From: "Darrick J. Wong" <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
To: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
Barani Muthukumaran <bmuthuku@qti.qualcomm.com>,
Kuohong Wang <kuohong.wang@mediatek.com>,
Kim Boojin <boojin.kim@samsung.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 2/9] block: Add encryption context to struct bio
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2019 13:21:16 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191218212116.GA7476@magnolia> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191218145136.172774-3-satyat@google.com>
On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 06:51:29AM -0800, Satya Tangirala wrote:
> We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what
> encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However,
> it's the filesystem/fscrypt that knows about and manages encryption
> contexts. As such, when the filesystem layer submits a bio to the block
> layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for
> inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the
> encryption context for that bio.
>
> We want to communicate the encryption context from the filesystem layer
> to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the
> block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which
> can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private
> field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass
> information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various
> functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging
> logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx.
>
> Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
> ---
> block/Makefile | 2 +-
> block/bio-crypt-ctx.c | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> block/bio.c | 16 ++--
> block/blk-core.c | 3 +
> block/blk-merge.c | 11 +++
> block/bounce.c | 12 ++-
> drivers/md/dm.c | 3 +-
> include/linux/bio-crypt-ctx.h | 146 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> include/linux/blk_types.h | 6 ++
> 9 files changed, 312 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 block/bio-crypt-ctx.c
>
> diff --git a/block/Makefile b/block/Makefile
> index 7c603669f216..79f2b8b3fc5d 100644
> --- a/block/Makefile
> +++ b/block/Makefile
> @@ -37,4 +37,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_DEBUG_FS) += blk-mq-debugfs.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_DEBUG_FS_ZONED)+= blk-mq-debugfs-zoned.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_SED_OPAL) += sed-opal.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_PM) += blk-pm.o
> -obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION) += keyslot-manager.o
> \ No newline at end of file
> +obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION) += keyslot-manager.o bio-crypt-ctx.o
> \ No newline at end of file
> diff --git a/block/bio-crypt-ctx.c b/block/bio-crypt-ctx.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..dadf0da3c21b
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/block/bio-crypt-ctx.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * Copyright 2019 Google LLC
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/bio.h>
> +#include <linux/blkdev.h>
> +#include <linux/keyslot-manager.h>
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +
> +
> +static int num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs = 128;
> +
> +module_param(num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs, int, 0444);
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs,
> + "Number of bio crypto contexts to preallocate");
> +
> +static struct kmem_cache *bio_crypt_ctx_cache;
> +static mempool_t *bio_crypt_ctx_pool;
> +
> +int __init bio_crypt_ctx_init(void)
> +{
> + bio_crypt_ctx_cache = KMEM_CACHE(bio_crypt_ctx, 0);
> + if (!bio_crypt_ctx_cache)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + bio_crypt_ctx_pool = mempool_create_slab_pool(num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs,
> + bio_crypt_ctx_cache);
> + if (!bio_crypt_ctx_pool)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + /* This is assumed in various places. */
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID != 0);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +struct bio_crypt_ctx *bio_crypt_alloc_ctx(gfp_t gfp_mask)
> +{
> + return mempool_alloc(bio_crypt_ctx_pool, gfp_mask);
> +}
> +
> +void bio_crypt_free_ctx(struct bio *bio)
> +{
> + mempool_free(bio->bi_crypt_context, bio_crypt_ctx_pool);
> + bio->bi_crypt_context = NULL;
> +}
> +
> +void bio_crypt_clone(struct bio *dst, struct bio *src, gfp_t gfp_mask)
> +{
> + const struct bio_crypt_ctx *src_bc = src->bi_crypt_context;
> +
> + /*
> + * If a bio is swhandled, then it will be decrypted when bio_endio
> + * is called. As we only want the data to be decrypted once, copies
> + * of the bio must not have have a crypt context.
> + */
> + if (!src_bc)
> + return;
> +
> + dst->bi_crypt_context = bio_crypt_alloc_ctx(gfp_mask);
> + *dst->bi_crypt_context = *src_bc;
> +
> + if (src_bc->bc_keyslot >= 0)
> + keyslot_manager_get_slot(src_bc->bc_ksm, src_bc->bc_keyslot);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bio_crypt_clone);
> +
> +bool bio_crypt_should_process(struct request *rq)
> +{
> + struct bio *bio = rq->bio;
> +
> + if (!bio || !bio->bi_crypt_context)
> + return false;
> +
> + return rq->q->ksm == bio->bi_crypt_context->bc_ksm;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bio_crypt_should_process);
> +
> +/*
> + * Checks that two bio crypt contexts are compatible - i.e. that
> + * they are mergeable except for data_unit_num continuity.
> + */
> +bool bio_crypt_ctx_compatible(struct bio *b_1, struct bio *b_2)
> +{
> + struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc1 = b_1->bi_crypt_context;
> + struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc2 = b_2->bi_crypt_context;
> +
> + if (bc1 != bc2)
> + return false;
> +
> + return !bc1 || bc1->bc_key == bc2->bc_key;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Checks that two bio crypt contexts are compatible, and also
> + * that their data_unit_nums are continuous (and can hence be merged)
> + * in the order b_1 followed by b_2.
> + */
> +bool bio_crypt_ctx_mergeable(struct bio *b_1, unsigned int b1_bytes,
> + struct bio *b_2)
> +{
> + struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc1 = b_1->bi_crypt_context;
> + struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc2 = b_2->bi_crypt_context;
> +
> + if (!bio_crypt_ctx_compatible(b_1, b_2))
> + return false;
> +
> + return !bc1 || bio_crypt_dun_is_contiguous(bc1, b1_bytes, bc2->bc_dun);
> +}
> +
> +void bio_crypt_ctx_release_keyslot(struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc)
> +{
> + keyslot_manager_put_slot(bc->bc_ksm, bc->bc_keyslot);
> + bc->bc_ksm = NULL;
> + bc->bc_keyslot = -1;
> +}
> +
> +int bio_crypt_ctx_acquire_keyslot(struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc,
> + struct keyslot_manager *ksm)
> +{
> + int slot = keyslot_manager_get_slot_for_key(ksm, bc->bc_key);
> +
> + if (slot < 0)
> + return slot;
> +
> + bc->bc_keyslot = slot;
> + bc->bc_ksm = ksm;
> + return 0;
> +}
> diff --git a/block/bio.c b/block/bio.c
> index a5d75f6bf4c7..c99e054d56ef 100644
> --- a/block/bio.c
> +++ b/block/bio.c
> @@ -236,6 +236,8 @@ void bio_uninit(struct bio *bio)
>
> if (bio_integrity(bio))
> bio_integrity_free(bio);
> +
> + bio_crypt_free_ctx(bio);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(bio_uninit);
>
> @@ -615,15 +617,12 @@ struct bio *bio_clone_fast(struct bio *bio, gfp_t gfp_mask, struct bio_set *bs)
>
> __bio_clone_fast(b, bio);
>
> - if (bio_integrity(bio)) {
> - int ret;
> -
> - ret = bio_integrity_clone(b, bio, gfp_mask);
> + bio_crypt_clone(b, bio, gfp_mask);
>
> - if (ret < 0) {
> - bio_put(b);
> - return NULL;
> - }
> + if (bio_integrity(bio) &&
> + bio_integrity_clone(b, bio, gfp_mask) < 0) {
> + bio_put(b);
> + return NULL;
> }
>
> return b;
> @@ -997,6 +996,7 @@ void bio_advance(struct bio *bio, unsigned bytes)
> if (bio_integrity(bio))
> bio_integrity_advance(bio, bytes);
>
> + bio_crypt_advance(bio, bytes);
> bio_advance_iter(bio, &bio->bi_iter, bytes);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(bio_advance);
> diff --git a/block/blk-core.c b/block/blk-core.c
> index e0a094fddee5..5200f4d1fed4 100644
> --- a/block/blk-core.c
> +++ b/block/blk-core.c
> @@ -1810,5 +1810,8 @@ int __init blk_dev_init(void)
> blk_debugfs_root = debugfs_create_dir("block", NULL);
> #endif
>
> + if (bio_crypt_ctx_init() < 0)
> + panic("Failed to allocate mem for bio crypt ctxs\n");
> +
> return 0;
> }
> diff --git a/block/blk-merge.c b/block/blk-merge.c
> index d783bdc4559b..5e53aad97da9 100644
> --- a/block/blk-merge.c
> +++ b/block/blk-merge.c
> @@ -596,6 +596,8 @@ int ll_back_merge_fn(struct request *req, struct bio *bio, unsigned int nr_segs)
> req_set_nomerge(req->q, req);
> return 0;
> }
> + if (!bio_crypt_ctx_mergeable(req->bio, blk_rq_bytes(req), bio))
> + return 0;
>
> return ll_new_hw_segment(req, bio, nr_segs);
> }
> @@ -612,6 +614,8 @@ int ll_front_merge_fn(struct request *req, struct bio *bio, unsigned int nr_segs
> req_set_nomerge(req->q, req);
> return 0;
> }
> + if (!bio_crypt_ctx_mergeable(bio, bio->bi_iter.bi_size, req->bio))
> + return 0;
>
> return ll_new_hw_segment(req, bio, nr_segs);
> }
> @@ -656,6 +660,9 @@ static int ll_merge_requests_fn(struct request_queue *q, struct request *req,
> if (blk_integrity_merge_rq(q, req, next) == false)
> return 0;
>
> + if (!bio_crypt_ctx_mergeable(req->bio, blk_rq_bytes(req), next->bio))
> + return 0;
> +
> /* Merge is OK... */
> req->nr_phys_segments = total_phys_segments;
> return 1;
> @@ -895,6 +902,10 @@ bool blk_rq_merge_ok(struct request *rq, struct bio *bio)
> if (rq->ioprio != bio_prio(bio))
> return false;
>
> + /* Only merge if the crypt contexts are compatible */
> + if (!bio_crypt_ctx_compatible(bio, rq->bio))
> + return false;
> +
> return true;
> }
>
> diff --git a/block/bounce.c b/block/bounce.c
> index f8ed677a1bf7..aa57ccc6ced3 100644
> --- a/block/bounce.c
> +++ b/block/bounce.c
> @@ -267,14 +267,12 @@ static struct bio *bounce_clone_bio(struct bio *bio_src, gfp_t gfp_mask,
> break;
> }
>
> - if (bio_integrity(bio_src)) {
> - int ret;
> + bio_crypt_clone(bio, bio_src, gfp_mask);
>
> - ret = bio_integrity_clone(bio, bio_src, gfp_mask);
> - if (ret < 0) {
> - bio_put(bio);
> - return NULL;
> - }
> + if (bio_integrity(bio_src) &&
> + bio_integrity_clone(bio, bio_src, gfp_mask) < 0) {
> + bio_put(bio);
> + return NULL;
> }
>
> bio_clone_blkg_association(bio, bio_src);
> diff --git a/drivers/md/dm.c b/drivers/md/dm.c
> index e8f9661a10a1..783e0d5fd130 100644
> --- a/drivers/md/dm.c
> +++ b/drivers/md/dm.c
> @@ -1304,9 +1304,10 @@ static int clone_bio(struct dm_target_io *tio, struct bio *bio,
>
> __bio_clone_fast(clone, bio);
>
> + bio_crypt_clone(clone, bio, GFP_NOIO);
> +
> if (bio_integrity(bio)) {
> int r;
> -
> if (unlikely(!dm_target_has_integrity(tio->ti->type) &&
> !dm_target_passes_integrity(tio->ti->type))) {
> DMWARN("%s: the target %s doesn't support integrity data.",
> diff --git a/include/linux/bio-crypt-ctx.h b/include/linux/bio-crypt-ctx.h
> index dd4ac9d95428..4535df0a6349 100644
> --- a/include/linux/bio-crypt-ctx.h
> +++ b/include/linux/bio-crypt-ctx.h
> @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
> enum blk_crypto_mode_num {
> BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID,
> BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS,
> - BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC,
> + BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC_ESSIV,
> BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_ADIANTUM,
> BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX,
> };
> @@ -44,6 +44,150 @@ struct blk_crypto_key {
> u8 raw[BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
> };
>
> +#define BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE 32
> +#define BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE (BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE/sizeof(u64))
> +
> +/**
> + * struct bio_crypt_ctx - an inline encryption context
> + * @bc_key: the key, algorithm, and data unit size to use
> + * @bc_keyslot: the keyslot that has been assigned for this key in @bc_ksm,
> + * or -1 if no keyslot has been assigned yet.
> + * @bc_dun: the data unit number (starting IV) to use
> + * @bc_ksm: the keyslot manager into which the key has been programmed with
> + * @bc_keyslot, or NULL if this key hasn't yet been programmed.
> + *
> + * A bio_crypt_ctx specifies that the contents of the bio will be encrypted (for
> + * write requests) or decrypted (for read requests) inline by the storage device
> + * or controller, or by the crypto API fallback.
> + */
> +struct bio_crypt_ctx {
> + const struct blk_crypto_key *bc_key;
> + int bc_keyslot;
> +
> + /* Data unit number */
> + u64 bc_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE];
> +
> + /*
> + * The keyslot manager where the key has been programmed
> + * with keyslot.
> + */
> + struct keyslot_manager *bc_ksm;
> +};
> +
> +int bio_crypt_ctx_init(void);
> +
> +struct bio_crypt_ctx *bio_crypt_alloc_ctx(gfp_t gfp_mask);
> +
> +void bio_crypt_free_ctx(struct bio *bio);
> +
> +static inline bool bio_has_crypt_ctx(struct bio *bio)
> +{
> + return bio->bi_crypt_context;
> +}
> +
> +void bio_crypt_clone(struct bio *dst, struct bio *src, gfp_t gfp_mask);
> +
> +static inline void bio_crypt_set_ctx(struct bio *bio,
> + const struct blk_crypto_key *key,
> + u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE],
> + gfp_t gfp_mask)
> +{
> + struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = bio_crypt_alloc_ctx(gfp_mask);
> +
> + bc->bc_key = key;
> + memcpy(bc->bc_dun, dun, sizeof(bc->bc_dun));
> + bc->bc_ksm = NULL;
> + bc->bc_keyslot = -1;
> +
> + bio->bi_crypt_context = bc;
> +}
> +
> +void bio_crypt_ctx_release_keyslot(struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc);
> +
> +int bio_crypt_ctx_acquire_keyslot(struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc,
> + struct keyslot_manager *ksm);
> +
> +struct request;
> +bool bio_crypt_should_process(struct request *rq);
> +
> +static inline bool bio_crypt_dun_is_contiguous(const struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc,
> + unsigned int bytes,
> + u64 next_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE])
> +{
> + int i = 0;
> + unsigned int inc = bytes >> bc->bc_key->data_unit_size_bits;
> +
> + while (inc && i < BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE) {
> + if (bc->bc_dun[i] + inc != next_dun[i])
> + return false;
> + inc = ((bc->bc_dun[i] + inc) < inc);
> + i++;
> + }
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +
> +static inline void bio_crypt_dun_increment(u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE],
> + unsigned int inc)
> +{
> + int i = 0;
> +
> + while (inc && i < BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE) {
> + dun[i] += inc;
> + inc = (dun[i] < inc);
> + i++;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static inline void bio_crypt_advance(struct bio *bio, unsigned int bytes)
> +{
> + struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = bio->bi_crypt_context;
> +
> + if (!bc)
> + return;
> +
> + bio_crypt_dun_increment(bc->bc_dun,
> + bytes >> bc->bc_key->data_unit_size_bits);
> +}
> +
> +bool bio_crypt_ctx_compatible(struct bio *b_1, struct bio *b_2);
> +
> +bool bio_crypt_ctx_mergeable(struct bio *b_1, unsigned int b1_bytes,
> + struct bio *b_2);
> +
> +#else /* CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION */
> +static inline int bio_crypt_ctx_init(void)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline bool bio_has_crypt_ctx(struct bio *bio)
> +{
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void bio_crypt_clone(struct bio *dst, struct bio *src,
> + gfp_t gfp_mask) { }
> +
> +static inline void bio_crypt_free_ctx(struct bio *bio) { }
> +
> +static inline void bio_crypt_advance(struct bio *bio, unsigned int bytes) { }
> +
> +static inline bool bio_crypt_ctx_compatible(struct bio *b_1, struct bio *b_2)
> +{
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +static inline bool bio_crypt_ctx_mergeable(struct bio *b_1,
> + unsigned int b1_bytes,
> + struct bio *b_2)
> +{
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION */
> +
> #endif /* CONFIG_BLOCK */
> +
> #endif /* __LINUX_BIO_CRYPT_CTX_H */
> diff --git a/include/linux/blk_types.h b/include/linux/blk_types.h
> index 70254ae11769..1996689c51d3 100644
> --- a/include/linux/blk_types.h
> +++ b/include/linux/blk_types.h
> @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct block_device;
> struct io_context;
> struct cgroup_subsys_state;
> typedef void (bio_end_io_t) (struct bio *);
> +struct bio_crypt_ctx;
>
> /*
> * Block error status values. See block/blk-core:blk_errors for the details.
> @@ -173,6 +174,11 @@ struct bio {
> u64 bi_iocost_cost;
> #endif
> #endif
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION
> + struct bio_crypt_ctx *bi_crypt_context;
> +#endif
This grows struct bio even if we aren't actively using bi_crypt_context,
and I thought Jens told us to stop making it bigger. :)
--D
> +
> union {
> #if defined(CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INTEGRITY)
> struct bio_integrity_payload *bi_integrity; /* data integrity */
> --
> 2.24.1.735.g03f4e72817-goog
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-18 21:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-18 14:51 [PATCH v6 0/9] Inline Encryption Support Satya Tangirala
2019-12-18 14:51 ` [PATCH v6 1/9] block: Keyslot Manager for Inline Encryption Satya Tangirala
2019-12-18 20:13 ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-17 9:10 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-12-18 14:51 ` [PATCH v6 2/9] block: Add encryption context to struct bio Satya Tangirala
2019-12-18 21:10 ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-18 21:21 ` Darrick J. Wong [this message]
2019-12-18 21:25 ` Martin K. Petersen
2019-12-18 22:27 ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-19 0:47 ` Martin K. Petersen
2019-12-20 3:52 ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-07 4:35 ` Martin K. Petersen
2020-01-08 14:07 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-01-08 17:26 ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-17 8:32 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-01-18 5:11 ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-21 22:05 ` Satya Tangirala
2020-01-09 3:40 ` Martin K. Petersen
2020-01-14 21:24 ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-18 14:51 ` [PATCH v6 3/9] block: blk-crypto for Inline Encryption Satya Tangirala
2019-12-20 3:14 ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-20 5:10 ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-14 21:22 ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-18 14:51 ` [PATCH v6 4/9] scsi: ufs: UFS driver v2.1 spec crypto additions Satya Tangirala
2020-01-17 12:31 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-12-18 14:51 ` [PATCH v6 5/9] scsi: ufs: UFS crypto API Satya Tangirala
2019-12-20 4:48 ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-14 21:16 ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-17 13:51 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-12-18 14:51 ` [PATCH v6 6/9] scsi: ufs: Add inline encryption support to UFS Satya Tangirala
2019-12-20 5:44 ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-17 13:58 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-01-18 5:27 ` Eric Biggers
2020-02-05 18:07 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-01-18 3:58 ` Eric Biggers
2020-02-05 20:47 ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-18 14:51 ` [PATCH v6 7/9] fscrypt: add inline encryption support Satya Tangirala
2020-01-14 21:12 ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-18 14:51 ` [PATCH v6 8/9] f2fs: " Satya Tangirala
2019-12-20 4:23 ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-18 14:51 ` [PATCH v6 9/9] ext4: " Satya Tangirala
2019-12-19 0:12 ` Eric Biggers
2019-12-19 0:31 ` Satya Tangirala
2019-12-22 0:16 ` Eric Biggers
2020-01-08 14:05 ` [PATCH v6 0/9] Inline Encryption Support Christoph Hellwig
2020-01-08 18:43 ` Satya Tangirala
2020-01-17 8:52 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-01 0:53 ` Satya Tangirala
2020-02-03 9:15 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-04 3:39 ` Satya Tangirala
2020-02-04 14:58 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-04 21:21 ` Eric Biggers
2020-02-05 7:36 ` Eric Biggers
2020-02-05 18:05 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-21 12:30 ` Satya Tangirala
2020-02-21 14:20 ` Christoph Hellwig
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20191218212116.GA7476@magnolia \
--to=darrick.wong@oracle.com \
--cc=bmuthuku@qti.qualcomm.com \
--cc=boojin.kim@samsung.com \
--cc=kuohong.wang@mediatek.com \
--cc=linux-block@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net \
--cc=linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=satyat@google.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).