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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
	linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>,
	Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>,
	linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>,
	kernel-team@android.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/8] fscrypt: Change format of no-key token
Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2019 16:09:54 -0800
Message-ID: <20191204000954.GD727@sol.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191203051049.44573-4-drosen@google.com>

On Mon, Dec 02, 2019 at 09:10:44PM -0800, Daniel Rosenberg wrote:
> Encrypted and casefolded names always require a dirtree hash, since
> their hash values cannot be generated without the key.

I feel like there should be another paragraph here that explains more clearly
(including for people who may not as familiar with fscrypt) what is meant by a
"no-key token", why they need to be changed, and why they are being changed even
for non-casefolded directories.

> 
> In the new format, we always base64 encode the same structure. For names
> that are less than 149 characters, we concatenate the provided hash and
> ciphertext. If the name is longer than 149 characters, we also include
> the sha256 of the remaining parts of the name. We then base64 encode the
> resulting data to get a representation of the name that is at most 252
> characters long, with a very low collision rate. We avoid needing to
> compute the sha256 apart from in the case of a very long filename, and
> then only need to compute the sha256 of possible matches if their
> ciphertext is also longer than 149.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
> ---
>  fs/crypto/Kconfig       |   1 +
>  fs/crypto/fname.c       | 182 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
>  include/linux/fscrypt.h |  92 ++++++--------------
>  3 files changed, 160 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/crypto/Kconfig b/fs/crypto/Kconfig
> index ff5a1746cbae..6e0d56f0b993 100644
> --- a/fs/crypto/Kconfig
> +++ b/fs/crypto/Kconfig
> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ config FS_ENCRYPTION
>  	select CRYPTO_CTS
>  	select CRYPTO_SHA512
>  	select CRYPTO_HMAC
> +	select CRYPTO_SHA256
>  	select KEYS
>  	help
>  	  Enable encryption of files and directories.  This
> diff --git a/fs/crypto/fname.c b/fs/crypto/fname.c
> index b33f03b9f892..03c837c461f2 100644
> --- a/fs/crypto/fname.c
> +++ b/fs/crypto/fname.c
> @@ -14,8 +14,46 @@
>  #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
>  #include <linux/siphash.h>
>  #include <crypto/skcipher.h>
> +#include <crypto/hash.h>
>  #include "fscrypt_private.h"
>  
> +static struct crypto_shash *sha256_hash_tfm;
> +
> +static int fscrypt_do_sha256(unsigned char *result,
> +	     const u8 *data, unsigned int data_len)
> +{
> +	struct crypto_shash *tfm = READ_ONCE(sha256_hash_tfm);
> +
> +	if (unlikely(!tfm)) {
> +		struct crypto_shash *prev_tfm;
> +
> +		tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
> +		if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
> +			if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
> +				fscrypt_warn(NULL,
> +					     "Missing crypto API support for SHA-256");
> +				return -ENOPKG;
> +			}

No need to check for -ENOENT specifically here, since this patch makes
CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION select CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256, so sha256 will always be
available.  Just handle -ENOENT like any other error.

> +			fscrypt_err(NULL,
> +				    "Error allocating SHA-256 transform: %ld",
> +				    PTR_ERR(tfm));
> +			return PTR_ERR(tfm);
> +		}
> +		prev_tfm = cmpxchg(&sha256_hash_tfm, NULL, tfm);
> +		if (prev_tfm) {
> +			crypto_free_shash(tfm);
> +			tfm = prev_tfm;
> +		}
> +	}
> +	{
> +		SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
> +
> +		desc->tfm = tfm;
> +
> +		return crypto_shash_digest(desc, data, data_len, result);
> +	}
> +}
> +
>  static inline bool fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(const struct qstr *str)
>  {
>  	if (str->len == 1 && str->name[0] == '.')
> @@ -208,8 +246,7 @@ int fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(const struct inode *inode,
>  			       struct fscrypt_str *crypto_str)
>  {
>  	const u32 max_encoded_len =
> -		max_t(u32, BASE64_CHARS(FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE),
> -		      1 + BASE64_CHARS(sizeof(struct fscrypt_digested_name)));
> +		      BASE64_CHARS(sizeof(struct fscrypt_nokey_name));
>  	u32 max_presented_len;
>  
>  	max_presented_len = max(max_encoded_len, max_encrypted_len);
> @@ -243,8 +280,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_fname_free_buffer);
>   * The caller must have allocated sufficient memory for the @oname string.
>   *
>   * If the key is available, we'll decrypt the disk name; otherwise, we'll encode
> - * it for presentation.  Short names are directly base64-encoded, while long
> - * names are encoded in fscrypt_digested_name format.
> + * it for presentation.  The usr name is the base64 encoding of the dirtree hash
> + * value, the first 149 characters of the name, and the sha256 of the rest of
> + * the name, if longer than 149 characters.

Maybe write just "If the key is available, we'll decrypt the disk name;
otherwise, we'll encode it for presentation in fscrypt_nokey_name format.
See struct fscrypt_nokey_name for details."

... since this comment doesn't really need to go into the details that are
already covered in the long comment above struct fscrypt_nokey_name.

>   *
>   * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
>   */
> @@ -254,7 +292,9 @@ int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(struct inode *inode,
>  			struct fscrypt_str *oname)
>  {
>  	const struct qstr qname = FSTR_TO_QSTR(iname);
> -	struct fscrypt_digested_name digested_name;
> +	struct fscrypt_nokey_name nokey_name;
> +	u32 size;
> +	int err = 0;
>  
>  	if (fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(&qname)) {
>  		oname->name[0] = '.';
> @@ -269,25 +309,29 @@ int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(struct inode *inode,
>  	if (fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode))
>  		return fname_decrypt(inode, iname, oname);
>  
> -	if (iname->len <= FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE) {
> -		oname->len = base64_encode(iname->name, iname->len,
> -					   oname->name);
> -		return 0;
> -	}
> +	size = min_t(u32, iname->len, FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE);
> +		memcpy(nokey_name.bytes, iname->name, size);
> +
>  	if (hash) {
> -		digested_name.hash = hash;
> -		digested_name.minor_hash = minor_hash;
> +		nokey_name.dirtree_hash[0] = hash;
> +		nokey_name.dirtree_hash[1] = minor_hash;
>  	} else {
> -		digested_name.hash = 0;
> -		digested_name.minor_hash = 0;
> +		nokey_name.dirtree_hash[0] = 0;
> +		nokey_name.dirtree_hash[1] = 0;
>  	}
> -	memcpy(digested_name.digest,
> -	       FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST(iname->name, iname->len),
> -	       FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST_SIZE);
> -	oname->name[0] = '_';
> -	oname->len = 1 + base64_encode((const u8 *)&digested_name,
> -				       sizeof(digested_name), oname->name + 1);
> -	return 0;
> +	size += sizeof(nokey_name.dirtree_hash);
> +
> +	if (iname->len > FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE) {
> +		/* compute sha256 of remaining name */
> +		err = fscrypt_do_sha256(nokey_name.sha256,
> +				&iname->name[FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE],
> +				iname->len - FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE);
> +		if (err)
> +			return err;
> +		size += sizeof(nokey_name.sha256);
> +	}
> +	oname->len = base64_encode((const u8 *)&nokey_name, size, oname->name);
> +	return err;
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr);
>  
> @@ -319,7 +363,6 @@ int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname,
>  			      int lookup, struct fscrypt_name *fname)

This function has a comment that needs to be updated:

 * Else, for keyless @lookup operations, @iname is the presented ciphertext, so
 * we decode it to get either the ciphertext disk_name (for short names) or the
 * fscrypt_digested_name (for long names).  Non-@lookup operations will be
 * impossible in this case, so we fail them with ENOKEY.

=>

 * Else, for keyless @lookup operations, @iname is the presented ciphertext, so
 * we decode it to get the fscrypt_nokey_name.  Non-@lookup operations will be
 * impossible in this case, so we fail them with ENOKEY.

>  {
>  	int ret;
> -	int digested;
>  
>  	memset(fname, 0, sizeof(struct fscrypt_name));
>  	fname->usr_fname = iname;
> @@ -359,42 +402,32 @@ int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname,
>  	 * We don't have the key and we are doing a lookup; decode the
>  	 * user-supplied name
>  	 */
> -	if (iname->name[0] == '_') {
> -		if (iname->len !=
> -		    1 + BASE64_CHARS(sizeof(struct fscrypt_digested_name)))
> -			return -ENOENT;
> -		digested = 1;
> -	} else {
> -		if (iname->len >
> -		    BASE64_CHARS(FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE))
> -			return -ENOENT;
> -		digested = 0;
> -	}
>  
>  	fname->crypto_buf.name =
> -		kmalloc(max_t(size_t, FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE,
> -			      sizeof(struct fscrypt_digested_name)),
> -			GFP_KERNEL);
> +			kmalloc(sizeof(struct fscrypt_nokey_name), GFP_KERNEL);
>  	if (fname->crypto_buf.name == NULL)
>  		return -ENOMEM;

Need to validate that the filename isn't too long before decoding it.  Otherwise
it might overflow this buffer.

>  
> -	ret = base64_decode(iname->name + digested, iname->len - digested,
> +	ret = base64_decode(iname->name, iname->len,
>  			    fname->crypto_buf.name);
>  	if (ret < 0) {
>  		ret = -ENOENT;
>  		goto errout;
>  	}
> -	fname->crypto_buf.len = ret;
> -	if (digested) {
> -		const struct fscrypt_digested_name *n =
> -			(const void *)fname->crypto_buf.name;
> -		fname->hash = n->hash;
> -		fname->minor_hash = n->minor_hash;
> -	} else {
> -		fname->disk_name.name = fname->crypto_buf.name;
> -		fname->disk_name.len = fname->crypto_buf.len;
> +	if (ret > (int)offsetofend(struct fscrypt_nokey_name, sha256)) {
> +		ret = -EINVAL;
> +		goto errout;
> +	}

This should be -ENOENT rather than -EINVAL, since we should report that the file
does not exist.

> +
> +	{
> +		struct fscrypt_nokey_name *n =
> +				(void *)fname->crypto_buf.name;

'n' (which maybe should be called 'nokey_name'?) could be declared at the
beginning of the function so that it doesn't have to go into this separate
block.

> +		fname->crypto_buf.len = ret;
> +
> +		fname->hash = n->dirtree_hash[0];
> +		fname->minor_hash = n->dirtree_hash[1];

Need to validate that these fields are actually included in the buffer that was
decoded, since it could be shorter.

> +/**
> + * fscrypt_match_name() - test whether the given name matches a directory entry
> + * @fname: the name being searched for
> + * @de_name: the name from the directory entry
> + * @de_name_len: the length of @de_name in bytes
> + *
> + * Normally @fname->disk_name will be set, and in that case we simply compare
> + * that to the name stored in the directory entry.  The only exception is that
> + * if we don't have the key for an encrypted directory and a filename in it is
> + * very long, then we won't have the full disk_name and we'll instead need to
> + * match against the fscrypt_digested_name.

Comment needs to be updated.

> +		bool check_sha256 = false;
> +		u8 sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
> +
> +		if (fname->crypto_buf.len ==
> +			    offsetofend(struct fscrypt_nokey_name, sha256)) {
> +			len = FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE;
> +			check_sha256 = true;
> +		} else {
> +			len = fname->crypto_buf.len -
> +				offsetof(struct fscrypt_nokey_name, bytes);
> +		}
> +		if (!check_sha256 && de_name_len != len)
> +			return false;
> +		if (check_sha256 && de_name_len <= len)
> +			return false;
> +		if (memcmp(de_name, n->bytes, len) != 0)
> +			return false;
> +		if (check_sha256) {
> +			fscrypt_do_sha256(sha256,
> +				&de_name[FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE],
> +				de_name_len - FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE);
> +			if (memcmp(sha256, n->sha256, sizeof(sha256)) != 0)
> +				return false;
> +		}

It's hard to understand what's going on here.  It would be easier to read if the
SHA-256 and non-SHA-256 cases were cleanly separated, e.g.:

		if (fname->crypto_buf.len ==
			    offsetofend(struct fscrypt_nokey_name, sha256)) {
			u8 sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];

			if (de_name_len <= FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE)
				return false;
			if (memcmp(de_name, n->bytes,
				   FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE) != 0)
				return false;
			fscrypt_do_sha256(sha256,
				&de_name[FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE],
				de_name_len - FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE);
			if (memcmp(sha256, n->sha256, sizeof(sha256)) != 0)
				return false;
		} else {
			u32 len = fname->crypto_buf.len -
				offsetof(struct fscrypt_nokey_name, bytes);

			if (de_name_len != len)
				return false;
			if (memcmp(de_name, n->bytes, len) != 0)
				return false;
		}

Also, I'm not sure it's a good idea to have so many hardcoded references to
SHA-256, since that this algorithm could be changed later.  It might be good to
use something more generic like 'strong_hash'.

> +
> +		return true;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (de_name_len != fname->disk_name.len)
> +		return false;
> +	return !memcmp(de_name, fname->disk_name.name, fname->disk_name.len);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_match_name);
> +
>  /**
>   * fscrypt_fname_siphash() - Calculate the siphash for a file name
>   * @dir: the parent directory
> diff --git a/include/linux/fscrypt.h b/include/linux/fscrypt.h
> index 028aed925e51..ddb7245ba92b 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fscrypt.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fscrypt.h
> @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
>  #include <linux/fs.h>
>  #include <linux/mm.h>
>  #include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <crypto/sha.h>
>  #include <uapi/linux/fscrypt.h>
>  
>  #define FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE		16
> @@ -160,79 +161,34 @@ extern int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(struct inode *, u32, u32,
>  extern u64 fscrypt_fname_siphash(const struct inode *dir,
>  					const struct qstr *name);
>  
> -#define FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE	32
> -
> -/* Extracts the second-to-last ciphertext block; see explanation below */
> -#define FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST(name, len)	\
> -	((name) + round_down((len) - FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE - 1, \
> -			     FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE))
> -
> -#define FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST_SIZE	FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE
> -
>  /**
> - * fscrypt_digested_name - alternate identifier for an on-disk filename
> + * fscrypt_nokey_name - identifier for on-disk filenames when key is not present

Now that fscrypt_match_name() is no longer an inline function, the definition of
struct fscrypt_nokey_name should be moved to fs/crypto/fname.c, since
filesystems don't need it directly anymore.

>   *
> - * When userspace lists an encrypted directory without access to the key,
> - * filenames whose ciphertext is longer than FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE
> - * bytes are shown in this abbreviated form (base64-encoded) rather than as the
> - * full ciphertext (base64-encoded).  This is necessary to allow supporting
> - * filenames up to NAME_MAX bytes, since base64 encoding expands the length.
> + * When userspace lists an encrypted directory without access to the key, we
> + * must present them with a unique identifier for the file. base64 encoding will
> + * expand the space, so we use this format to avoid most collisions.
>   *
> - * To make it possible for filesystems to still find the correct directory entry
> - * despite not knowing the full on-disk name, we encode any filesystem-specific
> - * 'hash' and/or 'minor_hash' which the filesystem may need for its lookups,
> - * followed by the second-to-last ciphertext block of the filename.  Due to the
> - * use of the CBC-CTS encryption mode, the second-to-last ciphertext block
> - * depends on the full plaintext.  (Note that ciphertext stealing causes the
> - * last two blocks to appear "flipped".)  This makes accidental collisions very
> - * unlikely: just a 1 in 2^128 chance for two filenames to collide even if they
> - * share the same filesystem-specific hashes.
> - *
> - * However, this scheme isn't immune to intentional collisions, which can be
> - * created by anyone able to create arbitrary plaintext filenames and view them
> - * without the key.  Making the "digest" be a real cryptographic hash like
> - * SHA-256 over the full ciphertext would prevent this, although it would be
> - * less efficient and harder to implement, especially since the filesystem would
> - * need to calculate it for each directory entry examined during a search.
> + * Filesystems may rely on the hash being present to look up a file on disk.
> + * For filenames that are both casefolded and encrypted, it is not possible to
> + * calculate the hash without the key. Additionally, if the ciphertext is longer
> + * than what we can base64 encode, we cannot generate the hash from the partial
> + * name. For simplicity, we always store the hash at the front of the name,
> + * followed by the first 149 bytes of the ciphertext, and then the sha256 of the
> + * remainder of the name if the ciphertext was longer than 149 bytes. For the
> + * usual case of relatively short filenames, this allows us to avoid needing to
> + * compute the sha256. This results in an encoded name that is at most 252 bytes
> + * long.
>   */
> -struct fscrypt_digested_name {
> -	u32 hash;
> -	u32 minor_hash;
> -	u8 digest[FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST_SIZE];
> -};
[...]

> +#define FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE 149

I assume that FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE is 149 in particular because it
makes the base64 encoding of struct fscrypt_nokey_name fit in NAME_MAX.  Can you
please add a BUILD_BUG_ON() which verifies this assumption at build time?

- Eric

  reply index

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-12-03  5:10 [PATCH 0/8] Support for Casefolding and Encryption Daniel Rosenberg
2019-12-03  5:10 ` [PATCH 1/8] fscrypt: Add siphash and hash key for policy v2 Daniel Rosenberg
2019-12-03 23:25   ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-03  5:10 ` [PATCH 2/8] fscrypt: Don't allow v1 policies with casefolding Daniel Rosenberg
2019-12-03 23:37   ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-03  5:10 ` [PATCH 3/8] fscrypt: Change format of no-key token Daniel Rosenberg
2019-12-04  0:09   ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2019-12-03  5:10 ` [PATCH 4/8] vfs: Fold casefolding into vfs Daniel Rosenberg
2019-12-03  7:41   ` Gao Xiang
2019-12-03 19:42     ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2019-12-03 20:34       ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-03 21:21         ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2019-12-04  0:32           ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-03 19:31   ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2019-12-03  5:10 ` [PATCH 5/8] f2fs: Handle casefolding with Encryption Daniel Rosenberg
2019-12-05  1:17   ` kbuild test robot
2019-12-03  5:10 ` [PATCH 6/8] ext4: Use struct super_block's casefold data Daniel Rosenberg
2019-12-03 19:44   ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2019-12-03  5:10 ` [PATCH 7/8] ext4: Hande casefolding with encryption Daniel Rosenberg
2019-12-03  5:10 ` [PATCH 8/8] ext4: Optimize match for casefolded encrypted dirs Daniel Rosenberg

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