From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@linux.ibm.com>,
Jim Cadden <jcadden@ibm.com>,
Daniele Buono <dbuono@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v6 2/5] efi/libstub: Reserve confidential computing secret area
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2021 11:42:48 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211129114251.3741721-3-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211129114251.3741721-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Some older firmware declare the confidential computing secret area as
EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA region. Fix this up by treating this memory
region as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE, as it should be.
If that memory region is already EFI_RESERVED_TYPE then this has no
effect on the E820 map.
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
---
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
index f14c4ff5839f..dabfa33ae2b3 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
const efi_system_table_t *efi_system_table;
extern u32 image_offset;
static efi_loaded_image_t *image = NULL;
+static u64 efi_coco_secret_phys_addr = U64_MAX;
static efi_status_t
preserve_pci_rom_image(efi_pci_io_protocol_t *pci, struct pci_setup_rom **__rom)
@@ -443,6 +444,21 @@ static void add_e820ext(struct boot_params *params,
params->hdr.setup_data = (unsigned long)e820ext;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET
+static void efi_set_coco_secret_phys_addr(void)
+{
+ struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area *secret_area =
+ get_efi_config_table(LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID);
+
+ if (!secret_area || secret_area->size == 0 || secret_area->size >= SZ_4G)
+ return;
+
+ efi_coco_secret_phys_addr = secret_area->base_pa;
+}
+#else
+static void efi_set_coco_secret_phys_addr(void) {}
+#endif
+
static efi_status_t
setup_e820(struct boot_params *params, struct setup_data *e820ext, u32 e820ext_size)
{
@@ -494,6 +510,16 @@ setup_e820(struct boot_params *params, struct setup_data *e820ext, u32 e820ext_s
e820_type = E820_TYPE_SOFT_RESERVED;
else
e820_type = E820_TYPE_RAM;
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET
+ if (d->phys_addr == efi_coco_secret_phys_addr)
+ /*
+ * Fix a quirk in firmwares which don't mark
+ * the EFI confidential computing area as
+ * EFI_RESERVED_TYPE, but instead as
+ * EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA.
+ */
+ e820_type = E820_TYPE_RESERVED;
+#endif
break;
case EFI_ACPI_MEMORY_NVS:
@@ -793,6 +819,8 @@ unsigned long efi_main(efi_handle_t handle,
efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog();
+ efi_set_coco_secret_phys_addr();
+
setup_graphics(boot_params);
setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-11-29 11:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-11-29 11:42 [PATCH v6 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area Dov Murik
2021-11-29 11:42 ` [PATCH v6 1/5] efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area Dov Murik
2021-11-29 11:42 ` Dov Murik [this message]
2021-11-29 11:42 ` [PATCH v6 3/5] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets Dov Murik
2021-12-06 7:58 ` kernel test robot
2021-11-29 11:42 ` [PATCH v6 4/5] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated Dov Murik
2021-11-29 11:42 ` [PATCH v6 5/5] docs: security: Add coco/efi_secret documentation Dov Murik
2021-12-15 11:33 ` [PATCH v6 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area Dov Murik
2022-01-03 18:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-04 7:02 ` Dov Murik
2022-01-04 18:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-05 11:43 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2022-01-05 19:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-05 20:07 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2022-01-07 11:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-07 19:16 ` Peter Gonda
2022-01-10 11:14 ` Dov Murik
2022-01-10 16:27 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
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