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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@eclypsium.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	ardb@kernel.org, dvhart@infradead.org, andy@infradead.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, rafael@kernel.org, rppt@kernel.org,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, daniel.gutson@eclypsium.com,
	hughsient@gmail.com, alex.bazhaniuk@eclypsium.com,
	alison.schofield@intel.com, keescook@chromium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
Date: Fri, 6 May 2022 14:44:28 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YnUYLDjIThbIz/Uf@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKgze5YDD02AsrF0yESv2sptZ4qxyTMgCDmnOKcbQWjKQsJRsw@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, May 04, 2022 at 02:18:30PM -0300, Martin Fernandez wrote:
> The use case is to know if a user is using hardware encryption or
> not. This new sysfs file plus knowing if tme/sev is active you can be
> pretty sure about that.

Then please explain it in detail and in the text so that it is clear. As
it is now, the reader is left wondering what that file is supposed to
state.

> Dave Hansen pointed those out in a previuos patch serie, here is the
> quote:
> 
> > CXL devices will have normal RAM on them, be exposed as "System RAM" and
> > they won't have encryption capabilities.  I think these devices were
> > probably the main motivation for EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO.

So this would mean that if a system doesn't have CXL devices and has
TME/SME/SEV-* enabled, then it is running with encrypted memory.

Which would then also mean, you don't need any of that code - you only
need to enumerate CXL devices which, it seems, do not support memory
encryption, and then state that memory encryption is enabled on the
whole system, except for the memory of those devices.

I.e.,

$ dmesg | grep -i SME
[    1.783650] AMD Memory Encryption Features active: SME

Done - memory is encrypted on the whole system.

We could export it into /proc/cpuinfo so that you don't have to grep
dmesg and problem solved.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

  reply	other threads:[~2022-05-06 12:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-29 20:17 [PATCH v8 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption Martin Fernandez
2022-04-29 20:17 ` [PATCH v8 1/8] mm/memblock: Tag memblocks with crypto capabilities Martin Fernandez
2022-04-29 20:17 ` [PATCH v8 2/8] mm/mmzone: Tag pg_data_t " Martin Fernandez
2022-04-29 20:17 ` [PATCH v8 3/8] x86/e820: Add infrastructure to refactor e820__range_{update,remove} Martin Fernandez
2022-04-29 20:17 ` [PATCH v8 4/8] x86/e820: Refactor __e820__range_update Martin Fernandez
2022-04-29 20:17 ` [PATCH v8 5/8] x86/e820: Refactor e820__range_remove Martin Fernandez
2022-04-29 20:17 ` [PATCH v8 6/8] x86/e820: Tag e820_entry with crypto capabilities Martin Fernandez
2022-04-29 20:17 ` [PATCH v8 7/8] x86/efi: Mark e820_entries as crypto capable from EFI memmap Martin Fernandez
2022-04-29 20:17 ` [PATCH v8 8/8] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities Martin Fernandez
2022-05-04 16:38 ` [PATCH v8 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption Borislav Petkov
2022-05-04 17:18   ` Martin Fernandez
2022-05-06 12:44     ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2022-05-06 14:18       ` Limonciello, Mario
2022-05-06 15:32       ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-06 16:00         ` Dan Williams
2022-05-06 17:55           ` Boris Petkov
2022-05-06 18:14             ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-06 18:25               ` Boris Petkov
2022-05-06 18:43                 ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-06 19:02                   ` Boris Petkov
2022-05-09 18:47                     ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-09 22:17                       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-05-09 22:56                         ` Dave Hansen
2022-05-16  8:39                     ` Richard Hughes
2022-05-18  7:52                       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-05-18 18:28                         ` Dan Williams
2022-05-18 20:23                           ` Borislav Petkov

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