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Fri, 21 Feb 2020 03:50:59 -0800 (PST) Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2020 03:50:41 -0800 Message-Id: <20200221115050.238976-1-satyat@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.0.265.gbab2e86ba0-goog To: linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org X-Headers-End: 1j57Ax-00ChPr-T9 Subject: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v7 0/9] Inline Encryption Support X-BeenThere: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.21 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , From: Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel Reply-To: Satya Tangirala Cc: Kuohong Wang , Satya Tangirala , Barani Muthukumaran , Kim Boojin Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Errors-To: linux-f2fs-devel-bounces@lists.sourceforge.net This patch series adds support for Inline Encryption to the block layer, UFS, fscrypt, f2fs and ext4. Note that the patches in this series for the block layer (i.e. patches 1, 2 and 3) can be applied independently of the subsequent patches in this series. Inline Encryption hardware allows software to specify an encryption context (an encryption key, crypto algorithm, data unit num, data unit size, etc.) along with a data transfer request to a storage device, and the inline encryption hardware will use that context to en/decrypt the data. The inline encryption hardware is part of the storage device, and it conceptually sits on the data path between system memory and the storage device. Inline Encryption hardware has become increasingly common, and we want to support it in the kernel. Inline Encryption hardware implementations often function around the concept of a limited number of "keyslots", which can hold an encryption context each. The storage device can be directed to en/decrypt any particular request with the encryption context stored in any particular keyslot. Patch 1 introduces a Keyslot Manager to efficiently manage keyslots. The keyslot manager also functions as the interface that blk-crypto (introduced in Patch 2), will use to program keys into inline encryption hardware. For more information on the Keyslot Manager, refer to documentation found in block/keyslot-manager.c and linux/keyslot-manager.h. Patch 2 adds the block layer changes for inline encryption support. It introduces struct bio_crypt_ctx, and a ptr to one in struct bio, which allows struct bio to represent an encryption context that can be passed down the storage stack from the filesystem layer to the storage driver. Patch 3 introduces blk-crypto-fallback - a kernel crypto API fallback for blk-crypto to use when inline encryption hardware isn't present. This allows filesystems to specify encryption contexts for bios without having to worry about whether the underlying hardware has inline encryption support, and allows for testing without real hardware inline encryption support. This fallback is separately configurable from blk-crypto, and can be disabled if desired while keeping inline encryption support. It may also be possible to remove file content en/decryption from fscrypt and simply use blk-crypto-fallback in a future patch. For more details on blk-crypto and the fallback, refer to Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst. Patches 4-6 add support for inline encryption into the UFS driver according to the JEDEC UFS HCI v2.1 specification. Inline encryption support for other drivers (like eMMC) may be added in the same way - the device driver should set up a Keyslot Manager in the device's request_queue (refer to the UFS crypto additions in ufshcd-crypto.c and ufshcd.c for an example). Patch 7 adds support to fscrypt - to use inline encryption with fscrypt, the filesystem must be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt' - when this option is specified, the contents of any AES-256-XTS encrypted file will be encrypted using blk-crypto. Patches 8 and 9 add support to f2fs and ext4 respectively, so that we have a complete stack that can make use of inline encryption. The patches were tested running kvm-xfstests, by specifying the introduced "inlinecrypt" mount option, so that en/decryption happens with the blk-crypto fallback. The patches were also tested on a Pixel 4 with UFS hardware that has support for inline encryption. There have been a few patch sets addressing Inline Encryption Support in the past. Briefly, this patch set differs from those as follows: 1) "crypto: qce: ice: Add support for Inline Crypto Engine" is specific to certain hardware, while our patch set's Inline Encryption support for UFS is implemented according to the JEDEC UFS specification. 2) "scsi: ufs: UFS Host Controller crypto changes" registers inline encryption support as a kernel crypto algorithm. Our patch views inline encryption as being fundamentally different from a generic crypto provider (in that inline encryption is tied to a device), and so does not use the kernel crypto API to represent inline encryption hardware. 3) "scsi: ufs: add real time/inline crypto support to UFS HCD" requires the device mapper to work - our patch does not. Changes v6 => v7: - Keyslot management is now done on a per-request basis rather than a per-bio basis. - Storage drivers can now specify the maximum number of bytes they can accept for the data unit number (DUN) for each crypto algorithm, and upper layers can specify the minimum number of bytes of DUN they want with the blk_crypto_key they send with the bio - a driver is only considered to support a blk_crypto_key if the driver supports at least as many DUN bytes as the upper layer wants. This is necessary because storage drivers may not support as many bytes as the algorithm specification dictates (for e.g. UFS only supports 8 byte DUNs for AES-256-XTS, even though the algorithm specification says DUNs are 16 bytes long). - Introduce SB_INLINECRYPT to keep track of whether inline encryption is enabled for a filesystem (instead of using an fscrypt_operation). - Expose keyslot manager declaration and embed it within ufs_hba to clean up code. - Make blk-crypto preclude blk-integrity. - Some bug fixes - Introduce UFSHCD_QUIRK_BROKEN_CRYPTO for UFS drivers that don't support inline encryption (yet) Changes v5 => v6: - Blk-crypto's kernel crypto API fallback is no longer restricted to 8-byte DUNs. It's also now separately configurable from blk-crypto, and can be disabled entirely, while still allowing the kernel to use inline encryption hardware. Further, struct bio_crypt_ctx takes up less space, and no longer contains the information needed by the crypto API fallback - the fallback allocates the required memory when necessary. - Blk-crypto now supports all file content encryption modes supported by fscrypt. - Fixed bio merging logic in blk-merge.c - Fscrypt now supports inline encryption with the direct key policy, since blk-crypto now has support for larger DUNs. - Keyslot manager now uses a hashtable to lookup which keyslot contains any particular key (thanks Eric!) - Fscrypt support for inline encryption now handles filesystems with multiple underlying block devices (thanks Eric!) - Numerous cleanups Changes v4 => v5: - The fscrypt patch has been separated into 2. The first adds support for the IV_INO_LBLK_64 policy (which was called INLINE_CRYPT_OPTIMIZED in past versions of this series). This policy is now purely an on disk format, and doesn't dictate whether blk-crypto is used for file content encryption or not. Instead, this is now decided based on the "inlinecrypt" mount option. - Inline crypto key eviction is now handled by blk-crypto instead of fscrypt. - More refactoring. Changes v3 => v4: - Fixed the issue with allocating crypto_skcipher in blk_crypto_keyslot_program. - bio_crypto_alloc_ctx is now mempool backed. - In f2fs, a bio's bi_crypt_context is now set up when the bio is allocated, rather than just before the bio is submitted - this fixes bugs in certain cases, like when an encrypted block is being moved without decryption. - Lots of refactoring and cleanup of blk-crypto - thanks Eric! Changes v2 => v3: - Overhauled keyslot manager's get keyslot logic and optimized LRU. - Block crypto en/decryption fallback now supports data unit sizes that divide the bvec length (instead of requiring each bvec's length to be the same as the data unit size). - fscrypt master key is now keyed additionally by super_block and ci_ctfm != NULL. - all references of "hw encryption" are replaced by inline encryption. - address various other review comments from Eric. Changes v1 => v2: - Block layer and UFS changes are split into 3 patches each. - We now only have a ptr to a struct bio_crypt_ctx in struct bio, instead of the struct itself. - struct bio_crypt_ctx no longer has flags. - blk-crypto now correctly handles the case when it fails to init (because of insufficient memory), but kernel continues to boot. - ufshcd-crypto now works on big endian cpus. - Many cleanups. Eric Biggers (1): ext4: add inline encryption support Satya Tangirala (8): block: Keyslot Manager for Inline Encryption block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq block: blk-crypto-fallback for Inline Encryption scsi: ufs: UFS driver v2.1 spec crypto additions scsi: ufs: UFS crypto API scsi: ufs: Add inline encryption support to UFS fscrypt: add inline encryption support f2fs: add inline encryption support Documentation/admin-guide/ext4.rst | 4 + Documentation/block/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst | 162 ++++++ Documentation/filesystems/f2fs.txt | 4 + block/Kconfig | 17 + block/Makefile | 2 + block/bio-integrity.c | 5 + block/bio.c | 7 +- block/blk-core.c | 16 + block/blk-crypto-fallback.c | 673 ++++++++++++++++++++++ block/blk-crypto-internal.h | 51 ++ block/blk-crypto.c | 441 ++++++++++++++ block/blk-map.c | 1 + block/blk-merge.c | 11 + block/blk-mq.c | 16 + block/blk.h | 3 + block/bounce.c | 2 + block/keyslot-manager.c | 426 ++++++++++++++ drivers/md/dm.c | 2 + drivers/scsi/ufs/Kconfig | 9 + drivers/scsi/ufs/Makefile | 1 + drivers/scsi/ufs/ufs-hisi.c | 8 + drivers/scsi/ufs/ufs-qcom.c | 7 + drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.c | 393 +++++++++++++ drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.h | 68 +++ drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 61 +- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.h | 33 ++ drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshci.h | 67 ++- fs/buffer.c | 7 +- fs/crypto/Kconfig | 6 + fs/crypto/Makefile | 1 + fs/crypto/bio.c | 55 ++ fs/crypto/crypto.c | 2 +- fs/crypto/fname.c | 4 +- fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 121 +++- fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c | 324 +++++++++++ fs/crypto/keyring.c | 4 +- fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 95 ++- fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c | 16 +- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 1 + fs/ext4/inode.c | 4 +- fs/ext4/page-io.c | 6 +- fs/ext4/readpage.c | 11 +- fs/ext4/super.c | 19 + fs/f2fs/compress.c | 2 +- fs/f2fs/data.c | 67 ++- fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 3 + fs/f2fs/super.c | 35 ++ include/linux/bio.h | 1 + include/linux/blk-crypto.h | 271 +++++++++ include/linux/blk_types.h | 12 + include/linux/blkdev.h | 16 + include/linux/fs.h | 1 + include/linux/fscrypt.h | 57 ++ include/linux/keyslot-manager.h | 108 ++++ 55 files changed, 3654 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst create mode 100644 block/blk-crypto-fallback.c create mode 100644 block/blk-crypto-internal.h create mode 100644 block/blk-crypto.c create mode 100644 block/keyslot-manager.c create mode 100644 drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.c create mode 100644 drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.h create mode 100644 fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c create mode 100644 include/linux/blk-crypto.h create mode 100644 include/linux/keyslot-manager.h -- 2.25.0.265.gbab2e86ba0-goog _______________________________________________ Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list Linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel