From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@eclypsium.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
kunit-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
ardb@kernel.org, dvhart@infradead.org, andy@infradead.org,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, rafael@kernel.org, rppt@kernel.org,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, daniel.gutson@eclypsium.com,
hughsient@gmail.com, alex.bazhaniuk@eclypsium.com,
alison.schofield@intel.com, keescook@chromium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 0/9] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2022 10:57:32 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y1pH/DuYJeo7Kyo5@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKgze5ajp-z0+F+8Qo2z=834=i=HNa5=s54MLyrk16wQVnxCzQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, Oct 13, 2022 at 06:00:58PM -0300, Martin Fernandez wrote:
> That's bad, because it would be nice if that attribute only depended
> on the hardware and not on some setting.
Why would that be bad?
You want to be able to disable encryption for whatever reason sometimes.
> The plan of this patch was, as you mentioned just to report
> EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO in a per node level.
>
> Now, I think I will need to check for tme/sme and only if those are
> active then show the file in sysfs, otherwise not show it at all,
> because it would be misleading. Any other idea?
Well, I still think this is not going to work in all cases. SME/TME can
be enabled but the kernel can go - and for whatever reason - map a bunch
of memory unencrypted.
So I don't know what the goal of this fwupd checking whether users have
configured memory encryption properly is. It might end up giving that
false sense of security...
> You mean that EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO means nothing on an AMD system?
I mean, you still can disable memory encryption.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-27 8:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-07-04 13:58 [PATCH v9 0/9] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption Martin Fernandez
2022-07-04 13:58 ` [PATCH v9 1/9] mm/memblock: Tag memblocks with crypto capabilities Martin Fernandez
2022-07-04 13:58 ` [PATCH v9 2/9] mm/mmzone: Tag pg_data_t " Martin Fernandez
2022-10-07 15:53 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-11 13:28 ` Martin Fernandez
2022-10-11 15:27 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-07-04 13:58 ` [PATCH v9 3/9] x86/e820: Add infrastructure to refactor e820__range_{update,remove} Martin Fernandez
2022-07-04 13:58 ` [PATCH v9 4/9] x86/e820: Refactor __e820__range_update Martin Fernandez
2022-07-04 13:58 ` [PATCH v9 5/9] x86/e820: Refactor e820__range_remove Martin Fernandez
2022-07-04 13:58 ` [PATCH v9 6/9] x86/e820: Tag e820_entry with crypto capabilities Martin Fernandez
2022-07-04 13:58 ` [PATCH v9 7/9] x86/e820: Add unit tests for e820_range_* functions Martin Fernandez
2022-07-05 2:04 ` David Gow
2022-07-05 17:24 ` Martin Fernandez
2022-07-04 13:58 ` [PATCH v9 8/9] x86/efi: Mark e820_entries as crypto capable from EFI memmap Martin Fernandez
2022-07-04 13:58 ` [PATCH v9 9/9] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities Martin Fernandez
2022-07-04 14:34 ` Greg KH
2022-07-05 17:35 ` Martin Fernandez
2022-07-06 6:38 ` Greg KH
2022-10-13 19:48 ` [PATCH v9 0/9] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption Borislav Petkov
2022-10-13 21:00 ` Martin Fernandez
2022-10-27 8:57 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2022-10-27 15:21 ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-27 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-10-14 0:24 ` Dave Hansen
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=Y1pH/DuYJeo7Kyo5@zn.tnic \
--to=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=alex.bazhaniuk@eclypsium.com \
--cc=alison.schofield@intel.com \
--cc=andy@infradead.org \
--cc=ardb@kernel.org \
--cc=daniel.gutson@eclypsium.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=dvhart@infradead.org \
--cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=hughsient@gmail.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kunit-dev@googlegroups.com \
--cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=martin.fernandez@eclypsium.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=rafael@kernel.org \
--cc=rppt@kernel.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).