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 messages from 2019-10-20 00:17:51 to 2019-11-06 19:12:03 UTC [more...]

[PATCH v3 0/9] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
 2019-11-06 19:11 UTC  (21+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 1/9] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
` [PATCH v3 2/9] kcsan: Add Documentation entry in dev-tools
` [PATCH v3 3/9] objtool, kcsan: Add KCSAN runtime functions to whitelist
` [PATCH v3 4/9] build, kcsan: Add KCSAN build exceptions
` [PATCH v3 5/9] seqlock, kcsan: Add annotations for KCSAN
` [PATCH v3 6/9] seqlock: Require WRITE_ONCE surrounding raw_seqcount_barrier
` [PATCH v3 7/9] asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation for bitops
` [PATCH v3 8/9] locking/atomics, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation
` [PATCH v3 9/9] x86, kcsan: Enable KCSAN for x86

[PATCH v5 0/3] x86/boot: Introduce the kernel_info et consortes
 2019-11-06 17:56 UTC  (7+ messages)
` [PATCH v5 1/3] x86/boot: Introduce the kernel_info
` [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/boot: Introduce the kernel_info.setup_type_max
` [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/boot: Introduce the setup_indirect

[PATCH] efi: Return EFI_RESERVED_TYPE in efi_mem_type() for absent addresses
 2019-11-06 17:01 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH] EFI/stub: tpm: enable tpm eventlog function for ARM64 platform
 2019-11-06 14:59 UTC  (3+ messages)

[PATCH 0/2] x86, efi/random: invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL in the x86 EFI stub
 2019-11-06 14:38 UTC  (4+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/2] efi/random: use arch-independent efi_call_proto()
` [PATCH 2/2] x86: efi/random: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table

[PATCH v6 0/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to the kernel and userspace
 2019-11-06  3:22 UTC  (7+ messages)
` [PATCH v6 1/4] powerpc/powernv: Add OPAL API interface to access secure variable
` [PATCH v6 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs
` [PATCH v6 3/4] x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file
` [PATCH v6 4/4] powerpc: load firmware trusted keys/hashes into kernel keyring

[PATCH v10 0/9] powerpc: Enabling IMA arch specific secure boot policies
 2019-11-05 23:02 UTC  (15+ messages)
` [PATCH v10 1/9] powerpc: detect the secure boot mode of the system
  ` [PATCH v10a "
` [PATCH v10 2/9] powerpc/ima: add support to initialize ima policy rules
` [PATCH v10 3/9] powerpc: detect the trusted boot state of the system
  ` [PATCH v10a "
` [PATCH v10 4/9] powerpc/ima: define trusted boot policy
` [PATCH v10 5/9] ima: make process_buffer_measurement() generic
` [PATCH v10 6/9] certs: add wrapper function to check blacklisted binary hash
` [PATCH v10 7/9] ima: check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig
` [PATCH v10 8/9] powerpc/ima: update ima arch policy to check for blacklist
` [RFC PATCH v10 9/9] powerpc/ima: indicate kernel modules appended signatures are enforced

[PATCH 4.4 15/46] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCIe class code
 2019-11-04 21:44 UTC  (2+ messages)
` [PATCH 4.4 16/46] efi/x86: Do not clean dummy variable in kexec path

[PATCH 4.9 21/62] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCIe class code
 2019-11-04 21:44 UTC  (2+ messages)
` [PATCH 4.9 22/62] efi/x86: Do not clean dummy variable in kexec path

[PATCH 4.14 41/95] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCIe class code
 2019-11-04 21:44 UTC  (2+ messages)
` [PATCH 4.14 42/95] efi/x86: Do not clean dummy variable in kexec path

[PATCH 4.19 081/149] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCIe class code
 2019-11-04 21:44 UTC  (2+ messages)
` [PATCH 4.19 082/149] efi/x86: Do not clean dummy variable in kexec path

[PATCH 5.3 051/163] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCIe class code
 2019-11-04 21:44 UTC  (2+ messages)
` [PATCH 5.3 052/163] efi/x86: Do not clean dummy variable in kexec path

[PATCH v4 0/3] x86/boot: Introduce the kernel_info et consortes
 2019-11-04 15:16 UTC  (6+ messages)
` [PATCH v4 1/3] x86/boot: Introduce the kernel_info
` [PATCH v4 2/3] x86/boot: Introduce the kernel_info.setup_type_max
` [PATCH v4 3/3] x86/boot: Introduce the setup_indirect

x86/boot: add ramoops.mem_size=1048576 boot parameter cause can't boot
 2019-11-02  5:41 UTC  (3+ messages)

[GIT PULL] EFI fixes
 2019-11-01 19:10 UTC  (2+ messages)

[RFC PATCH] arch/x86: efistub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table
 2019-10-31 15:30 UTC  (10+ messages)
` efistub: EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL on Dell Inc. Latitude 7390

[GIT PULL v2 0/6] EFI fixes for v5.4
 2019-10-31 13:47 UTC  (17+ messages)
` [PATCH v2 1/6] efi: Make CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE selectable on x86 only
  ` [tip: efi/urgent] "
` [PATCH v2 2/6] efi/tpm: return -EINVAL when determining tpm final events log size fails
  ` [tip: efi/urgent] efi/tpm: Return "
` [PATCH v2 3/6] efi/random: treat EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL output as bootloader randomness
  ` [tip: efi/urgent] efi/random: Treat "
` [PATCH v2 4/6] efi: libstub/arm: account for firmware reserved memory at the base of RAM
  ` [tip: efi/urgent] efi: libstub/arm: Account "
` [PATCH v2 5/6] x86, efi: never relocate kernel below lowest acceptable address
  ` [tip: efi/urgent] x86, efi: Never "
` [PATCH v2 6/6] efi/efi_test: lock down /dev/efi_test and require CAP_SYS_ADMIN
  ` [tip: efi/urgent] efi/efi_test: Lock "

[PATCH v9 0/8] powerpc: Enabling IMA arch specific secure boot policies
 2019-10-30 16:35 UTC  (29+ messages)
` [PATCH v9 1/8] powerpc: detect the secure boot mode of the system
` [PATCH v9 2/8] powerpc/ima: add support to initialize ima policy rules
` [PATCH v9 3/8] powerpc: detect the trusted boot state of the system
` [PATCH v9 4/8] powerpc/ima: define trusted boot policy
` [PATCH v9 5/8] ima: make process_buffer_measurement() generic
` [PATCH v9 6/8] certs: add wrapper function to check blacklisted binary hash
` [PATCH v9 7/8] ima: check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig
` [PATCH v9 8/8] powerpc/ima: update ima arch policy to check for blacklist

[ARK INTERNAL PATCHv2 2/5] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode
 2019-10-30 14:17 UTC 

[PATCH v7 00/12] EFI Specific Purpose Memory Support
 2019-10-29  3:06 UTC  (7+ messages)
` [PATCH v7 01/12] acpi/numa: Establish a new drivers/acpi/numa/ directory

[PATCH v5 4/4] powerpc: load firmware trusted keys/hashes into kernel keyring
 2019-10-25 16:02 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH v5 0/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to the kernel and userspace
 2019-10-25 15:58 UTC  (6+ messages)
` [PATCH v5 1/4] powerpc/powernv: Add OPAL API interface to access secure variable
` [PATCH v5 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs
` [PATCH v5 3/4] x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file

[PATCH] Cleanup: replace prefered with preferred
 2019-10-24 18:47 UTC  (6+ messages)

[PATCH v2 0/8] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
 2019-10-24 17:09 UTC  (33+ messages)
` [PATCH v2 1/8] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
` [PATCH v2 2/8] objtool, kcsan: Add KCSAN runtime functions to whitelist
` [PATCH v2 4/8] seqlock, kcsan: Add annotations for KCSAN
` [PATCH v2 7/8] locking/atomics, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation
` [PATCH v2 8/8] x86, kcsan: Enable KCSAN for x86

[PATCH v3 0/3] x86/boot: Introduce the kernel_info et consortes
 2019-10-23 20:44 UTC  (3+ messages)

[GIT PULL 0/5] EFI fixes for v5.4
 2019-10-23 17:32 UTC  (6+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/5] efi: Make CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE selectable on x86 only
` [PATCH 2/5] efi/tpm: return -EINVAL when determining tpm final events log size fails
` [PATCH 3/5] efi/random: treat EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL output as bootloader randomness
` [PATCH 4/5] efi: libstub/arm: account for firmware reserved memory at the base of RAM
` [PATCH 5/5] x86, efi: never relocate kernel below lowest acceptable address

[PATCH v4] x86, efi: never relocate kernel below lowest acceptable address
 2019-10-23  6:37 UTC  (5+ messages)

[PATCH v8 0/8] powerpc: Enabling IMA arch specific secure boot policies
 2019-10-22 23:38 UTC  (14+ messages)
` [PATCH v8 1/8] powerpc: detect the secure boot mode of the system
` [PATCH v8 3/8] powerpc: detect the trusted boot state "
` [PATCH v8 4/8] powerpc/ima: add measurement rules to ima arch specific policy
` [PATCH v8 5/8] ima: make process_buffer_measurement() generic
` [PATCH v8 7/8] ima: check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig


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