From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
"Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>,
Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
Ext4 Developers List <linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-man <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>,
Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 8/8] random: Remove kernel.random.read_wakeup_threshold
Date: Mon, 23 Dec 2019 00:20:51 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a74ed2cf0b5a5451428a246a9239f5bc4e29358f.1577088521.git.luto@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1577088521.git.luto@kernel.org>
It has no effect any more, so remove it. We can revert this if
there is some user code that expects to be able to set this sysctl.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 18 +-----------------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 920bf771e3e1..2a6818cae2d6 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -369,12 +369,6 @@
#define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3
#define ENTROPY_BITS(r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT)
-/*
- * The minimum number of bits of entropy before we wake up a read on
- * /dev/random. Should be enough to do a significant reseed.
- */
-static int random_read_wakeup_bits = 64;
-
/*
* If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
* should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write
@@ -2053,8 +2047,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
-static int min_read_thresh = 8, min_write_thresh;
-static int max_read_thresh = OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
+static int min_write_thresh;
static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60;
static char sysctl_bootid[16];
@@ -2129,15 +2122,6 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
.proc_handler = proc_do_entropy,
.data = &input_pool.entropy_count,
},
- {
- .procname = "read_wakeup_threshold",
- .data = &random_read_wakeup_bits,
- .maxlen = sizeof(int),
- .mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
- .extra1 = &min_read_thresh,
- .extra2 = &max_read_thresh,
- },
{
.procname = "write_wakeup_threshold",
.data = &random_write_wakeup_bits,
--
2.23.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-23 8:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-23 8:20 [PATCH v3 0/8] Rework random blocking Andy Lutomirski
2019-12-23 8:20 ` [PATCH v3 1/8] random: Don't wake crng_init_wait when crng_init == 1 Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 20:42 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23 8:20 ` [PATCH v3 2/8] random: Add a urandom_read_nowait() for random APIs that don't warn Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 20:43 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23 8:20 ` [PATCH v3 3/8] random: Add GRND_INSECURE to return best-effort non-cryptographic bytes Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 20:44 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23 8:20 ` [PATCH v3 4/8] random: Ignore GRND_RANDOM in getentropy(2) Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 20:44 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23 8:20 ` [PATCH v3 5/8] random: Make /dev/random be almost like /dev/urandom Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 21:02 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23 8:20 ` [PATCH v3 6/8] random: Remove the blocking pool Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 21:03 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23 8:20 ` [PATCH v3 7/8] random: Delete code to pull data into pools Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 21:03 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-23 8:20 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2020-01-07 21:04 ` [PATCH v3 8/8] random: Remove kernel.random.read_wakeup_threshold Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-26 9:29 ` [PATCH v3 0/8] Rework random blocking Stephan Müller
2019-12-26 10:03 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-12-26 11:40 ` Stephan Mueller
2019-12-26 11:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-12-26 12:03 ` Stephan Mueller
2019-12-26 12:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-12-27 9:55 ` Stephan Mueller
2019-12-26 14:04 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-26 23:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-12-27 10:29 ` Stephan Mueller
2019-12-27 13:04 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-27 21:22 ` Stephan Mueller
2019-12-27 22:08 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-28 2:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-12-29 14:49 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-12-29 15:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-12-28 7:01 ` Willy Tarreau
2020-01-09 22:02 ` Kurt Roeckx
2020-01-09 22:40 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2020-01-09 23:02 ` Kurt Roeckx
2020-01-10 7:53 ` Stephan Mueller
2020-01-10 0:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
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