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From: Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel <linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
To: linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
	Barani Muthukumaran <bmuthuku@qti.qualcomm.com>,
	Kim Boojin <boojin.kim@samsung.com>,
	Kuohong Wang <kuohong.wang@mediatek.com>,
	Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Subject: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v13 04/12] block: Make blk-integrity preclude hardware inline encryption
Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 00:37:19 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200514003727.69001-5-satyat@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200514003727.69001-1-satyat@google.com>

Whenever a device supports blk-integrity, make the kernel pretend that
the device doesn't support inline encryption (essentially by setting the
keyslot manager in the request queue to NULL).

There's no hardware currently that supports both integrity and inline
encryption. However, it seems possible that there will be such hardware
in the near future (like the NVMe key per I/O support that might support
both inline encryption and PI).

But properly integrating both features is not trivial, and without
real hardware that implements both, it is difficult to tell if it will
be done correctly by the majority of hardware that support both.
So it seems best not to support both features together right now, and
to decide what to do at probe time.

Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
---
 block/bio-integrity.c   |  3 +++
 block/blk-integrity.c   |  7 +++++++
 block/keyslot-manager.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/blkdev.h  | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 59 insertions(+)

diff --git a/block/bio-integrity.c b/block/bio-integrity.c
index bf62c25cde8f4..3579ac0f6ec1f 100644
--- a/block/bio-integrity.c
+++ b/block/bio-integrity.c
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ struct bio_integrity_payload *bio_integrity_alloc(struct bio *bio,
 	struct bio_set *bs = bio->bi_pool;
 	unsigned inline_vecs;
 
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_has_crypt_ctx(bio)))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+
 	if (!bs || !mempool_initialized(&bs->bio_integrity_pool)) {
 		bip = kmalloc(struct_size(bip, bip_inline_vecs, nr_vecs), gfp_mask);
 		inline_vecs = nr_vecs;
diff --git a/block/blk-integrity.c b/block/blk-integrity.c
index ff1070edbb400..c03705cbb9c9f 100644
--- a/block/blk-integrity.c
+++ b/block/blk-integrity.c
@@ -409,6 +409,13 @@ void blk_integrity_register(struct gendisk *disk, struct blk_integrity *template
 	bi->tag_size = template->tag_size;
 
 	disk->queue->backing_dev_info->capabilities |= BDI_CAP_STABLE_WRITES;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION
+	if (disk->queue->ksm) {
+		pr_warn("blk-integrity: Integrity and hardware inline encryption are not supported together. Disabling hardware inline encryption.\n");
+		blk_ksm_unregister(disk->queue);
+	}
+#endif
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(blk_integrity_register);
 
diff --git a/block/keyslot-manager.c b/block/keyslot-manager.c
index fcd3fd469d7c1..c2ef41b3147ba 100644
--- a/block/keyslot-manager.c
+++ b/block/keyslot-manager.c
@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@
  * Upper layers will call blk_ksm_get_slot_for_key() to program a
  * key into some slot in the inline encryption hardware.
  */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "blk-crypto: " fmt
+
 #include <linux/keyslot-manager.h>
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
@@ -376,3 +379,19 @@ void blk_ksm_destroy(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm)
 	memzero_explicit(ksm, sizeof(*ksm));
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_ksm_destroy);
+
+bool blk_ksm_register(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, struct request_queue *q)
+{
+	if (blk_integrity_queue_supports_integrity(q)) {
+		pr_warn("Integrity and hardware inline encryption are not supported together. Disabling hardware inline encryption.\n");
+		return false;
+	}
+	q->ksm = ksm;
+	return true;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_ksm_register);
+
+void blk_ksm_unregister(struct request_queue *q)
+{
+	q->ksm = NULL;
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/blkdev.h b/include/linux/blkdev.h
index de38318a7acf0..d8f85fe696752 100644
--- a/include/linux/blkdev.h
+++ b/include/linux/blkdev.h
@@ -1582,6 +1582,12 @@ struct blk_integrity *bdev_get_integrity(struct block_device *bdev)
 	return blk_get_integrity(bdev->bd_disk);
 }
 
+static inline bool
+blk_integrity_queue_supports_integrity(struct request_queue *q)
+{
+	return q->integrity.profile;
+}
+
 static inline bool blk_integrity_rq(struct request *rq)
 {
 	return rq->cmd_flags & REQ_INTEGRITY;
@@ -1662,6 +1668,11 @@ static inline struct blk_integrity *blk_get_integrity(struct gendisk *disk)
 {
 	return NULL;
 }
+static inline bool
+blk_integrity_queue_supports_integrity(struct request_queue *q)
+{
+	return false;
+}
 static inline int blk_integrity_compare(struct gendisk *a, struct gendisk *b)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -1713,6 +1724,25 @@ static inline struct bio_vec *rq_integrity_vec(struct request *rq)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INTEGRITY */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION
+
+bool blk_ksm_register(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, struct request_queue *q);
+
+void blk_ksm_unregister(struct request_queue *q);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION */
+
+static inline bool blk_ksm_register(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm,
+				    struct request_queue *q)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline void blk_ksm_unregister(struct request_queue *q) { }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION */
+
+
 struct block_device_operations {
 	int (*open) (struct block_device *, fmode_t);
 	void (*release) (struct gendisk *, fmode_t);
-- 
2.26.2.645.ge9eca65c58-goog



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  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-05-14  1:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-14  0:37 [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v13 00/12] Inline Encryption Support Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-05-14  0:37 ` [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v13 01/12] Documentation: Document the blk-crypto framework Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-05-14  0:37 ` [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v13 02/12] block: Keyslot Manager for Inline Encryption Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-05-14  0:37 ` [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v13 03/12] block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-05-14  0:37 ` Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel [this message]
2020-05-14  0:37 ` [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v13 05/12] block: blk-crypto-fallback for Inline Encryption Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-05-14  0:37 ` [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v13 06/12] scsi: ufs: UFS driver v2.1 spec crypto additions Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-05-15  3:55   ` Stanley Chu
2020-05-14  0:37 ` [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v13 07/12] scsi: ufs: UFS crypto API Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-05-15  6:35   ` Stanley Chu
2020-05-14  0:37 ` [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v13 08/12] scsi: ufs: Add inline encryption support to UFS Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-05-14  5:12   ` Eric Biggers
2020-05-15  7:37   ` Stanley Chu
2020-05-14  0:37 ` [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v13 09/12] fs: introduce SB_INLINECRYPT Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-05-14  0:37 ` [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v13 10/12] fscrypt: add inline encryption support Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-05-28 21:54   ` Eric Biggers
2020-06-03  2:07   ` Eric Biggers
2020-05-14  0:37 ` [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v13 11/12] f2fs: " Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-05-14  0:37 ` [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v13 12/12] ext4: " Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-05-14  5:10 ` [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v13 00/12] Inline Encryption Support Eric Biggers
2020-05-14 15:48   ` Jens Axboe
2020-05-15  7:41     ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-15 12:25       ` Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-05-15 14:42         ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-15 17:00           ` Eric Biggers
2020-05-18 16:50             ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-05-15  1:04   ` Martin K. Petersen

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