From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
To: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>,
Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@nebula.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>,
George Wilson <gcwilson@linux.ibm.com>,
Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@us.ibm.com>,
Eric Ricther <erichte@linux.ibm.com>,
Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>,
Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/4] x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file
Date: Mon, 02 Sep 2019 21:55:36 +1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87pnkisyiv.fsf@mpe.ellerman.id.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1566825818-9731-4-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> writes:
> The handlers to add the keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted
> hashes to the .blacklist keyring is common for both the uefi and powerpc
> mechanisms of loading the keys/hashes from the firmware.
>
> This patch moves the common code from load_uefi.c to keyring_handler.c
>
> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> security/integrity/Makefile | 3 +-
> .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++
> .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 32 ++++++++
> security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 67 +---------------
> 4 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
> create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
This has no acks from security folks, though I'm not really clear on who
maintains those files.
Do I take it because it's mostly just code movement people are OK with
it going in via the powerpc tree?
cheers
> diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile
> index 19faace69644..525bf1d6e0db 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/Makefile
> +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile
> @@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o
> integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o
> integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) += platform_certs/platform_keyring.o
> integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \
> - platform_certs/load_uefi.o
> + platform_certs/load_uefi.o \
> + platform_certs/keyring_handler.o
> integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o
> $(obj)/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..c5ba695c10e3
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/sched.h>
> +#include <linux/cred.h>
> +#include <linux/err.h>
> +#include <linux/efi.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
> +#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
> +#include "../integrity.h"
> +
> +static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
> +static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid __initdata =
> + EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;
> +static efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
> +
> +/*
> + * Blacklist a hash.
> + */
> +static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data,
> + size_t len, const char *type,
> + size_t type_len)
> +{
> + char *hash, *p;
> +
> + hash = kmalloc(type_len + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!hash)
> + return;
> + p = memcpy(hash, type, type_len);
> + p += type_len;
> + bin2hex(p, data, len);
> + p += len * 2;
> + *p = 0;
> +
> + mark_hash_blacklisted(hash);
> + kfree(hash);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash.
> + */
> +static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,
> + const void *data, size_t len)
> +{
> + uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "tbs:", 4);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Blacklist the hash of an executable.
> + */
> +static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source,
> + const void *data, size_t len)
> +{
> + uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "bin:", 4);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
> + * the UEFI db and MokListRT tables.
> + */
> +__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
> +{
> + if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
> + return add_to_platform_keyring;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
> + * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
> + */
> +__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
> +{
> + if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid) == 0)
> + return uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs;
> + if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_sha256_guid) == 0)
> + return uefi_blacklist_binary;
> + return 0;
> +}
> diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..2462bfa08fe3
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +
> +#ifndef PLATFORM_CERTS_INTERNAL_H
> +#define PLATFORM_CERTS_INTERNAL_H
> +
> +#include <linux/efi.h>
> +
> +void blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data,
> + size_t len, const char *type,
> + size_t type_len);
> +
> +/*
> + * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash.
> + */
> +void blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
> +
> +/*
> + * Blacklist the hash of an executable.
> + */
> +void blacklist_binary(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
> +
> +/*
> + * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the db.
> + */
> +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
> +
> +/*
> + * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx.
> + */
> +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
> +
> +#endif
> diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
> index 81b19c52832b..4369204a19cd 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
> #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
> #include <keys/system_keyring.h>
> #include "../integrity.h"
> +#include "keyring_handler.h"
>
> static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
> static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid __initdata =
> @@ -67,72 +68,6 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
> return db;
> }
>
> -/*
> - * Blacklist a hash.
> - */
> -static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data,
> - size_t len, const char *type,
> - size_t type_len)
> -{
> - char *hash, *p;
> -
> - hash = kmalloc(type_len + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!hash)
> - return;
> - p = memcpy(hash, type, type_len);
> - p += type_len;
> - bin2hex(p, data, len);
> - p += len * 2;
> - *p = 0;
> -
> - mark_hash_blacklisted(hash);
> - kfree(hash);
> -}
> -
> -/*
> - * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash.
> - */
> -static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,
> - const void *data, size_t len)
> -{
> - uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "tbs:", 4);
> -}
> -
> -/*
> - * Blacklist the hash of an executable.
> - */
> -static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source,
> - const void *data, size_t len)
> -{
> - uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "bin:", 4);
> -}
> -
> -/*
> - * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
> - * the UEFI db and MokListRT tables.
> - */
> -static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *
> - sig_type)
> -{
> - if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0)
> - return add_to_platform_keyring;
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -/*
> - * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
> - * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
> - */
> -static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *
> - sig_type)
> -{
> - if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid) == 0)
> - return uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs;
> - if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_sha256_guid) == 0)
> - return uefi_blacklist_binary;
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> /*
> * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases into the platform trusted
> * keyring and the UEFI blacklisted X.509 cert SHA256 hashes into the blacklist
> --
> 2.20.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-09-02 11:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-08-26 13:23 [PATCH v3 0/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to the kernel and userspace Nayna Jain
2019-08-26 13:23 ` [PATCH v3 1/4] powerpc/powernv: Add OPAL API interface to access secure variable Nayna Jain
2019-08-26 13:23 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs Nayna Jain
2019-08-26 14:01 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-08-26 14:12 ` Nayna
2019-08-26 15:01 ` [PATCH] sysfs: add BIN_ATTR_WO() macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-09-03 3:37 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-09-04 11:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-01 18:08 ` Nayna
2019-10-01 18:16 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-01 18:55 ` Nayna
2019-08-26 14:56 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-08-26 15:46 ` Nayna
2019-08-26 15:57 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-08-26 13:23 ` [PATCH v3 3/4] x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file Nayna Jain
2019-09-02 11:55 ` Michael Ellerman [this message]
2019-09-03 22:51 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-09-05 3:59 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-08-26 13:23 ` [PATCH v3 4/4] powerpc: load firmware trusted keys/hashes into kernel keyring Nayna Jain
2019-09-03 22:54 ` Mimi Zohar
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