From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org,
"Theodore Y . Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>,
linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>,
Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>,
linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com>,
g@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fscrypt: support passing a keyring key to FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2019 19:29:44 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191115172944.GB21300@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191113203550.GI221701@gmail.com>
On Wed, Nov 13, 2019 at 12:35:51PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 06, 2019 at 04:12:59PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
> >
> > Extend the FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl to allow the raw key to be
> > specified by a Linux keyring key, rather than specified directly.
> >
> > This is useful because fscrypt keys belong to a particular filesystem
> > instance, so they are destroyed when that filesystem is unmounted.
> > Usually this is desired. But in some cases, userspace may need to
> > unmount and re-mount the filesystem while keeping the keys, e.g. during
> > a system update. This requires keeping the keys somewhere else too.
> >
> > The keys could be kept in memory in a userspace daemon. But depending
> > on the security architecture and assumptions, it can be preferable to
> > keep them only in kernel memory, where they are unreadable by userspace.
> >
> > We also can't solve this by going back to the original fscrypt API
> > (where for each file, the master key was looked up in the process's
> > keyring hierarchy) because that caused lots of problems of its own.
> >
> > Therefore, add the ability for FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY to accept a
> > Linux keyring key. This solves the problem by allowing userspace to (if
> > needed) save the keys securely in a Linux keyring for re-provisioning,
> > while still using the new fscrypt key management ioctls.
> >
> > This is analogous to how dm-crypt accepts a Linux keyring key, but the
> > key is then stored internally in the dm-crypt data structures rather
> > than being looked up again each time the dm-crypt device is accessed.
> >
> > Use a custom key type "fscrypt-provisioning" rather than one of the
> > existing key types such as "logon". This is strongly desired because it
> > enforces that these keys are only usable for a particular purpose: for
> > fscrypt as input to a particular KDF. Otherwise, the keys could also be
> > passed to any kernel API that accepts a "logon" key with any service
> > prefix, e.g. dm-crypt, UBIFS, or (recently proposed) AF_ALG. This would
> > risk leaking information about the raw key despite it ostensibly being
> > unreadable. Of course, this mistake has already been made for multiple
> > kernel APIs; but since this is a new API, let's do it right.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
>
> David and Jarkko, are you okay with this patch from a keyrings subsystem
> perspective?
Thanks for reminding. Still catching up with keyring. I gave some
feedback to the patch.
/Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-11-15 17:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-11-07 0:12 [PATCH] fscrypt: support passing a keyring key to FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY Eric Biggers
2019-11-13 20:35 ` Eric Biggers
2019-11-15 17:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2019-11-15 17:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-15 19:22 ` Eric Biggers
2019-11-15 22:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-15 23:04 ` Eric Biggers
2019-11-18 18:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-18 18:14 ` Eric Biggers
2019-11-16 0:01 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-11-17 21:44 ` Darrick J. Wong
2019-11-18 18:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-18 18:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-11-18 18:27 ` Eric Biggers
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