linux-fscrypt.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org,
	axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org,
	eparis@redhat.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org,
	dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v12 5/20] initramfs|security: Add security hook to initramfs unpack
Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 13:18:03 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <13daca32-ee3f-46f5-a6ca-66bb02726e5c@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b9ca171301d5abeb78922dd79d65136a@paul-moore.com>



On 2/3/2024 2:25 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Jan 30, 2024 Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>>
>> This patch introduces a new hook to notify security system that the
>> content of initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs.
>>
>> Upon receiving this notification, the security system can activate
>> a policy to allow only files that originated from the initramfs to
>> execute or load into kernel during the early stages of booting.
>>
>> This approach is crucial for minimizing the attack surface by
>> ensuring that only trusted files from the initramfs are operational
>> in the critical boot phase.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
>> ---
>> v1-v11:
>>    + Not present
>>
>> v12:
>>    + Introduced
>> ---
>>   include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  4 ++++
>>   include/linux/security.h      | 10 ++++++++++
>>   init/initramfs.c              |  3 +++
>>   security/security.c           | 12 ++++++++++++
>>   4 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
>> index 185924c56378..b247388786a9 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
>> @@ -425,3 +425,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_override_creds, const struct cred *new)
>>   LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_sqpoll, void)
>>   LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_cmd, struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
>>   #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
>> +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, unpack_initramfs_security, void)
>> +#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */
> 
> Let's just call it "unpack_initramfs", the "_security" part is somewhat
> implied since we are talking about a LSM hook ;)
> 
>> diff --git a/init/initramfs.c b/init/initramfs.c
>> index 76deb48c38cb..075a5794cde5 100644
>> --- a/init/initramfs.c
>> +++ b/init/initramfs.c
>> @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
>>   #include <linux/init_syscalls.h>
>>   #include <linux/task_work.h>
>>   #include <linux/umh.h>
>> +#include <linux/security.h>
>>   
>>   static __initdata bool csum_present;
>>   static __initdata u32 io_csum;
>> @@ -720,6 +721,8 @@ static void __init do_populate_rootfs(void *unused, async_cookie_t cookie)
>>   #endif
>>   	}
>>   
>> +	security_unpack_initramfs();
> 
> Given the caller, what do you think of changing the hook name to
> "security_initramfs_populated()"?  I think this not only matches up
> better with the caller, "do_populate_rootfs()", but since in using the
> past tense we help indicate that this hook happens *after* the rootfs
> is populated with the initramfs data.
> 

Yeah, I agree this sounds better. I will update this part.

-Fan
>>   done:
>>   	/*
>>   	 * If the initrd region is overlapped with crashkernel reserved region,
>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>> index ddf2e69cf8f2..2a527d4c69bc 100644
>> --- a/security/security.c
>> +++ b/security/security.c
>> @@ -5581,3 +5581,15 @@ int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
>>   	return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd);
>>   }
>>   #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
>> +/**
>> + * security_unpack_initramfs() - Notify LSM that initramfs has been loaded
>> + *
>> + * Tells the LSM the initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs.
>> + */
>> +void security_unpack_initramfs(void)
>> +{
>> +	call_void_hook(unpack_initramfs_security);
>> +}
>> +#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */
>> -- 
>> 2.43.0
> 
> --
> paul-moore.com

  reply	other threads:[~2024-02-05 21:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-01-30 22:36 [RFC PATCH v12 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2024-01-30 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v12 01/20] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2024-01-30 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v12 02/20] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2024-01-30 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v12 03/20] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2024-01-30 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v12 04/20] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2024-01-30 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v12 05/20] initramfs|security: Add security hook to initramfs unpack Fan Wu
2024-02-03 22:25   ` [PATCH RFC v12 5/20] " Paul Moore
2024-02-05 21:18     ` Fan Wu [this message]
2024-01-30 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v12 06/20] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-02-03 22:25   ` [PATCH RFC v12 6/20] " Paul Moore
2024-02-05 22:39     ` Fan Wu
2024-01-30 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v12 07/20] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2024-01-30 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v12 08/20] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2024-02-03 22:25   ` [PATCH RFC v12 8/20] " Paul Moore
2024-02-05 23:01     ` Fan Wu
2024-02-05 23:10       ` Paul Moore
2024-02-05 23:21         ` Fan Wu
2024-01-30 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v12 09/20] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2024-02-03 22:25   ` [PATCH RFC v12 9/20] " Paul Moore
2024-01-30 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v12 10/20] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2024-02-03 22:25   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2024-01-30 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v12 11/20] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device Fan Wu
2024-01-30 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v12 12/20] dm verity: set DM_TARGET_SINGLETON feature flag Fan Wu
2024-02-02 18:51   ` Mike Snitzer
2024-02-03  3:56     ` Fan Wu
2024-01-30 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v12 13/20] dm: add finalize hook to target_type Fan Wu
2024-01-30 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v12 14/20] dm verity: consume root hash digest and signature data via LSM hook Fan Wu
2024-01-30 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v12 15/20] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-02-03 22:25   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2024-02-05 23:11     ` Fan Wu
2024-02-06 21:53       ` Paul Moore
2024-01-30 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v12 16/20] fsverity: consume builtin signature via LSM hook Fan Wu
2024-01-30 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v12 17/20] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-02-03 22:25   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2024-01-30 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v12 18/20] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2024-01-30 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v12 19/20] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2024-01-30 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v12 20/20] documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=13daca32-ee3f-46f5-a6ca-66bb02726e5c@linux.microsoft.com \
    --to=wufan@linux.microsoft.com \
    --cc=agk@redhat.com \
    --cc=audit@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=axboe@kernel.dk \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dm-devel@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=ebiggers@kernel.org \
    --cc=eparis@redhat.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=linux-block@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=snitzer@kernel.org \
    --cc=tytso@mit.edu \
    --cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).