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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>,
	linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org,
	Barani Muthukumaran <bmuthuku@qti.qualcomm.com>,
	Kuohong Wang <kuohong.wang@mediatek.com>,
	Kim Boojin <boojin.kim@samsung.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 3/9] block: blk-crypto-fallback for Inline Encryption
Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2020 10:34:37 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200221183437.GC925@sol.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200221173539.GA6525@infradead.org>

On Fri, Feb 21, 2020 at 09:35:39AM -0800, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> High-level question:  Does the whole keyslot manager concept even make
> sense for the fallback?  With the work-queue we have item that exectutes
> at a time per cpu.  So just allocatea per-cpu crypto_skcipher for
> each encryption mode and there should never be a slot limitation.  Or
> do I miss something?

It does make sense because if blk-crypto-fallback didn't use a keyslot manager,
it would have to call crypto_skcipher_setkey() on the I/O path for every bio to
ensure that the CPU's crypto_skcipher has the correct key.  That's undesirable,
because setting a new key can be expensive with some encryption algorithms, and
also it can require a memory allocation which can fail.  For example, with the
Adiantum algorithm, setting a key requires encrypting ~1100 bytes of data in
order to generate subkeys.  It's better to set a key once and use it many times.

Making blk-crypto-fallback use the keyslot manager also allows the keyslot
manager to be tested by routine filesystem regression testing, e.g.
'gce-xfstests -c ext4/encrypt -g auto -m inlinecrypt'.

- Eric

  reply	other threads:[~2020-02-21 18:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-21 11:50 [PATCH v7 0/9] Inline Encryption Support Satya Tangirala
2020-02-21 11:50 ` [PATCH v7 1/9] block: Keyslot Manager for Inline Encryption Satya Tangirala
2020-02-21 17:04   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-21 17:31     ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-27 18:14       ` Eric Biggers
2020-02-27 21:25         ` Satya Tangirala
2020-03-05 16:11           ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-27 18:48   ` Eric Biggers
2020-02-21 11:50 ` [PATCH v7 2/9] block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq Satya Tangirala
2020-02-21 17:22   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-22  0:52     ` Satya Tangirala
2020-02-24 23:34       ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-27 18:25     ` Eric Biggers
2020-02-21 11:50 ` [PATCH v7 3/9] block: blk-crypto-fallback for Inline Encryption Satya Tangirala
2020-02-21 16:51   ` Randy Dunlap
2020-02-21 17:25   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-21 17:35   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-21 18:34     ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2020-02-24 23:36       ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-27 19:25   ` Eric Biggers
2020-02-21 11:50 ` [PATCH v7 4/9] scsi: ufs: UFS driver v2.1 spec crypto additions Satya Tangirala
2020-02-21 11:50 ` [PATCH v7 5/9] scsi: ufs: UFS crypto API Satya Tangirala
2020-02-22  4:59   ` Eric Biggers
2020-02-21 11:50 ` [PATCH v7 6/9] scsi: ufs: Add inline encryption support to UFS Satya Tangirala
2020-02-21 17:22   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-21 18:11     ` Eric Biggers
2020-02-23 13:47       ` Stanley Chu
2020-02-24 23:37         ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-02-25  7:21           ` Stanley Chu
2020-02-26  1:12             ` Eric Biggers
2020-02-26  6:43               ` Stanley Chu
2020-03-02  9:17                 ` Stanley Chu
2020-02-21 11:50 ` [PATCH v7 7/9] fscrypt: add inline encryption support Satya Tangirala
2020-02-21 18:40   ` Eric Biggers
2020-02-22  5:39   ` Eric Biggers
2020-02-26  0:30   ` Eric Biggers
2020-02-21 11:50 ` [PATCH v7 8/9] f2fs: " Satya Tangirala
2020-02-21 11:50 ` [PATCH v7 9/9] ext4: " Satya Tangirala
2020-02-22  5:21   ` Eric Biggers
2020-02-21 17:16 ` [PATCH v7 0/9] Inline Encryption Support Eric Biggers

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