From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>, Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>, "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>, "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>, Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>, lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Ext4 Developers List <linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org>, Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>, linux-man <linux-man@vger.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v4 1/1] random: WARN on large getrandom() waits and introduce getrandom2() Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2019 11:09:53 -0700 Message-ID: <CAHk-=wjpTWgpo6d24pTv+ubfea_uEomX-sHjjOkdACfV-8Nmkg@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CALCETrV=4TX2a4uV5t2xOFzv+zM_jnOtMLJna8Vb7uXz6S=wSw@mail.gmail.com> On Fri, Sep 20, 2019 at 10:52 AM Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote: > > IMO, from the beginning, we should have done this: > > GRND_INSECURE: insecure. always works. > > GRND_SECURE_BLOCKING: does exactly what it says. > > 0: -EINVAL. Violently agreed. And that's kind of what the GRND_EXPLICIT is really aiming for. However, it's worth noting that nobody should ever use GRND_EXPLICIT directly. That's just the name for the bit. The actual users would use GRND_INSECURE or GRND_SECURE. And yes, maybe it's worth making the name be GRND_SECURE_BLOCKING just to make people see what the big deal is. In the meantime, we need that new bit just to be able to create the new semantics eventually. With a warning to nudge people in the right direction. We may never be able to return -EINVAL, but we can add the pr_notice() to discourage people from using it. And yes, we'll have to block - at least for a time - to get some entropy. But at some point we either start making entropy up, or we say "0 means jitter-entropy for ten seconds". That will _work_, but it will also make the security-people nervous, which is just one more hint that they should move to GRND_SECURE[_BLOCKING]. > getrandom(..., GRND_EXPLICIT): just fscking give me a number. it > seems to work and it shuts up the warning > > And we're back to square one. Actually, you didn't read the GRND_INSECURE patch, did you. getrandom(GRND_EXPLICIT) on its own returns -EINVAL. Because yes, I thought about it, and yes, I agree that it's the same as the old 0. So GRND_EXPLICIT is a bit that basically means "I am explicit about what behavior I want". But part of that is that you need to _state_ the behavior too. So: - GRND_INSECURE is (GRND_EXPLICIT | GRND_NONBLOCK) As in "I explicitly ask you not to just not ever block": urandom - GRND_SECURE_BLOCKING is (GRND_EXPLICIT | GRND_RANDOM) As in "I explicitly ask you for those secure random numbers" - GRND_SECURE_NONBLOCKING is (GRND_EXPLICIT | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_NONBLOCK) As in "I want explicitly secure random numbers, but return -EAGAIN if that would block". Which are the three sane behaviors (that last one is useful for the "I can try to generate entropy if you don't have any" case. I'm not sure anybody will do it, but it definitely conceptually makes sense). And I agree that your naming is better. I had it as just "GRND_SECURE" for the blocking version, and "GRND_SECURE | GRND_NONBLOCK" for the "secure but return EAGAIN if you would need to block for entropy" version. But explicitly stating the blockingness in the name makes it clearer to the people who just want GRND_INSECURE, and makes them realize that they don't want the blocking version. Linus
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 211+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top [not found] <CAHk-=whBQ+6c-h+htiv6pp8ndtv97+45AH9WvdZougDRM6M4VQ@mail.gmail.com> 2019-09-10 4:21 ` Linux 5.3-rc8 Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-10 11:33 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-10 12:21 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-10 17:33 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-10 17:47 ` Reindl Harald 2019-09-10 18:21 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-11 16:07 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o 2019-09-11 16:45 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-11 17:00 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-11 17:36 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o 2019-09-12 3:44 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-12 8:25 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o 2019-09-12 11:34 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-12 11:58 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-14 12:25 ` [PATCH RFC] random: getrandom(2): don't block on non-initialized entropy pool Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-14 14:08 ` Alexander E. Patrakov 2019-09-15 5:22 ` [PATCH RFC v2] random: optionally block in getrandom(2) when the CRNG is uninitialized Theodore Y. Ts'o 2019-09-15 8:17 ` [PATCH RFC v3] random: getrandom(2): optionally block when " Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-15 8:59 ` Lennart Poettering 2019-09-15 9:30 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-15 10:02 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-15 10:40 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-15 10:55 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-15 11:17 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-15 17:32 ` [PATCH RFC v2] random: optionally block in getrandom(2) when the " Linus Torvalds 2019-09-15 18:32 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-15 18:36 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-15 19:08 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-15 19:18 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-15 19:31 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-15 19:54 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-15 18:59 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-15 19:12 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-16 2:45 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-16 18:08 ` Lennart Poettering 2019-09-16 19:16 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-18 21:15 ` [PATCH RFC v4 0/1] random: WARN on large getrandom() waits and introduce getrandom2() Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-18 21:17 ` [PATCH RFC v4 1/1] " Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-18 23:57 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-19 14:34 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o 2019-09-19 15:20 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-19 15:50 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-20 13:13 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o 2019-09-19 20:04 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-19 20:45 ` Alexander E. Patrakov 2019-09-19 21:47 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-19 22:23 ` Alexander E. Patrakov 2019-09-19 23:44 ` Alexander E. Patrakov 2019-09-20 13:16 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o 2019-09-23 11:55 ` David Laight 2019-09-20 13:08 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o 2019-09-20 13:46 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-20 14:33 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-09-20 16:29 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-20 17:52 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-09-20 18:09 ` Linus Torvalds [this message] 2019-09-20 18:16 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-20 19:12 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-09-20 19:51 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-20 20:11 ` Alexander E. Patrakov 2019-09-20 20:17 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-09-20 20:51 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-09-20 22:44 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-20 23:30 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-09-21 3:05 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-21 6:07 ` Florian Weimer 2019-09-23 18:33 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-09-26 21:11 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-20 18:12 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-20 19:22 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-09-20 19:37 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-20 19:52 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-09-20 20:02 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-20 18:15 ` Alexander E. Patrakov 2019-09-20 18:29 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-09-20 17:26 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-20 17:56 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-26 20:42 ` [PATCH v5 0/1] random: getrandom(2): warn on large CRNG waits, introduce new flags Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-26 20:44 ` [PATCH v5 1/1] " Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-26 21:39 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-09-28 9:30 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-14 15:02 ` Linux 5.3-rc8 Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-14 16:30 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-14 16:35 ` Alexander E. Patrakov 2019-09-14 16:52 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-14 17:09 ` Alexander E. Patrakov 2019-09-14 19:19 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-15 6:56 ` Lennart Poettering 2019-09-15 7:01 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-15 7:05 ` Lennart Poettering 2019-09-15 7:07 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-15 8:34 ` Lennart Poettering 2019-09-15 17:02 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-16 3:23 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o 2019-09-16 3:40 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-16 3:56 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-16 17:00 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o 2019-09-16 17:07 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-14 21:11 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-14 22:05 ` Martin Steigerwald 2019-09-14 22:24 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o 2019-09-14 22:32 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-15 1:00 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o 2019-09-15 1:10 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-15 2:05 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o 2019-09-15 2:11 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-15 6:33 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-15 6:53 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-15 6:51 ` Lennart Poettering 2019-09-15 7:27 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-15 8:48 ` Lennart Poettering 2019-09-15 16:29 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-16 1:40 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-16 1:48 ` Vito Caputo 2019-09-16 2:49 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o 2019-09-16 4:29 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-16 5:02 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-16 6:12 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-16 16:17 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-16 17:21 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o 2019-09-16 17:44 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-16 17:55 ` Serge Belyshev 2019-09-16 19:08 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-16 23:02 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-09-16 23:05 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-16 23:11 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-09-16 23:13 ` Alexander E. Patrakov 2019-09-16 23:15 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-09-16 23:18 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-16 23:29 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-17 1:05 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-17 1:23 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-09-17 1:41 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-17 1:46 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-09-17 5:24 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-17 7:33 ` Martin Steigerwald 2019-09-17 8:35 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-17 8:44 ` Martin Steigerwald 2019-09-17 12:11 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o 2019-09-17 12:30 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-17 12:46 ` Alexander E. Patrakov 2019-09-17 12:47 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-17 16:08 ` Lennart Poettering 2019-09-17 16:23 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-17 16:34 ` Reindl Harald 2019-09-17 17:42 ` Lennart Poettering 2019-09-17 18:01 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-17 20:28 ` Martin Steigerwald 2019-09-17 20:52 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-17 21:38 ` Martin Steigerwald 2019-09-17 21:52 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-09-17 22:10 ` Martin Steigerwald 2019-09-18 13:53 ` Lennart Poettering 2019-09-19 7:28 ` Martin Steigerwald 2019-09-17 23:08 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-18 13:40 ` Lennart Poettering 2019-09-17 20:58 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-18 9:33 ` Rasmus Villemoes 2019-09-18 10:16 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-18 10:25 ` Alexander E. Patrakov 2019-09-18 10:42 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-18 19:31 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-18 19:56 ` Eric W. Biederman 2019-09-18 20:13 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-18 20:15 ` Alexander E. Patrakov 2019-09-18 20:26 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-18 22:12 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-27 13:57 ` Lennart Poettering 2019-09-27 15:58 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-29 9:05 ` Lennart Poettering 2019-09-17 13:11 ` Alexander E. Patrakov 2019-09-17 13:37 ` Alexander E. Patrakov 2019-09-17 15:57 ` Lennart Poettering 2019-09-17 16:21 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-17 17:13 ` Lennart Poettering 2019-09-17 17:29 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-17 20:42 ` Martin Steigerwald 2019-09-18 13:38 ` Lennart Poettering 2019-09-18 13:59 ` Alexander E. Patrakov 2019-09-18 14:50 ` Alexander E. Patrakov 2019-09-17 20:36 ` Martin Steigerwald 2019-09-17 16:27 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-17 16:34 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-09-17 17:16 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-17 17:20 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-09-17 17:23 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-09-17 17:57 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-17 16:58 ` Alexander E. Patrakov 2019-09-17 17:30 ` Lennart Poettering 2019-09-17 17:32 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-17 17:41 ` Alexander E. Patrakov 2019-09-17 17:28 ` Lennart Poettering 2019-09-17 0:03 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-09-17 0:40 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-09-17 7:15 ` a sane approach to random numbers (was: Re: Linux 5.3-rc8) Martin Steigerwald 2019-09-16 18:00 ` Linux 5.3-rc8 Alexander E. Patrakov 2019-09-16 19:53 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-17 15:32 ` Lennart Poettering 2019-09-16 3:31 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-23 20:49 ` chaos generating driver was " Pavel Machek 2019-09-14 9:25 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-14 16:27 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o 2019-09-11 21:41 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-11 22:37 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2019-09-16 3:52 ` Herbert Xu 2019-09-16 4:21 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-09-16 4:53 ` Willy Tarreau 2019-09-10 11:56 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o 2019-09-16 10:33 ` Christoph Hellwig 2019-10-03 21:10 ` Jon Masters 2019-10-03 21:31 ` Jon Masters
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