Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v6 2/9] block: Add encryption context to struct bio

[Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>]

On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 07:47:56PM -0500, Martin K. Petersen wrote:
> 
> Eric,
> 
> > There's not really any such thing as "use the bio integrity plumbing".
> > blk-integrity just does blk-integrity; it's not a plumbing layer that
> > allows other features to be supported.  Well, in theory we could
> > refactor and rename all the hooks to "blk-extra" and make them
> > delegate to either blk-integrity or blk-crypto, but I think that would
> > be overkill.
> 
> I certainly don't expect your crypto stuff to plug in without any
> modification to what we currently have. I'm just observing that the
> existing plumbing is designed to have pluggable functions that let
> filesystems attach additional information to bios on writes and process
> additional attached information on reads. And the block layer already
> handles slicing and dicing these attachments as the I/O traverses the
> stack.
> 
> There's also other stuff that probably won't be directly applicable or
> interesting for your use case. It just seems like identifying actual
> commonalities and differences would be worthwhile.
> 
> Note that substantial changes to the integrity code would inevitably
> lead to a lot of pain and suffering for me. So from that perspective I
> am very happy if you leave it alone. From an architectural viewpoint,
> however, it seems that there are more similarities than differences
> between crypto and integrity. And we should avoid duplication where
> possible. That's all.

There are some similarities, like both being optional features that need extra
per-bio information and hooks for bio merging, freeing, cloning, and advancing.

However, the nature of the per-bio information is very different.  Most of the
complexity in blk-integrity is around managing of a separate integrity
scatterlist for each bio, alongside the regular data scatterlist.

That's not something we need or want for inline encryption.  For each bio we
just need a key, algorithm, data unit number, and data unit size.  Since the
data unit number (IV) is automatically incremented for each sector and the
encryption is length-preserving, there's no per-sector data.

(Granted, from a crypto perspective ideally one would use authenticated
encryption, which does require per-sector data.  However, no one seems
interested in building hardware that supports it.  So for the forseeable future,
only length-preserving encryption is in scope for this.)

Also, blk-crypto actually transforms the data whereas blk-integrity does not.

> > What we could do, though, is say that at most one of blk-crypto and
> > blk-integrity can be used at once on a given bio, and put the
> > bi_integrity and bi_crypt_context pointers in union.  (That would
> > require allocating a REQ_INLINECRYPT bit so that we can tell what the
> > pointer points to.)
> 
> Absolutely. That's why it's a union. Putting your stuff there is a
> prerequisite as far as I'm concerned. No need to grow the bio when the
> two features are unlikely to coexist. We can revisit that later should
> the need arise.

There are some ways the two features could be supported simultaneously without
using more space, like making the pointer point to a linked list of tagged
structs, or making the struct contain both a bio_crypt_ctx and
bio_integrity_payload (or whichever combination is enabled in kconfig).

But it would be painful and I don't think people need this for now.  So if
people really aren't willing to accept the extra 8 bytes per bio even behind a
kconfig option, my vote is we that we put bi_crypt_context in the union with
bi_integrity, and add a flag REQ_INLINECRYPT (like REQ_INTEGRITY) that indicates
that the bi_crypt_context member of the union is valid.

We'd also need some error-handling to prevent the two features from actually
being used together.  It looks like there are several cases to consider.  One of
them is what happens if bio_crypt_set_ctx() is called when blk-integrity
verification or generation is enabled for the disk.  I suppose it could either
return an error, or we could make blk-crypto use the crypto API fallback
provided that it was modified to make the decryption stop relying on
->bi_crypt_context, which could be done by cloning the bio and using
->bi_private instead.

- Eric


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