From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data
	in the clear
Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 13:54:39 -0500
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To: Borislav Petkov <bp-Gina5bIWoIWzQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>, Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani-ZPxbGqLxI0U@public.gmane.org>, =?UTF-8?B?UmFkaW0gS3LEjW3DocWZ?= <rkrcmar-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>, Matt Fleming <matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>, x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org, linux-mm-Bw31MaZKKs3YtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org, Alexander Potapenko <glider-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>, "H. Peter
	Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>, Larry Woodman <lwoodman-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>, linux-arch-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, Jonathan Corbet <corbet-T1hC0tSOHrs@public.gmane.org>, linux-doc-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, kasan-dev-/JYPxA39Uh5TLH3MbocFFw@public.gmane.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin-5HdwGun5lf+gSpxsJD1C4w@public.gmane.org>, Dave Young <dyoung-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>, Rik van Riel <riel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd-r2nGTMty4D4@public.gmane.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>, kexec-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org, linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, iommu-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org, "Michael S.
	Tsirkin" <mst>
List-Id: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org

On 5/15/2017 1:35 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 04:19:21PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> Boot data (such as EFI related data) is not encrypted when the system is
>> booted because UEFI/BIOS does not run with SME active. In order to access
>> this data properly it needs to be mapped decrypted.
>>
>> The early_memremap() support is updated to provide an arch specific
>
> "Update early_memremap() to provide... "

Will do.

>
>> routine to modify the pagetable protection attributes before they are
>> applied to the new mapping. This is used to remove the encryption mask
>> for boot related data.
>>
>> The memremap() support is updated to provide an arch specific routine
>
> Ditto. Passive tone always reads harder than an active tone,
> "doer"-sentence.

Ditto.

>
>> to determine if RAM remapping is allowed.  RAM remapping will cause an
>> encrypted mapping to be generated. By preventing RAM remapping,
>> ioremap_cache() will be used instead, which will provide a decrypted
>> mapping of the boot related data.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/include/asm/io.h |    4 +
>>  arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c     |  182 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>  include/linux/io.h        |    2
>>  kernel/memremap.c         |   20 ++++-
>>  mm/early_ioremap.c        |   18 ++++
>>  5 files changed, 219 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
>> index 7afb0e2..75f2858 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
>> @@ -381,4 +381,8 @@ extern int __must_check arch_phys_wc_add(unsigned long base,
>>  #define arch_io_reserve_memtype_wc arch_io_reserve_memtype_wc
>>  #endif
>>
>> +extern bool arch_memremap_do_ram_remap(resource_size_t offset, size_t size,
>> +				       unsigned long flags);
>> +#define arch_memremap_do_ram_remap arch_memremap_do_ram_remap
>> +
>>  #endif /* _ASM_X86_IO_H */
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>> index 9bfcb1f..bce0604 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
>> @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
>>  #include <linux/slab.h>
>>  #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
>>  #include <linux/mmiotrace.h>
>> +#include <linux/efi.h>
>>
>>  #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
>>  #include <asm/e820/api.h>
>> @@ -21,6 +22,7 @@
>>  #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
>>  #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
>>  #include <asm/pat.h>
>> +#include <asm/setup.h>
>>
>>  #include "physaddr.h"
>>
>> @@ -419,6 +421,186 @@ void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr)
>>  	iounmap((void __iomem *)((unsigned long)addr & PAGE_MASK));
>>  }
>>
>> +/*
>> + * Examine the physical address to determine if it is an area of memory
>> + * that should be mapped decrypted.  If the memory is not part of the
>> + * kernel usable area it was accessed and created decrypted, so these
>> + * areas should be mapped decrypted.
>> + */
>> +static bool memremap_should_map_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
>> +					  unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> +	/* Check if the address is outside kernel usable area */
>> +	switch (e820__get_entry_type(phys_addr, phys_addr + size - 1)) {
>> +	case E820_TYPE_RESERVED:
>> +	case E820_TYPE_ACPI:
>> +	case E820_TYPE_NVS:
>> +	case E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE:
>> +		return true;
>> +	default:
>> +		break;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	return false;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Examine the physical address to determine if it is EFI data. Check
>> + * it against the boot params structure and EFI tables and memory types.
>> + */
>> +static bool memremap_is_efi_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
>> +				 unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> +	u64 paddr;
>> +
>> +	/* Check if the address is part of EFI boot/runtime data */
>> +	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
>
> Save indentation level:
>
> 	if (!efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
> 		return false;
>

I was worried what the compiler might do when CONFIG_EFI is not set,
but it appears to take care of it. I'll double check though.

>
>> +		paddr = boot_params.efi_info.efi_memmap_hi;
>> +		paddr <<= 32;
>> +		paddr |= boot_params.efi_info.efi_memmap;
>> +		if (phys_addr == paddr)
>> +			return true;
>> +
>> +		paddr = boot_params.efi_info.efi_systab_hi;
>> +		paddr <<= 32;
>> +		paddr |= boot_params.efi_info.efi_systab;
>
> So those two above look like could be two global vars which are
> initialized somewhere in the EFI init path:
>
> efi_memmap_phys and efi_systab_phys or so.
>
> Matt ?
>
> And then you won't need to create that paddr each time on the fly. I
> mean, it's not a lot of instructions but still...
>
>> +		if (phys_addr == paddr)
>> +			return true;
>> +
>> +		if (efi_table_address_match(phys_addr))
>> +			return true;
>> +
>> +		switch (efi_mem_type(phys_addr)) {
>> +		case EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA:
>> +		case EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA:
>> +			return true;
>> +		default:
>> +			break;
>> +		}
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	return false;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Examine the physical address to determine if it is boot data by checking
>> + * it against the boot params setup_data chain.
>> + */
>> +static bool memremap_is_setup_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
>> +				   unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> +	struct setup_data *data;
>> +	u64 paddr, paddr_next;
>> +
>> +	paddr = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
>> +	while (paddr) {
>> +		bool is_setup_data = false;
>
> You don't need that bool:
>
> static bool memremap_is_setup_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
>                                    unsigned long size)
> {
>         struct setup_data *data;
>         u64 paddr, paddr_next;
>
>         paddr = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
>         while (paddr) {
>                 if (phys_addr == paddr)
>                         return true;
>
>                 data = memremap(paddr, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB | MEMREMAP_DEC);
>
>                 paddr_next = data->next;
>
>                 if ((phys_addr > paddr) && (phys_addr < (paddr + data->len))) {
>                         memunmap(data);
>                         return true;
>                 }
>
>                 memunmap(data);
>
>                 paddr = paddr_next;
>         }
>         return false;
> }
>
> Flow is a bit clearer.

I may introduce a length variable to capture data->len right after
paddr_next is set and then have just a single memunmap() call before
the if check.

>
>> +/*
>> + * Examine the physical address to determine if it is boot data by checking
>> + * it against the boot params setup_data chain (early boot version).
>> + */
>> +static bool __init early_memremap_is_setup_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
>> +						unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> +	struct setup_data *data;
>> +	u64 paddr, paddr_next;
>> +
>> +	paddr = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
>> +	while (paddr) {
>> +		bool is_setup_data = false;
>> +
>> +		if (phys_addr == paddr)
>> +			return true;
>> +
>> +		data = early_memremap_decrypted(paddr, sizeof(*data));
>> +
>> +		paddr_next = data->next;
>> +
>> +		if ((phys_addr > paddr) && (phys_addr < (paddr + data->len)))
>> +			is_setup_data = true;
>> +
>> +		early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data));
>> +
>> +		if (is_setup_data)
>> +			return true;
>> +
>> +		paddr = paddr_next;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	return false;
>> +}
>
> This one is begging to be unified with memremap_is_setup_data() to both
> call a __ worker function.

I tried that, but calling an "__init" function (early_memremap()) from
a non "__init" function generated warnings. I suppose I can pass in a
function for the map and unmap but that looks worse to me (also the
unmap functions take different arguments).

>
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Architecture function to determine if RAM remap is allowed. By default, a
>> + * RAM remap will map the data as encrypted. Determine if a RAM remap should
>> + * not be done so that the data will be mapped decrypted.
>> + */
>> +bool arch_memremap_do_ram_remap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
>> +				unsigned long flags)
>
> So this function doesn't do anything - it replies to a yes/no question.
> So the name should not say "do" but sound like a question. Maybe:
>
> 	if (arch_memremap_can_remap( ... ))
>
> or so...

Ok, I'll change that.

>
>> +{
>> +	if (!sme_active())
>> +		return true;
>> +
>> +	if (flags & MEMREMAP_ENC)
>> +		return true;
>> +
>> +	if (flags & MEMREMAP_DEC)
>> +		return false;
>
> So this looks strange to me: both flags MEMREMAP_ENC and _DEC override
> setup and efi data checking. But we want to remap setup and EFI  data
> *always* decrypted because that data was not encrypted as, as you say,
> firmware doesn't run with SME active.
>
> So my simple logic says that EFI stuff should *always* be mapped DEC,
> regardless of flags. Ditto for setup data. So that check below should
> actually *override* the flags checks and go before them, no?

This is like the chicken and the egg scenario. In order to determine if
an address is setup data I have to explicitly map the setup data chain
as decrypted. In order to do that I have to supply a flag to explicitly
map the data decrypted otherwise I wind up back in the
memremap_is_setup_data() function again and again and again...

>
>> +
>> +	if (memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) ||
>> +	    memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size) ||
>> +	    memremap_should_map_decrypted(phys_addr, size))
>> +		return false;
>> +
>> +	return true;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Architecture override of __weak function to adjust the protection attributes
>> + * used when remapping memory. By default, early_memremp() will map the data
>
> early_memremAp() - a is missing.

Got it.

Thanks,
Tom

>