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Mon, 24 Aug 2020 16:48:59 +0000 Received: from tleilax.poochiereds.net (68-20-15-154.lightspeed.rlghnc.sbcglobal.net [68.20.15.154]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AC9DC20838; Mon, 24 Aug 2020 16:48:49 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1598287730; bh=hV12fRJTb2YN0BwEhwGQ9WwGg49PGSB00/53tQ6sM3o=; h=Subject:From:To:Cc:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=fpiNZ9KkjYhisWLwDc7A334iOgd5L5c+XBHbXFNr77OvnSmJp5KqVOlty7CePItU6 FEbdBqH7aha/v3kIq2HIRKNwX5YXx0ZoWGJj6HwCm486qxLZHDtlAA0WHTFUh1u14o 0O4GJpSVcJNNZWi2QJJc9Q7kitBaYfiW4glyylig= Message-ID: <0cf5638796e7cddacc38dcd1e967368b99f0069a.camel@kernel.org> From: Jeff Layton To: Eric Biggers , linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2020 12:48:48 -0400 In-Reply-To: <20200824061712.195654-2-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20200824061712.195654-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> <20200824061712.195654-2-ebiggers@kernel.org> User-Agent: Evolution 3.36.5 (3.36.5-1.fc32) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Headers-End: 1kAFeS-00HE1h-G5 Subject: Re: [f2fs-dev] [RFC PATCH 1/8] fscrypt: add fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() and fscrypt_set_context() X-BeenThere: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.21 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Errors-To: linux-f2fs-devel-bounces@lists.sourceforge.net On Sun, 2020-08-23 at 23:17 -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > From: Eric Biggers > > fscrypt_get_encryption_info() (setting up an inode's encryption key) is > intended to be GFP_NOFS safe. But actually it isn't, since it uses > functions like crypto_alloc_skcipher() which aren't GFP_NOFS safe, even > when called with memalloc_nofs_save(). Therefore it can deadlock when > called from a context that needs GFP_NOFS, e.g. during an ext4 > filesystem transaction or between f2fs_lock_op() and f2fs_unlock_op(). > Currently, this happens when creating a new encrypted file. > > We can't fix this just by not setting up the key for new inodes right > away, since new symlinks need their key to encrypt the symlink target. > > So we need to set up the new inode's key before starting the > transaction. But fscrypt_get_encryption_info() can't do this currently, > since it assumes the encryption xattr is already set, and the encryption > xattr can't be set until the transaction. > > The recently proposed fscrypt support for the ceph filesystem > (https://lkml.kernel.org/linux-fscrypt/20200821182813.52570-1-jlayton@kernel.org/T/#u) > will have this same ordering problem too, since when ceph creates a new > symlink, it will need to encrypt it before setting its encryption xattr. > > To solve this problem, add new helper functions: > > - fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() sets up a new inode's encryption key > (fscrypt_info), using the parent directory's encryption policy and a > new random nonce. It neither reads nor writes the xattr. > > - fscrypt_set_context() sets the encryption xattr from the fscrypt_info > already in memory. This replaces fscrypt_inherit_context(). > > Keep fscrypt_inherit_context() around temporarily until all filesystems > are converted to use fscrypt_set_context(). > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers > --- > fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 3 + > fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 188 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- > fs/crypto/policy.c | 61 ++++++++++-- > include/linux/fscrypt.h | 17 ++++ > 4 files changed, 220 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h > index 8117a61b6f558..355f6d9377517 100644 > --- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h > +++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h > @@ -572,6 +572,9 @@ int fscrypt_set_per_file_enc_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key); > int fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, > const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk); > > +void fscrypt_hash_inode_number(struct fscrypt_info *ci, > + const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk); > + > /* keysetup_v1.c */ > > void fscrypt_put_direct_key(struct fscrypt_direct_key *dk); > diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c > index fea6226afc2b0..6ac816d3e8478 100644 > --- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c > +++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c > @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ > > #include > #include > +#include > > #include "fscrypt_private.h" > > @@ -222,6 +223,16 @@ int fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, > return 0; > } > > +void fscrypt_hash_inode_number(struct fscrypt_info *ci, > + const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) > +{ > + WARN_ON(ci->ci_inode->i_ino == 0); > + WARN_ON(!mk->mk_ino_hash_key_initialized); > + > + ci->ci_hashed_ino = (u32)siphash_1u64(ci->ci_inode->i_ino, > + &mk->mk_ino_hash_key); i_ino is an unsigned long. Will this produce a consistent results on arches with 32 and 64 bit long values? I think it'd be nice to ensure that we can access an encrypted directory created on a 32-bit host from (e.g.) a 64-bit host. It may be better to base this on something besides i_ino or provide an alternate way of fetching a full 64-bit inode number here when i_ino is 32-bits. > +} > + > static int fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, > struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) > { > @@ -254,8 +265,10 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, > return err; > } > > - ci->ci_hashed_ino = (u32)siphash_1u64(ci->ci_inode->i_ino, > - &mk->mk_ino_hash_key); > + if (ci->ci_inode->i_ino == 0) > + WARN_ON(!(ci->ci_inode->i_state & I_NEW)); > + else > + fscrypt_hash_inode_number(ci, mk); > return 0; > } > > @@ -454,57 +467,23 @@ static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci) > kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci); > } > > -int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) > +static int > +fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, > + const union fscrypt_policy *policy, > + const u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE]) > { > struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info; > - union fscrypt_context ctx; > struct fscrypt_mode *mode; > struct key *master_key = NULL; > int res; > > - if (fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode)) > - return 0; > - > - res = fscrypt_initialize(inode->i_sb->s_cop->flags); > - if (res) > - return res; > - > - res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx)); > - if (res < 0) { > - const union fscrypt_context *dummy_ctx = > - fscrypt_get_dummy_context(inode->i_sb); > - > - if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) || !dummy_ctx) { > - fscrypt_warn(inode, > - "Error %d getting encryption context", > - res); > - return res; > - } > - /* Fake up a context for an unencrypted directory */ > - res = fscrypt_context_size(dummy_ctx); > - memcpy(&ctx, dummy_ctx, res); > - } > - > crypt_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(fscrypt_info_cachep, GFP_NOFS); > if (!crypt_info) > return -ENOMEM; > > crypt_info->ci_inode = inode; > - > - res = fscrypt_policy_from_context(&crypt_info->ci_policy, &ctx, res); > - if (res) { > - fscrypt_warn(inode, > - "Unrecognized or corrupt encryption context"); > - goto out; > - } > - > - memcpy(crypt_info->ci_nonce, fscrypt_context_nonce(&ctx), > - FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE); > - > - if (!fscrypt_supported_policy(&crypt_info->ci_policy, inode)) { > - res = -EINVAL; > - goto out; > - } > + crypt_info->ci_policy = *policy; > + memcpy(crypt_info->ci_nonce, nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE); > > mode = select_encryption_mode(&crypt_info->ci_policy, inode); > if (IS_ERR(mode)) { > @@ -555,8 +534,133 @@ int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) > put_crypt_info(crypt_info); > return res; > } > + > +/** > + * fscrypt_get_encryption_info() - set up an inode's encryption key > + * @inode: the inode to set up the key for. Must either be encrypted, or be an > + * unencrypted directory with '-o test_dummy_encryption'. > + * > + * Create ->i_crypt_info, if it's not already set. > + * > + * Note: unless ->i_crypt_info is already set, this isn't %GFP_NOFS-safe. So > + * generally this shouldn't be called from within a filesystem transaction. > + * > + * Return: 0 if ->i_crypt_info was set or was already set, *or* if the > + * encryption key is unavailable. (Use fscrypt_has_encryption_key() to > + * distinguish these cases.) Also can return another -errno code. > + */ > +int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) > +{ > + int res; > + union fscrypt_context ctx; > + union fscrypt_policy policy; > + > + if (fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode)) > + return 0; > + > + res = fscrypt_initialize(inode->i_sb->s_cop->flags); > + if (res) > + return res; > + > + res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx)); > + if (res < 0) { > + const union fscrypt_context *dummy_ctx = > + fscrypt_get_dummy_context(inode->i_sb); > + > + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) || !dummy_ctx) { > + fscrypt_warn(inode, > + "Error %d getting encryption context", > + res); > + return res; > + } > + /* Fake up a context for an unencrypted directory */ > + res = fscrypt_context_size(dummy_ctx); > + memcpy(&ctx, dummy_ctx, res); > + } > + > + res = fscrypt_policy_from_context(&policy, &ctx, res); > + if (res) { > + fscrypt_warn(inode, > + "Unrecognized or corrupt encryption context"); > + return res; > + } > + > + if (!fscrypt_supported_policy(&policy, inode)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + return fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(inode, &policy, > + fscrypt_context_nonce(&ctx)); > +} > EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_get_encryption_info); > > +/** > + * fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() - prepare to create a new inode in a directory > + * @dir: a possibly-encrypted directory > + * @inode: the inode that is being created. ->i_mode must be set already. > + * ->i_ino does *not* need to be set yet. > + * @encrypt_ret: (output) set to true if the new inode will be encrypted. > + * > + * Prepares to create a new inode in a directory. If either the inode or its > + * filename will be encrypted, this sets up the directory's > + * ->i_crypt_info. Additionally, if the inode will be encrypted, this sets up > + * its ->i_crypt_info and sets *encrypt_ret to true. > + * > + * Note that the new inode's ->i_crypt_info *usually* isn't actually needed > + * right away. However, symlinks do need it. > + * > + * This isn't %GFP_NOFS-safe, and therefore it should be called before starting > + * any filesystem transaction to create the inode. For this reason, ->i_ino > + * isn't required to be set yet, as the filesystem may not have set it yet. > + * > + * This doesn't actually store the new inode's encryption context to disk. > + * That still needs to be done later by calling fscrypt_set_context(). > + * > + * Return: 0 on success, -ENOKEY if the directory's encryption key is missing, > + * or another -errno code > + */ > +int fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, > + bool *encrypt_ret) > +{ > + int err; > + u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE]; > + > + /* > + * If the filesystem is mounted with '-o test_dummy_encryption', files > + * created in unencrypted directories are automatically encrypted. For > + * that case, we just need to treat the directory as encrypted here. > + */ > + > + if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) && fscrypt_get_dummy_context(dir->i_sb) == NULL) > + return 0; > + > + err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir); > + if (err) > + return err; > + if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) > + return -ENOKEY; > + > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(inode->i_mode == 0)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* > + * Only regular files, directories, and symlinks are encrypted. > + * Special files like device nodes and named pipes aren't. > + */ > + if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && > + !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && > + !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) > + return 0; > + > + *encrypt_ret = true; > + > + get_random_bytes(nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE); > + > + return fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(inode, > + &dir->i_crypt_info->ci_policy, > + nonce); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_prepare_new_inode); > + > /** > * fscrypt_put_encryption_info() - free most of an inode's fscrypt data > * @inode: an inode being evicted > diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c > index 2d73fd39ad96f..fbe4933206469 100644 > --- a/fs/crypto/policy.c > +++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c > @@ -235,14 +235,17 @@ bool fscrypt_supported_policy(const union fscrypt_policy *policy_u, > * an fscrypt_policy > * @ctx_u: output context > * @policy_u: input policy > + * @nonce: nonce to use > * > * Create an fscrypt_context for an inode that is being assigned the given > - * encryption policy. A new nonce is randomly generated. > + * encryption policy. @nonce must be a new random nonce. > * > * Return: the size of the new context in bytes. > */ > -static int fscrypt_new_context_from_policy(union fscrypt_context *ctx_u, > - const union fscrypt_policy *policy_u) > +static int > +fscrypt_new_context_from_policy(union fscrypt_context *ctx_u, > + const union fscrypt_policy *policy_u, > + const u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE]) > { > memset(ctx_u, 0, sizeof(*ctx_u)); > > @@ -260,7 +263,7 @@ static int fscrypt_new_context_from_policy(union fscrypt_context *ctx_u, > memcpy(ctx->master_key_descriptor, > policy->master_key_descriptor, > sizeof(ctx->master_key_descriptor)); > - get_random_bytes(ctx->nonce, sizeof(ctx->nonce)); > + memcpy(ctx->nonce, nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE); > return sizeof(*ctx); > } > case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2: { > @@ -276,7 +279,7 @@ static int fscrypt_new_context_from_policy(union fscrypt_context *ctx_u, > memcpy(ctx->master_key_identifier, > policy->master_key_identifier, > sizeof(ctx->master_key_identifier)); > - get_random_bytes(ctx->nonce, sizeof(ctx->nonce)); > + memcpy(ctx->nonce, nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE); > return sizeof(*ctx); > } > } > @@ -372,6 +375,7 @@ static int fscrypt_get_policy(struct inode *inode, union fscrypt_policy *policy) > static int set_encryption_policy(struct inode *inode, > const union fscrypt_policy *policy) > { > + u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE]; > union fscrypt_context ctx; > int ctxsize; > int err; > @@ -409,7 +413,8 @@ static int set_encryption_policy(struct inode *inode, > return -EINVAL; > } > > - ctxsize = fscrypt_new_context_from_policy(&ctx, policy); > + get_random_bytes(nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE); > + ctxsize = fscrypt_new_context_from_policy(&ctx, policy, nonce); > > return inode->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(inode, &ctx, ctxsize, NULL); > } > @@ -632,6 +637,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_has_permitted_context); > int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child, > void *fs_data, bool preload) > { > + u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE]; > union fscrypt_context ctx; > int ctxsize; > struct fscrypt_info *ci; > @@ -645,7 +651,8 @@ int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child, > if (ci == NULL) > return -ENOKEY; > > - ctxsize = fscrypt_new_context_from_policy(&ctx, &ci->ci_policy); > + get_random_bytes(nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE); > + ctxsize = fscrypt_new_context_from_policy(&ctx, &ci->ci_policy, nonce); > > BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx) != FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE); > res = parent->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(child, &ctx, ctxsize, fs_data); > @@ -655,6 +662,46 @@ int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child, > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_inherit_context); > > +/** > + * fscrypt_set_context() - Set the fscrypt context of a new inode > + * @inode: A new inode > + * @fs_data: private data given by FS and passed to ->set_context() > + * > + * This should be called after fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(), generally during a > + * filesystem transaction. Everything here must be %GFP_NOFS-safe. > + * > + * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure > + */ > +int fscrypt_set_context(struct inode *inode, void *fs_data) > +{ > + struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info; > + union fscrypt_context ctx; > + int ctxsize; > + > + /* fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() should have set up the key already. */ > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ci)) > + return -ENOKEY; > + > + /* > + * This may be the first time the inode number is available, so do any > + * delayed key setup that requires the inode number. > + */ > + if (ci->ci_policy.version == FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2 && > + (ci->ci_policy.v2.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32)) { > + const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk = > + ci->ci_master_key->payload.data[0]; > + > + fscrypt_hash_inode_number(ci, mk); > + } > + > + ctxsize = fscrypt_new_context_from_policy(&ctx, &ci->ci_policy, > + ci->ci_nonce); > + > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx) != FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE); > + return inode->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(inode, &ctx, ctxsize, fs_data); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_set_context); > + > /** > * fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption() - handle '-o test_dummy_encryption' > * @sb: the filesystem on which test_dummy_encryption is being specified > diff --git a/include/linux/fscrypt.h b/include/linux/fscrypt.h > index 991ff8575d0e7..726131dfa0a9b 100644 > --- a/include/linux/fscrypt.h > +++ b/include/linux/fscrypt.h > @@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_get_nonce(struct file *filp, void __user *arg); > int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child); > int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child, > void *fs_data, bool preload); > +int fscrypt_set_context(struct inode *inode, void *fs_data); > > struct fscrypt_dummy_context { > const union fscrypt_context *ctx; > @@ -184,6 +185,8 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status(struct file *filp, void __user *arg); > > /* keysetup.c */ > int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode); > +int fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, > + bool *encrypt_ret); > void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *inode); > void fscrypt_free_inode(struct inode *inode); > int fscrypt_drop_inode(struct inode *inode); > @@ -347,6 +350,11 @@ static inline int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, > return -EOPNOTSUPP; > } > > +static inline int fscrypt_set_context(struct inode *inode, void *fs_data) > +{ > + return -EOPNOTSUPP; > +} > + > struct fscrypt_dummy_context { > }; > > @@ -394,6 +402,15 @@ static inline int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) > return -EOPNOTSUPP; > } > > +static inline int fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(struct inode *dir, > + struct inode *inode, > + bool *encrypt_ret) > +{ > + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) > + return -EOPNOTSUPP; > + return 0; > +} > + > static inline void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) > { > return; -- Jeff Layton _______________________________________________ Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list Linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel