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From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
To: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
	linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>,
	Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@nebula.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>,
	George Wilson <gcwilson@linux.ibm.com>,
	Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@us.ibm.com>,
	Eric Ricther <erichte@linux.ibm.com>,
	Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>,
	Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 2/8] powerpc: add support to initialize ima policy rules
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2019 22:29:17 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <871rveuu0i.fsf@mpe.ellerman.id.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1570497267-13672-3-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com>

Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> writes:
> PowerNV systems uses kernel based bootloader, thus its secure boot
> implementation uses kernel IMA security subsystem to verify the kernel
> before kexec. Since the verification policy might differ based on the
> secure boot mode of the system, the policies are defined at runtime.
>
> This patch implements the arch-specific support to define the IMA policy
> rules based on the runtime secure boot mode of the system.
>
> This patch provides arch-specific IMA policies if PPC_SECURE_BOOT
> config is enabled.
...
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..c22d82965eb4
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
> + * Author: Nayna Jain
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/ima.h>
> +#include <asm/secure_boot.h>
> +
> +bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
> +{
> +	return is_powerpc_os_secureboot_enabled();
> +}
> +
> +/* Defines IMA appraise rules for secureboot */
> +static const char *const arch_rules[] = {
> +	"appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
> +#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE)
> +	"appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
> +#endif

This confuses me.

If I spell it out we get:

#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE)
	// nothing
#else
	"appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
#endif

Which is just:

#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
	// nothing
#else
	"appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
#endif

But CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled says that we *do* require modules to
have a valid signature. Isn't that the inverse of what the rules say?

Presumably I'm misunderstanding something :)

cheers

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-10-15 11:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-10-08  1:14 [PATCH v7 0/8] powerpc: Enabling IMA arch specific secure boot policies Nayna Jain
2019-10-08  1:14 ` [PATCH v7 1/8] powerpc: detect the secure boot mode of the system Nayna Jain
2019-10-15 11:30   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-08  1:14 ` [PATCH v7 2/8] powerpc: add support to initialize ima policy rules Nayna Jain
2019-10-11 13:12   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-15  9:59     ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-15 11:29   ` Michael Ellerman [this message]
2019-10-17 12:58     ` Nayna
2019-10-08  1:14 ` [PATCH v7 3/8] powerpc: detect the trusted boot state of the system Nayna Jain
2019-10-15 10:23   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-08  1:14 ` [PATCH v7 4/8] powerpc/ima: add measurement rules to ima arch specific policy Nayna Jain
2019-10-15 11:29   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-19 18:27     ` Nayna
2019-10-08  1:14 ` [PATCH v7 5/8] ima: make process_buffer_measurement() generic Nayna Jain
2019-10-11 13:14   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-08  1:14 ` [PATCH v7 6/8] certs: add wrapper function to check blacklisted binary hash Nayna Jain
2019-10-11 13:18   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-08  1:14 ` [PATCH v7 7/8] ima: check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig Nayna Jain
2019-10-11 13:19   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-10-19 18:30     ` Nayna
2019-10-08  1:14 ` [PATCH v7 8/8] powerpc/ima: update ima arch policy to check for blacklist Nayna Jain
2019-10-11 13:19   ` Mimi Zohar

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