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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@eclypsium.com>,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	dvhart@infradead.org, andy@infradead.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, rafael@kernel.org,
	daniel.gutson@eclypsium.com, hughsient@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] x86: Export information about hardware memory encryption to sysfs
Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2021 14:42:18 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3efedc48-74eb-ee3f-451f-a96117719c4f@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210910213337.48017-2-martin.fernandez@eclypsium.com>

On 9/10/21 2:33 PM, Martin Fernandez wrote:
> +static void __init efi_set_mem_crypto(void)
> +{
> +	efi_memory_desc_t *md;
> +
> +	efi_mem_crypto = EFI_MEM_ENCRYPTION_CAPABLE;
> +
> +	for_each_efi_memory_desc(md) {
> +		switch (md->type) {
> +		/* System memory after ExitBootServices */
> +		case EFI_LOADER_CODE:
> +		case EFI_LOADER_DATA:
> +		case EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE:
> +		case EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA:
> +		case EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY:
> +		case EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY:
> +			if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO)) {
> +				efi_mem_crypto = EFI_MEM_ENCRYPTION_NOT_CAPABLE;
> +				return;
> +			}
> +		}
> +	}
> +}

If the ABI is per-NUMA-node, shouldn't this be determining and reporting
of each individual node is EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO instead of reporting a
system-wide value?

I understand that this was a lot easier to hack together than doing
that, but it could be extremely misleading to an end user.

Would it be possible that 'efi_mem_crypto' would need to be updated on a
memory hotplug event?

  reply	other threads:[~2021-09-10 21:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-09-10 21:33 [PATCH 0/1] [RFC] " Martin Fernandez
2021-09-10 21:33 ` [PATCH 1/1] " Martin Fernandez
2021-09-10 21:42   ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2021-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 0/1] [RFC] " Ard Biesheuvel

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