[f2fs-dev] [PATCH v2] f2fs: avoid out-of-range memory access

[f2fs-dev] [PATCH v2] f2fs: avoid out-of-range memory access

[Ocean Chen via Linux-f2fs-devel]

blk_off might over 512 due to fs corrupt.
Use ENTRIES_IN_SUM to protect invalid memory access.

v2:
- fix typo
Signed-off-by: Ocean Chen <oceanchen@google.com>
---
 fs/f2fs/segment.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/f2fs/segment.c b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
index 8dee063c833f..a5e8af0bd62e 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
@@ -3403,6 +3403,8 @@ static int read_compacted_summaries(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
 
 		for (j = 0; j < blk_off; j++) {
 			struct f2fs_summary *s;
+			if (j >= ENTRIES_IN_SUM)
+				return -EFAULT;
 			s = (struct f2fs_summary *)(kaddr + offset);
 			seg_i->sum_blk->entries[j] = *s;
 			offset += SUMMARY_SIZE;
-- 
2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog



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Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v2] f2fs: avoid out-of-range memory access

[Chao Yu]

Hi Ocean,

If filesystem is corrupted, it should fail mount due to below check in
f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(), so we are safe in read_compacted_summaries() to access
entries[0,blk_off], right?

	for (i = 0; i < NR_CURSEG_DATA_TYPE; i++) {
		if (le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_segno[i]) >= main_segs ||
			le16_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_blkoff[i]) >= blocks_per_seg)
			return 1;

Thanks,

On 2019/7/2 16:05, Ocean Chen wrote:
> blk_off might over 512 due to fs corrupt.
> Use ENTRIES_IN_SUM to protect invalid memory access.
> 
> v2:
> - fix typo
> Signed-off-by: Ocean Chen <oceanchen@google.com>
> ---
>  fs/f2fs/segment.c | 2 ++
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/segment.c b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
> index 8dee063c833f..a5e8af0bd62e 100644
> --- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c
> +++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
> @@ -3403,6 +3403,8 @@ static int read_compacted_summaries(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
>  
>  		for (j = 0; j < blk_off; j++) {
>  			struct f2fs_summary *s;
> +			if (j >= ENTRIES_IN_SUM)
> +				return -EFAULT;
>  			s = (struct f2fs_summary *)(kaddr + offset);
>  			seg_i->sum_blk->entries[j] = *s;
>  			offset += SUMMARY_SIZE;
> 


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Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v2] f2fs: avoid out-of-range memory access

[Ocean Chen via Linux-f2fs-devel]

Hi Yu Chao,

The cur_data_segno only was checked in mount process. In terms of
security concern, it's better to check value before using it. I know the
risk is low. IMHO, it can be safer.
BTW, I found we can only check blk_off before for loop instead of
checking 'j' in each iteratoin.

On Wed, Jul 03, 2019 at 10:07:11AM +0800, Chao Yu wrote:
> Hi Ocean,
> 
> If filesystem is corrupted, it should fail mount due to below check in
> f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(), so we are safe in read_compacted_summaries() to access
> entries[0,blk_off], right?
> 
> 	for (i = 0; i < NR_CURSEG_DATA_TYPE; i++) {
> 		if (le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_segno[i]) >= main_segs ||
> 			le16_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_blkoff[i]) >= blocks_per_seg)
> 			return 1;
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> On 2019/7/2 16:05, Ocean Chen wrote:
> > blk_off might over 512 due to fs corrupt.
> > Use ENTRIES_IN_SUM to protect invalid memory access.
> > 
> > v2:
> > - fix typo
> > Signed-off-by: Ocean Chen <oceanchen@google.com>
> > ---
> >  fs/f2fs/segment.c | 2 ++
> >  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/fs/f2fs/segment.c b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
> > index 8dee063c833f..a5e8af0bd62e 100644
> > --- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c
> > +++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
> > @@ -3403,6 +3403,8 @@ static int read_compacted_summaries(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
> >  
> >  		for (j = 0; j < blk_off; j++) {
> >  			struct f2fs_summary *s;
> > +			if (j >= ENTRIES_IN_SUM)
> > +				return -EFAULT;
> >  			s = (struct f2fs_summary *)(kaddr + offset);
> >  			seg_i->sum_blk->entries[j] = *s;
> >  			offset += SUMMARY_SIZE;
> > 


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Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v2] f2fs: avoid out-of-range memory access

[Chao Yu]

Hi Ocean,

On 2019/7/3 23:03, Ocean Chen wrote:
> Hi Yu Chao,
> 
> The cur_data_segno only was checked in mount process. In terms of
> security concern, it's better to check value before using it. I know the

Could you explain more about security concern.. Do you get any report from user
or tools that complaining f2fs issue/codes?

I'm not against sanity check for basic core data of filesystem in run-time, but,
in order to troubleshoot root cause of this issue we can trigger panic directly
to dump more info under F2FS_CHECK_FS macro.

So, maybe we can change as below?

blk_off = le16_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_blkoff[i]);
+if (blk_off > ENTRIES_IN_SUM) {
+	f2fs_bug_on(1);
+	f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
+	return -EFAULT;
+}

Thanks,

> risk is low. IMHO, it can be safer.
> BTW, I found we can only check blk_off before for loop instead of
> checking 'j' in each iteratoin.
> 
> On Wed, Jul 03, 2019 at 10:07:11AM +0800, Chao Yu wrote:
>> Hi Ocean,
>>
>> If filesystem is corrupted, it should fail mount due to below check in
>> f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(), so we are safe in read_compacted_summaries() to access
>> entries[0,blk_off], right?
>>
>> 	for (i = 0; i < NR_CURSEG_DATA_TYPE; i++) {
>> 		if (le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_segno[i]) >= main_segs ||
>> 			le16_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_blkoff[i]) >= blocks_per_seg)
>> 			return 1;
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> On 2019/7/2 16:05, Ocean Chen wrote:
>>> blk_off might over 512 due to fs corrupt.
>>> Use ENTRIES_IN_SUM to protect invalid memory access.
>>>
>>> v2:
>>> - fix typo
>>> Signed-off-by: Ocean Chen <oceanchen@google.com>
>>> ---
>>>  fs/f2fs/segment.c | 2 ++
>>>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/segment.c b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
>>> index 8dee063c833f..a5e8af0bd62e 100644
>>> --- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c
>>> +++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
>>> @@ -3403,6 +3403,8 @@ static int read_compacted_summaries(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
>>>  
>>>  		for (j = 0; j < blk_off; j++) {
>>>  			struct f2fs_summary *s;
>>> +			if (j >= ENTRIES_IN_SUM)
>>> +				return -EFAULT;
>>>  			s = (struct f2fs_summary *)(kaddr + offset);
>>>  			seg_i->sum_blk->entries[j] = *s;
>>>  			offset += SUMMARY_SIZE;
>>>
> .
> 


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Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v2] f2fs: avoid out-of-range memory access

[Ocean Chen via Linux-f2fs-devel]

Hi YuChao,

  Yes, we got externel researcher reports this security vulnerability.

And dump info is better when blk_off is invalid. I'll prepare the next
patch for it.

On Thu, Jul 04, 2019 at 03:11:27PM +0800, Chao Yu wrote:
> Hi Ocean,
> 
> On 2019/7/3 23:03, Ocean Chen wrote:
> > Hi Yu Chao,
> > 
> > The cur_data_segno only was checked in mount process. In terms of
> > security concern, it's better to check value before using it. I know the
> 
> Could you explain more about security concern.. Do you get any report from user
> or tools that complaining f2fs issue/codes?
> 
> I'm not against sanity check for basic core data of filesystem in run-time, but,
> in order to troubleshoot root cause of this issue we can trigger panic directly
> to dump more info under F2FS_CHECK_FS macro.
> 
> So, maybe we can change as below?
> 
> blk_off = le16_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_blkoff[i]);
> +if (blk_off > ENTRIES_IN_SUM) {
> +	f2fs_bug_on(1);
> +	f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
> +	return -EFAULT;
> +}
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> > risk is low. IMHO, it can be safer.
> > BTW, I found we can only check blk_off before for loop instead of
> > checking 'j' in each iteratoin.
> > 
> > On Wed, Jul 03, 2019 at 10:07:11AM +0800, Chao Yu wrote:
> >> Hi Ocean,
> >>
> >> If filesystem is corrupted, it should fail mount due to below check in
> >> f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(), so we are safe in read_compacted_summaries() to access
> >> entries[0,blk_off], right?
> >>
> >> 	for (i = 0; i < NR_CURSEG_DATA_TYPE; i++) {
> >> 		if (le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_segno[i]) >= main_segs ||
> >> 			le16_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_blkoff[i]) >= blocks_per_seg)
> >> 			return 1;
> >>
> >> Thanks,
> >>
> >> On 2019/7/2 16:05, Ocean Chen wrote:
> >>> blk_off might over 512 due to fs corrupt.
> >>> Use ENTRIES_IN_SUM to protect invalid memory access.
> >>>
> >>> v2:
> >>> - fix typo
> >>> Signed-off-by: Ocean Chen <oceanchen@google.com>
> >>> ---
> >>>  fs/f2fs/segment.c | 2 ++
> >>>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
> >>>
> >>> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/segment.c b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
> >>> index 8dee063c833f..a5e8af0bd62e 100644
> >>> --- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c
> >>> +++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
> >>> @@ -3403,6 +3403,8 @@ static int read_compacted_summaries(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
> >>>  
> >>>  		for (j = 0; j < blk_off; j++) {
> >>>  			struct f2fs_summary *s;
> >>> +			if (j >= ENTRIES_IN_SUM)
> >>> +				return -EFAULT;
> >>>  			s = (struct f2fs_summary *)(kaddr + offset);
> >>>  			seg_i->sum_blk->entries[j] = *s;
> >>>  			offset += SUMMARY_SIZE;
> >>>
> > .
> > 


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