payload *payload,
 						 struct key *trusted);
 
+extern int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
+			       const struct key_type *type,
+			       const union key_payload *payload,
+			       struct key *trust_keyring);
+
 extern int query_asymmetric_key(const struct kernel_pkey_params *,
 				struct kernel_pkey_query *);
 
-- 
2.18.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-11-16  0:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-11-16  0:15 [PATCH v7 00/17] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 01/17] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine Eric Snowberg
2021-11-17 13:01   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 02/17] integrity: Do not allow machine keyring updates following init Eric Snowberg
2021-11-17 13:18   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 03/17] KEYS: Create static version of public_key_verify_signature Eric Snowberg
2021-11-17 13:32   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-17 13:53     ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 04/17] X.509: Parse Basic Constraints for CA Eric Snowberg
2021-11-18 22:59   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-18 23:29     ` Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16  0:15 ` Eric Snowberg [this message]
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 06/17] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE to restrict_link_by_ca Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 07/17] integrity: Fix warning about missing prototypes Eric Snowberg
2021-11-17 15:16   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 08/17] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys Eric Snowberg
2021-11-19  0:05   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 09/17] KEYS: Rename get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-11-19  0:05   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 10/17] KEYS: add a reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 11/17] KEYS: Introduce link restriction for machine keys Eric Snowberg
2021-11-19  0:20   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-19  2:50     ` Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 12/17] KEYS: integrity: change link restriction to trust the machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-11-19  0:23   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 13/17] KEYS: link secondary_trusted_keys to machine trusted keys Eric Snowberg
2021-11-18 12:32   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-11-18 21:37     ` Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 14/17] integrity: store reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 15/17] efi/mokvar: move up init order Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 16/17] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16  0:15 ` [PATCH v7 17/17] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true Eric Snowberg
2021-11-16 16:00 ` [PATCH v7 00/17] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-11-16 16:18   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2021-11-16 16:24     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-11-16 16:39       ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2021-11-17  7:50         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-11-17  7:51           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-11-17 17:02             ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2021-11-17 17:20               ` Eric Snowberg
2021-11-18  3:14                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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