* [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 0/6] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation
@ 2019-08-19 14:17 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 1/6] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template " Ard Biesheuvel
` (7 more replies)
0 siblings, 8 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-19 14:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-fscrypt,
Gilad Ben-Yossef, dm-devel, Milan Broz
This series creates an ESSIV template that produces a skcipher or AEAD
transform based on a tuple of the form '<skcipher>,<shash>' (or '<aead>,<shash>'
for the AEAD case). It exposes the encapsulated sync or async skcipher/aead by
passing through all operations, while using the cipher/shash pair to transform
the input IV into an ESSIV output IV.
Changes since v12:
- don't use a per-instance shash but only record the cra_driver_name of the
shash when instantiating the template, and allocate the shash for each
allocated transform instead
- add back the dm-crypt patch -> as Milan has indicated, his preference would
be to queue these changes for v5.4 (with the first patch shared between the
cryptodev and md trees on a stable branch based on v5.3-rc1 - if needed,
I can provide a signed tag)
Changes since v11:
- Avoid spawns for the ESSIV shash and cipher algos. Instead, the shash TFM is
allocated per-instance (which is appropriate since it is unkeyed and thus
stateless), and the cipher is allocated explicitly based on the parsed
skcipher/aead cra_name.
Changes since v10:
- Drop patches against fscrypt and dm-crypt - these will be routed via the
respective maintainer trees during the next cycle
- Fix error handling when parsing the cipher name from the skcipher cra_name
- Use existing ivsize temporary instead of retrieving it again
- Expose cra_name via module alias (#4)
Changes since v9:
- Fix cipher_api parsing bug that was introduced by dropping the cipher name
parsing patch in v9 (#3). Thanks to Milan for finding it.
- Fix a couple of instances where the old essiv(x,y,z) format was used in
comments instead of the essiv(x,z) format we adopted in v9
Changes since v8:
- Remove 'cipher' argument from essiv() template, and instead, parse the
cra_name of the skcipher to obtain the cipher. This is slightly cleaner
than what dm-crypt currently does, since we can get the cra_name from the
spawn, and we don't have to actually allocate the TFM. Since this implies
that dm-crypt does not need to provide the cipher, we can drop the parsing
code from it entirely (assuming the eboiv patch I sent out recently is
applied first) (patch #7)
- Restrict the essiv() AEAD instantiation to AEADs whose cra_name starts with
'authenc('
- Rebase onto cryptodev/master
- Drop dm-crypt to reorder/refactor cipher name parsing, since it was wrong
and it is no longer needed.
- Drop Milan's R-b since the code has changed
- Fix bug in accelerated arm64 implementation.
Changes since v7:
- rebase onto cryptodev/master
- drop change to ivsize in #2
- add Milan's R-b's
Changes since v6:
- make CRYPTO_ESSIV user selectable so we can opt out of selecting it even
if FS_ENCRYPTION (which cannot be built as a module) is enabled
- move a comment along with the code it referred to (#3), not that this change
and removing some redundant braces makes the diff look totally different
- add Milan's R-b to #3 and #4
Changes since v5:
- drop redundant #includes and drop some unneeded braces (#2)
- add test case for essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)
- make ESSIV driver deal with assoc data that is described by more than two
scatterlist entries - this only happens when the extended tests are being
performed, so don't optimize for it
- clarify that both fscrypt and dm-crypt only use ESSIV in special cases (#7)
Changes since v4:
- make the ESSIV template IV size equal the IV size of the encapsulated
cipher - defining it as 8 bytes was needlessly restrictive, and also
complicated the code for no reason
- add a missing kfree() spotted by Smatch
- add additional algo length name checks when constructing the essiv()
cipher name
- reinstate the 'essiv' IV generation implementation in dm-crypt, but
make its generation function identical to plain64le (and drop the other
methods)
- fix a bug in the arm64 CE/NEON code
- simplify the arm64 code by reusing more of the existing CBC implementation
(patch #6 is new to this series and was added for this reason)
Changes since v3:
- address various review comments from Eric on patch #1
- use Kconfig's 'imply' instead of 'select' to permit CRYPTO_ESSIV to be
enabled as a module or disabled entirely even if fscrypt is compiled in (#2)
- fix an issue in the AEAD encrypt path caused by the IV being clobbered by
the inner skcipher before the hmac was being calculated
Changes since v2:
- fixed a couple of bugs that snuck in after I'd done the bulk of my
testing
- some cosmetic tweaks to the ESSIV template skcipher setkey function
to align it with the aead one
- add a test case for essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)
- add an accelerated implementation for arm64 that combines the IV
derivation and the actual en/decryption in a single asm routine
Code can be found here
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ardb/linux.git/log/?h=essiv-v11
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Cc: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Ard Biesheuvel (6):
crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
crypto: essiv - add tests for essiv in cbc(aes)+sha256 mode
crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk
crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode
md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
md: dm-crypt: omit parsing of the encapsulated cipher
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c | 206 ++++--
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S | 28 +
crypto/Kconfig | 28 +
crypto/Makefile | 1 +
crypto/essiv.c | 663 ++++++++++++++++++++
crypto/tcrypt.c | 9 +
crypto/testmgr.c | 14 +
crypto/testmgr.h | 497 +++++++++++++++
drivers/md/Kconfig | 1 +
drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 271 ++------
10 files changed, 1448 insertions(+), 270 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 crypto/essiv.c
--
2.17.1
--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 1/6] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
2019-08-19 14:17 [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 0/6] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-08-19 14:17 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-30 4:58 ` Herbert Xu
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [PATCH v13 2/6] crypto: essiv - add tests for essiv in cbc(aes)+sha256 mode Ard Biesheuvel
` (6 subsequent siblings)
7 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-19 14:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-fscrypt,
Gilad Ben-Yossef, dm-devel, Milan Broz
Implement a template that wraps a (skcipher,shash) or (aead,shash) tuple
so that we can consolidate the ESSIV handling in fscrypt and dm-crypt and
move it into the crypto API. This will result in better test coverage, and
will allow future changes to make the bare cipher interface internal to the
crypto subsystem, in order to increase robustness of the API against misuse.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
crypto/Kconfig | 28 +
crypto/Makefile | 1 +
crypto/essiv.c | 663 ++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 692 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index 455a3354e291..01f81c1f3138 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -487,6 +487,34 @@ config CRYPTO_ADIANTUM
If unsure, say N.
+config CRYPTO_ESSIV
+ tristate "ESSIV support for block encryption"
+ select CRYPTO_AUTHENC
+ help
+ Encrypted salt-sector initialization vector (ESSIV) is an IV
+ generation method that is used in some cases by fscrypt and/or
+ dm-crypt. It uses the hash of the block encryption key as the
+ symmetric key for a block encryption pass applied to the input
+ IV, making low entropy IV sources more suitable for block
+ encryption.
+
+ This driver implements a crypto API template that can be
+ instantiated either as a skcipher or as a aead (depending on the
+ type of the first template argument), and which defers encryption
+ and decryption requests to the encapsulated cipher after applying
+ ESSIV to the input IV. Note that in the aead case, it is assumed
+ that the keys are presented in the same format used by the authenc
+ template, and that the IV appears at the end of the authenticated
+ associated data (AAD) region (which is how dm-crypt uses it.)
+
+ Note that the use of ESSIV is not recommended for new deployments,
+ and so this only needs to be enabled when interoperability with
+ existing encrypted volumes of filesystems is required, or when
+ building for a particular system that requires it (e.g., when
+ the SoC in question has accelerated CBC but not XTS, making CBC
+ combined with ESSIV the only feasible mode for h/w accelerated
+ block encryption)
+
comment "Hash modes"
config CRYPTO_CMAC
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index 0d2cdd523fd9..fcb1ee679782 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD) += algif_aead.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ZSTD) += zstd.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_OFB) += ofb.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECC) += ecc.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ESSIV) += essiv.o
ecdh_generic-y += ecdh.o
ecdh_generic-y += ecdh_helper.o
diff --git a/crypto/essiv.c b/crypto/essiv.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a8befc8fb06e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/essiv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,663 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * ESSIV skcipher and aead template for block encryption
+ *
+ * This template encapsulates the ESSIV IV generation algorithm used by
+ * dm-crypt and fscrypt, which converts the initial vector for the skcipher
+ * used for block encryption, by encrypting it using the hash of the
+ * skcipher key as encryption key. Usually, the input IV is a 64-bit sector
+ * number in LE representation zero-padded to the size of the IV, but this
+ * is not assumed by this driver.
+ *
+ * The typical use of this template is to instantiate the skcipher
+ * 'essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)', which is the only instantiation used by
+ * fscrypt, and the most relevant one for dm-crypt. However, dm-crypt
+ * also permits ESSIV to be used in combination with the authenc template,
+ * e.g., 'essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),sha256)', in which case
+ * we need to instantiate an aead that accepts the same special key format
+ * as the authenc template, and deals with the way the encrypted IV is
+ * embedded into the AAD area of the aead request. This means the AEAD
+ * flavor produced by this template is tightly coupled to the way dm-crypt
+ * happens to use it.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Linaro, Ltd. <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+ *
+ * Heavily based on:
+ * adiantum length-preserving encryption mode
+ *
+ * Copyright 2018 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/authenc.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+struct essiv_instance_ctx {
+ union {
+ struct crypto_skcipher_spawn skcipher_spawn;
+ struct crypto_aead_spawn aead_spawn;
+ } u;
+ char essiv_cipher_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+ char shash_driver_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+};
+
+struct essiv_tfm_ctx {
+ union {
+ struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher;
+ struct crypto_aead *aead;
+ } u;
+ struct crypto_cipher *essiv_cipher;
+ struct crypto_shash *hash;
+ int ivoffset;
+};
+
+struct essiv_aead_request_ctx {
+ struct scatterlist sg[4];
+ u8 *assoc;
+ struct aead_request aead_req;
+};
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm,
+ const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tctx->hash);
+ u8 salt[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
+ int err;
+
+ crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(tctx->u.skcipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+ crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tctx->u.skcipher,
+ crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) &
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+ err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tctx->u.skcipher, key, keylen);
+ crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm,
+ crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tctx->u.skcipher) &
+ CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ desc->tfm = tctx->hash;
+ err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, key, keylen, salt);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ crypto_cipher_clear_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+ crypto_cipher_set_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher,
+ crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) &
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+ err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tctx->essiv_cipher, salt,
+ crypto_shash_digestsize(tctx->hash));
+ crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm,
+ crypto_cipher_get_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher) &
+ CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tctx->hash);
+ struct crypto_authenc_keys keys;
+ u8 salt[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
+ int err;
+
+ crypto_aead_clear_flags(tctx->u.aead, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+ crypto_aead_set_flags(tctx->u.aead, crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm) &
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+ err = crypto_aead_setkey(tctx->u.aead, key, keylen);
+ crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, crypto_aead_get_flags(tctx->u.aead) &
+ CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen) != 0) {
+ crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ desc->tfm = tctx->hash;
+ err = crypto_shash_init(desc) ?:
+ crypto_shash_update(desc, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen) ?:
+ crypto_shash_finup(desc, keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen, salt);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ crypto_cipher_clear_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+ crypto_cipher_set_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher, crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm) &
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+ err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tctx->essiv_cipher, salt,
+ crypto_shash_digestsize(tctx->hash));
+ crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, crypto_cipher_get_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher) &
+ CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+ unsigned int authsize)
+{
+ struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+ return crypto_aead_setauthsize(tctx->u.aead, authsize);
+}
+
+static void essiv_skcipher_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
+{
+ struct skcipher_request *req = areq->data;
+
+ skcipher_request_complete(req, err);
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, bool enc)
+{
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ const struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+ struct skcipher_request *subreq = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
+
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->essiv_cipher, req->iv, req->iv);
+
+ skcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, tctx->u.skcipher);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->src, req->dst, req->cryptlen,
+ req->iv);
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(subreq, skcipher_request_flags(req),
+ essiv_skcipher_done, req);
+
+ return enc ? crypto_skcipher_encrypt(subreq) :
+ crypto_skcipher_decrypt(subreq);
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+ return essiv_skcipher_crypt(req, true);
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+ return essiv_skcipher_crypt(req, false);
+}
+
+static void essiv_aead_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
+{
+ struct aead_request *req = areq->data;
+ struct essiv_aead_request_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+
+ if (rctx->assoc)
+ kfree(rctx->assoc);
+ aead_request_complete(req, err);
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_crypt(struct aead_request *req, bool enc)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ const struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+ struct essiv_aead_request_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+ struct aead_request *subreq = &rctx->aead_req;
+ struct scatterlist *src = req->src;
+ int err;
+
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->essiv_cipher, req->iv, req->iv);
+
+ /*
+ * dm-crypt embeds the sector number and the IV in the AAD region, so
+ * we have to copy the converted IV into the right scatterlist before
+ * we pass it on.
+ */
+ rctx->assoc = NULL;
+ if (req->src == req->dst || !enc) {
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->iv, req->dst,
+ req->assoclen - crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm),
+ crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm), 1);
+ } else {
+ u8 *iv = (u8 *)aead_request_ctx(req) + tctx->ivoffset;
+ int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+ int ssize = req->assoclen - ivsize;
+ struct scatterlist *sg;
+ int nents;
+
+ if (ssize < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->src, ssize);
+ if (nents < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ memcpy(iv, req->iv, ivsize);
+ sg_init_table(rctx->sg, 4);
+
+ if (unlikely(nents > 1)) {
+ /*
+ * This is a case that rarely occurs in practice, but
+ * for correctness, we have to deal with it nonetheless.
+ */
+ rctx->assoc = kmalloc(ssize, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!rctx->assoc)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(rctx->assoc, req->src, 0,
+ ssize, 0);
+ sg_set_buf(rctx->sg, rctx->assoc, ssize);
+ } else {
+ sg_set_page(rctx->sg, sg_page(req->src), ssize,
+ req->src->offset);
+ }
+
+ sg_set_buf(rctx->sg + 1, iv, ivsize);
+ sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->sg + 2, req->src, req->assoclen);
+ if (sg != rctx->sg + 2)
+ sg_chain(rctx->sg, 3, sg);
+
+ src = rctx->sg;
+ }
+
+ aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, tctx->u.aead);
+ aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen);
+ aead_request_set_callback(subreq, aead_request_flags(req),
+ essiv_aead_done, req);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, src, req->dst, req->cryptlen, req->iv);
+
+ err = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(subreq) :
+ crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq);
+
+ if (rctx->assoc && err != -EINPROGRESS)
+ kfree(rctx->assoc);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ return essiv_aead_crypt(req, true);
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ return essiv_aead_crypt(req, false);
+}
+
+static int essiv_init_tfm(struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx,
+ struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx)
+{
+ struct crypto_cipher *essiv_cipher;
+ struct crypto_shash *hash;
+ int err;
+
+ essiv_cipher = crypto_alloc_cipher(ictx->essiv_cipher_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(essiv_cipher))
+ return PTR_ERR(essiv_cipher);
+
+ hash = crypto_alloc_shash(ictx->shash_driver_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(hash)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(hash);
+ goto err_free_essiv_cipher;
+ }
+
+ tctx->essiv_cipher = essiv_cipher;
+ tctx->hash = hash;
+
+ return 0;
+
+err_free_essiv_cipher:
+ crypto_free_cipher(essiv_cipher);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+ struct skcipher_instance *inst = skcipher_alg_instance(tfm);
+ struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
+ struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+ struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher;
+ int err;
+
+ skcipher = crypto_spawn_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+ if (IS_ERR(skcipher))
+ return PTR_ERR(skcipher);
+
+ crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct skcipher_request) +
+ crypto_skcipher_reqsize(skcipher));
+
+ err = essiv_init_tfm(ictx, tctx);
+ if (err) {
+ crypto_free_skcipher(skcipher);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ tctx->u.skcipher = skcipher;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_init_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+ struct aead_instance *inst = aead_alg_instance(tfm);
+ struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
+ struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+ struct crypto_aead *aead;
+ unsigned int subreq_size;
+ int err;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetofend(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx, aead_req) !=
+ sizeof(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx));
+
+ aead = crypto_spawn_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+ if (IS_ERR(aead))
+ return PTR_ERR(aead);
+
+ subreq_size = FIELD_SIZEOF(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx, aead_req) +
+ crypto_aead_reqsize(aead);
+
+ tctx->ivoffset = offsetof(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx, aead_req) +
+ subreq_size;
+ crypto_aead_set_reqsize(tfm, tctx->ivoffset + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead));
+
+ err = essiv_init_tfm(ictx, tctx);
+ if (err) {
+ crypto_free_aead(aead);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ tctx->u.aead = aead;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void essiv_skcipher_exit_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+ struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+ crypto_free_skcipher(tctx->u.skcipher);
+ crypto_free_cipher(tctx->essiv_cipher);
+ crypto_free_shash(tctx->hash);
+}
+
+static void essiv_aead_exit_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+ struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+ crypto_free_aead(tctx->u.aead);
+ crypto_free_cipher(tctx->essiv_cipher);
+ crypto_free_shash(tctx->hash);
+}
+
+static void essiv_skcipher_free_instance(struct skcipher_instance *inst)
+{
+ struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+ crypto_drop_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+ kfree(inst);
+}
+
+static void essiv_aead_free_instance(struct aead_instance *inst)
+{
+ struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+ crypto_drop_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+ kfree(inst);
+}
+
+static bool parse_cipher_name(char *essiv_cipher_name, const char *cra_name)
+{
+ const char *p, *q;
+ int len;
+
+ /* find the last opening parens */
+ p = strrchr(cra_name, '(');
+ if (!p++)
+ return false;
+
+ /* find the first closing parens in the tail of the string */
+ q = strchr(p, ')');
+ if (!q)
+ return false;
+
+ len = q - p;
+ if (len >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+ return false;
+
+ memcpy(essiv_cipher_name, p, len);
+ essiv_cipher_name[len] = '\0';
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool essiv_supported_algorithms(const char *essiv_cipher_name,
+ struct shash_alg *hash_alg,
+ int ivsize)
+{
+ struct crypto_alg *alg;
+ bool ret = false;
+
+ alg = crypto_alg_mod_lookup(essiv_cipher_name,
+ CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
+ CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
+ if (IS_ERR(alg))
+ return false;
+
+ if (hash_alg->digestsize < alg->cra_cipher.cia_min_keysize ||
+ hash_alg->digestsize > alg->cra_cipher.cia_max_keysize)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (ivsize != alg->cra_blocksize)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey(hash_alg))
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = true;
+
+out:
+ crypto_mod_put(alg);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int essiv_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
+{
+ struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
+ const char *inner_cipher_name;
+ const char *shash_name;
+ struct skcipher_instance *skcipher_inst = NULL;
+ struct aead_instance *aead_inst = NULL;
+ struct crypto_instance *inst;
+ struct crypto_alg *base, *block_base;
+ struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx;
+ struct skcipher_alg *skcipher_alg = NULL;
+ struct aead_alg *aead_alg = NULL;
+ struct crypto_alg *_hash_alg;
+ struct shash_alg *hash_alg;
+ int ivsize;
+ u32 type;
+ int err;
+
+ algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
+ if (IS_ERR(algt))
+ return PTR_ERR(algt);
+
+ inner_cipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
+ if (IS_ERR(inner_cipher_name))
+ return PTR_ERR(inner_cipher_name);
+
+ shash_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]);
+ if (IS_ERR(shash_name))
+ return PTR_ERR(shash_name);
+
+ type = algt->type & algt->mask;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER:
+ skcipher_inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*skcipher_inst) +
+ sizeof(*ictx), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!skcipher_inst)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ inst = skcipher_crypto_instance(skcipher_inst);
+ base = &skcipher_inst->alg.base;
+ ictx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+ /* Symmetric cipher, e.g., "cbc(aes)" */
+ crypto_set_skcipher_spawn(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn, inst);
+ err = crypto_grab_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn,
+ inner_cipher_name, 0,
+ crypto_requires_sync(algt->type,
+ algt->mask));
+ if (err)
+ goto out_free_inst;
+ skcipher_alg = crypto_spawn_skcipher_alg(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+ block_base = &skcipher_alg->base;
+ ivsize = crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(skcipher_alg);
+ break;
+
+ case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD:
+ aead_inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*aead_inst) +
+ sizeof(*ictx), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!aead_inst)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ inst = aead_crypto_instance(aead_inst);
+ base = &aead_inst->alg.base;
+ ictx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+ /* AEAD cipher, e.g., "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))" */
+ crypto_set_aead_spawn(&ictx->u.aead_spawn, inst);
+ err = crypto_grab_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn,
+ inner_cipher_name, 0,
+ crypto_requires_sync(algt->type,
+ algt->mask));
+ if (err)
+ goto out_free_inst;
+ aead_alg = crypto_spawn_aead_alg(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+ block_base = &aead_alg->base;
+ if (!strstarts(block_base->cra_name, "authenc(")) {
+ pr_warn("Only authenc() type AEADs are supported by ESSIV\n");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_drop_skcipher;
+ }
+ ivsize = aead_alg->ivsize;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!parse_cipher_name(ictx->essiv_cipher_name, block_base->cra_name)) {
+ pr_warn("Failed to parse ESSIV cipher name from skcipher cra_name\n");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_drop_skcipher;
+ }
+
+ /* Synchronous hash, e.g., "sha256" */
+ _hash_alg = crypto_alg_mod_lookup(shash_name,
+ CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH,
+ CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
+ if (IS_ERR(_hash_alg)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(_hash_alg);
+ goto out_drop_skcipher;
+ }
+ hash_alg = __crypto_shash_alg(_hash_alg);
+
+ /* Check the set of algorithms */
+ if (!essiv_supported_algorithms(ictx->essiv_cipher_name, hash_alg,
+ ivsize)) {
+ pr_warn("Unsupported essiv instantiation: essiv(%s,%s)\n",
+ block_base->cra_name, hash_alg->base.cra_name);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free_hash;
+ }
+
+ /* record the driver name so we can instantiate this exact algo later */
+ strlcpy(ictx->shash_driver_name, hash_alg->base.cra_driver_name,
+ CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
+
+ /* Instance fields */
+
+ err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ if (snprintf(base->cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+ "essiv(%s,%s)", block_base->cra_name,
+ hash_alg->base.cra_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+ goto out_free_hash;
+ if (snprintf(base->cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+ "essiv(%s,%s)", block_base->cra_driver_name,
+ hash_alg->base.cra_driver_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+ goto out_free_hash;
+
+ base->cra_flags = block_base->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
+ base->cra_blocksize = block_base->cra_blocksize;
+ base->cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct essiv_tfm_ctx);
+ base->cra_alignmask = block_base->cra_alignmask;
+ base->cra_priority = block_base->cra_priority;
+
+ if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER) {
+ skcipher_inst->alg.setkey = essiv_skcipher_setkey;
+ skcipher_inst->alg.encrypt = essiv_skcipher_encrypt;
+ skcipher_inst->alg.decrypt = essiv_skcipher_decrypt;
+ skcipher_inst->alg.init = essiv_skcipher_init_tfm;
+ skcipher_inst->alg.exit = essiv_skcipher_exit_tfm;
+
+ skcipher_inst->alg.min_keysize = crypto_skcipher_alg_min_keysize(skcipher_alg);
+ skcipher_inst->alg.max_keysize = crypto_skcipher_alg_max_keysize(skcipher_alg);
+ skcipher_inst->alg.ivsize = ivsize;
+ skcipher_inst->alg.chunksize = crypto_skcipher_alg_chunksize(skcipher_alg);
+ skcipher_inst->alg.walksize = crypto_skcipher_alg_walksize(skcipher_alg);
+
+ skcipher_inst->free = essiv_skcipher_free_instance;
+
+ err = skcipher_register_instance(tmpl, skcipher_inst);
+ } else {
+ aead_inst->alg.setkey = essiv_aead_setkey;
+ aead_inst->alg.setauthsize = essiv_aead_setauthsize;
+ aead_inst->alg.encrypt = essiv_aead_encrypt;
+ aead_inst->alg.decrypt = essiv_aead_decrypt;
+ aead_inst->alg.init = essiv_aead_init_tfm;
+ aead_inst->alg.exit = essiv_aead_exit_tfm;
+
+ aead_inst->alg.ivsize = ivsize;
+ aead_inst->alg.maxauthsize = crypto_aead_alg_maxauthsize(aead_alg);
+ aead_inst->alg.chunksize = crypto_aead_alg_chunksize(aead_alg);
+
+ aead_inst->free = essiv_aead_free_instance;
+
+ err = aead_register_instance(tmpl, aead_inst);
+ }
+
+ if (err)
+ goto out_free_hash;
+
+ crypto_mod_put(_hash_alg);
+ return 0;
+
+out_free_hash:
+ crypto_mod_put(_hash_alg);
+out_drop_skcipher:
+ if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER)
+ crypto_drop_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+ else
+ crypto_drop_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+out_free_inst:
+ kfree(skcipher_inst);
+ kfree(aead_inst);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* essiv(cipher_name, shash_name) */
+static struct crypto_template essiv_tmpl = {
+ .name = "essiv",
+ .create = essiv_create,
+ .module = THIS_MODULE,
+};
+
+static int __init essiv_module_init(void)
+{
+ return crypto_register_template(&essiv_tmpl);
+}
+
+static void __exit essiv_module_exit(void)
+{
+ crypto_unregister_template(&essiv_tmpl);
+}
+
+subsys_initcall(essiv_module_init);
+module_exit(essiv_module_exit);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ESSIV skcipher/aead wrapper for block encryption");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("essiv");
--
2.17.1
--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 2/6] crypto: essiv - add tests for essiv in cbc(aes)+sha256 mode
2019-08-19 14:17 [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 0/6] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 1/6] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template " Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-08-19 14:17 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [PATCH v13 3/6] crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk Ard Biesheuvel
` (5 subsequent siblings)
7 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-19 14:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz
Add a test vector for the ESSIV mode that is the most widely used,
i.e., using cbc(aes) and sha256, in both skcipher and AEAD modes
(the latter is used by tcrypt to encapsulate the authenc template
or h/w instantiations of the same)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
crypto/tcrypt.c | 9 +
crypto/testmgr.c | 14 +
crypto/testmgr.h | 497 ++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 520 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/tcrypt.c b/crypto/tcrypt.c
index c578ccd92c57..83ad0b1fab30 100644
--- a/crypto/tcrypt.c
+++ b/crypto/tcrypt.c
@@ -2327,6 +2327,15 @@ static int do_test(const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask, int m, u32 num_mb)
0, speed_template_32);
break;
+ case 220:
+ test_acipher_speed("essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)",
+ ENCRYPT, sec, NULL, 0,
+ speed_template_16_24_32);
+ test_acipher_speed("essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)",
+ DECRYPT, sec, NULL, 0,
+ speed_template_16_24_32);
+ break;
+
case 221:
test_aead_speed("aegis128", ENCRYPT, sec,
NULL, 0, 16, 8, speed_template_16);
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
index d990eba723cd..c39e39e55dc2 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -4544,6 +4544,20 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
.suite = {
.akcipher = __VECS(ecrdsa_tv_template)
}
+ }, {
+ .alg = "essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),sha256)",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(essiv_hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(essiv_aes_cbc_tv_template)
+ }
}, {
.alg = "gcm(aes)",
.generic_driver = "gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic)",
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h
index 154052d07818..ef7d21f39d4a 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.h
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.h
@@ -31070,4 +31070,501 @@ static const struct comp_testvec zstd_decomp_tv_template[] = {
"functions.",
},
};
+
+/* based on aes_cbc_tv_template */
+static const struct cipher_testvec essiv_aes_cbc_tv_template[] = {
+ {
+ .key = "\x06\xa9\x21\x40\x36\xb8\xa1\x5b"
+ "\x51\x2e\x03\xd5\x34\x12\x00\x06",
+ .klen = 16,
+ .iv = "\x3d\xaf\xba\x42\x9d\x9e\xb4\x30"
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+ .ptext = "Single block msg",
+ .ctext = "\xfa\x59\xe7\x5f\x41\x56\x65\xc3"
+ "\x36\xca\x6b\x72\x10\x9f\x8c\xd4",
+ .len = 16,
+ }, {
+ .key = "\xc2\x86\x69\x6d\x88\x7c\x9a\xa0"
+ "\x61\x1b\xbb\x3e\x20\x25\xa4\x5a",
+ .klen = 16,
+ .iv = "\x56\x2e\x17\x99\x6d\x09\x3d\x28"
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+ .ptext = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+ "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+ "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17"
+ "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f",
+ .ctext = "\xc8\x59\x9a\xfe\x79\xe6\x7b\x20"
+ "\x06\x7d\x55\x0a\x5e\xc7\xb5\xa7"
+ "\x0b\x9c\x80\xd2\x15\xa1\xb8\x6d"
+ "\xc6\xab\x7b\x65\xd9\xfd\x88\xeb",
+ .len = 32,
+ }, {
+ .key = "\x8e\x73\xb0\xf7\xda\x0e\x64\x52"
+ "\xc8\x10\xf3\x2b\x80\x90\x79\xe5"
+ "\x62\xf8\xea\xd2\x52\x2c\x6b\x7b",
+ .klen = 24,
+ .iv = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+ .ptext = "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+ "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+ "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+ "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+ "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+ "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+ "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+ "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+ .ctext = "\x96\x6d\xa9\x7a\x42\xe6\x01\xc7"
+ "\x17\xfc\xa7\x41\xd3\x38\x0b\xe5"
+ "\x51\x48\xf7\x7e\x5e\x26\xa9\xfe"
+ "\x45\x72\x1c\xd9\xde\xab\xf3\x4d"
+ "\x39\x47\xc5\x4f\x97\x3a\x55\x63"
+ "\x80\x29\x64\x4c\x33\xe8\x21\x8a"
+ "\x6a\xef\x6b\x6a\x8f\x43\xc0\xcb"
+ "\xf0\xf3\x6e\x74\x54\x44\x92\x44",
+ .len = 64,
+ }, {
+ .key = "\x60\x3d\xeb\x10\x15\xca\x71\xbe"
+ "\x2b\x73\xae\xf0\x85\x7d\x77\x81"
+ "\x1f\x35\x2c\x07\x3b\x61\x08\xd7"
+ "\x2d\x98\x10\xa3\x09\x14\xdf\xf4",
+ .klen = 32,
+ .iv = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+ .ptext = "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+ "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+ "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+ "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+ "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+ "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+ "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+ "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+ .ctext = "\x24\x52\xf1\x48\x74\xd0\xa7\x93"
+ "\x75\x9b\x63\x46\xc0\x1c\x1e\x17"
+ "\x4d\xdc\x5b\x3a\x27\x93\x2a\x63"
+ "\xf7\xf1\xc7\xb3\x54\x56\x5b\x50"
+ "\xa3\x31\xa5\x8b\xd6\xfd\xb6\x3c"
+ "\x8b\xf6\xf2\x45\x05\x0c\xc8\xbb"
+ "\x32\x0b\x26\x1c\xe9\x8b\x02\xc0"
+ "\xb2\x6f\x37\xa7\x5b\xa8\xa9\x42",
+ .len = 64,
+ }, {
+ .key = "\xC9\x83\xA6\xC9\xEC\x0F\x32\x55"
+ "\x0F\x32\x55\x78\x9B\xBE\x78\x9B"
+ "\xBE\xE1\x04\x27\xE1\x04\x27\x4A"
+ "\x6D\x90\x4A\x6D\x90\xB3\xD6\xF9",
+ .klen = 32,
+ .iv = "\xE7\x82\x1D\xB8\x53\x11\xAC\x47"
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+ .ptext = "\x50\xB9\x22\xAE\x17\x80\x0C\x75"
+ "\xDE\x47\xD3\x3C\xA5\x0E\x9A\x03"
+ "\x6C\xF8\x61\xCA\x33\xBF\x28\x91"
+ "\x1D\x86\xEF\x58\xE4\x4D\xB6\x1F"
+ "\xAB\x14\x7D\x09\x72\xDB\x44\xD0"
+ "\x39\xA2\x0B\x97\x00\x69\xF5\x5E"
+ "\xC7\x30\xBC\x25\x8E\x1A\x83\xEC"
+ "\x55\xE1\x4A\xB3\x1C\xA8\x11\x7A"
+ "\x06\x6F\xD8\x41\xCD\x36\x9F\x08"
+ "\x94\xFD\x66\xF2\x5B\xC4\x2D\xB9"
+ "\x22\x8B\x17\x80\xE9\x52\xDE\x47"
+ "\xB0\x19\xA5\x0E\x77\x03\x6C\xD5"
+ "\x3E\xCA\x33\x9C\x05\x91\xFA\x63"
+ "\xEF\x58\xC1\x2A\xB6\x1F\x88\x14"
+ "\x7D\xE6\x4F\xDB\x44\xAD\x16\xA2"
+ "\x0B\x74\x00\x69\xD2\x3B\xC7\x30"
+ "\x99\x02\x8E\xF7\x60\xEC\x55\xBE"
+ "\x27\xB3\x1C\x85\x11\x7A\xE3\x4C"
+ "\xD8\x41\xAA\x13\x9F\x08\x71\xFD"
+ "\x66\xCF\x38\xC4\x2D\x96\x22\x8B"
+ "\xF4\x5D\xE9\x52\xBB\x24\xB0\x19"
+ "\x82\x0E\x77\xE0\x49\xD5\x3E\xA7"
+ "\x10\x9C\x05\x6E\xFA\x63\xCC\x35"
+ "\xC1\x2A\x93\x1F\x88\xF1\x5A\xE6"
+ "\x4F\xB8\x21\xAD\x16\x7F\x0B\x74"
+ "\xDD\x46\xD2\x3B\xA4\x0D\x99\x02"
+ "\x6B\xF7\x60\xC9\x32\xBE\x27\x90"
+ "\x1C\x85\xEE\x57\xE3\x4C\xB5\x1E"
+ "\xAA\x13\x7C\x08\x71\xDA\x43\xCF"
+ "\x38\xA1\x0A\x96\xFF\x68\xF4\x5D"
+ "\xC6\x2F\xBB\x24\x8D\x19\x82\xEB"
+ "\x54\xE0\x49\xB2\x1B\xA7\x10\x79"
+ "\x05\x6E\xD7\x40\xCC\x35\x9E\x07"
+ "\x93\xFC\x65\xF1\x5A\xC3\x2C\xB8"
+ "\x21\x8A\x16\x7F\xE8\x51\xDD\x46"
+ "\xAF\x18\xA4\x0D\x76\x02\x6B\xD4"
+ "\x3D\xC9\x32\x9B\x04\x90\xF9\x62"
+ "\xEE\x57\xC0\x29\xB5\x1E\x87\x13"
+ "\x7C\xE5\x4E\xDA\x43\xAC\x15\xA1"
+ "\x0A\x73\xFF\x68\xD1\x3A\xC6\x2F"
+ "\x98\x01\x8D\xF6\x5F\xEB\x54\xBD"
+ "\x26\xB2\x1B\x84\x10\x79\xE2\x4B"
+ "\xD7\x40\xA9\x12\x9E\x07\x70\xFC"
+ "\x65\xCE\x37\xC3\x2C\x95\x21\x8A"
+ "\xF3\x5C\xE8\x51\xBA\x23\xAF\x18"
+ "\x81\x0D\x76\xDF\x48\xD4\x3D\xA6"
+ "\x0F\x9B\x04\x6D\xF9\x62\xCB\x34"
+ "\xC0\x29\x92\x1E\x87\xF0\x59\xE5"
+ "\x4E\xB7\x20\xAC\x15\x7E\x0A\x73"
+ "\xDC\x45\xD1\x3A\xA3\x0C\x98\x01"
+ "\x6A\xF6\x5F\xC8\x31\xBD\x26\x8F"
+ "\x1B\x84\xED\x56\xE2\x4B\xB4\x1D"
+ "\xA9\x12\x7B\x07\x70\xD9\x42\xCE"
+ "\x37\xA0\x09\x95\xFE\x67\xF3\x5C"
+ "\xC5\x2E\xBA\x23\x8C\x18\x81\xEA"
+ "\x53\xDF\x48\xB1\x1A\xA6\x0F\x78"
+ "\x04\x6D\xD6\x3F\xCB\x34\x9D\x06"
+ "\x92\xFB\x64\xF0\x59\xC2\x2B\xB7"
+ "\x20\x89\x15\x7E\xE7\x50\xDC\x45"
+ "\xAE\x17\xA3\x0C\x75\x01\x6A\xD3"
+ "\x3C\xC8\x31\x9A\x03\x8F\xF8\x61"
+ "\xED\x56\xBF\x28\xB4\x1D\x86\x12",
+ .ctext = "\x97\x7f\x69\x0f\x0f\x34\xa6\x33"
+ "\x66\x49\x7e\xd0\x4d\x1b\xc9\x64"
+ "\xf9\x61\x95\x98\x11\x00\x88\xf8"
+ "\x2e\x88\x01\x0f\x2b\xe1\xae\x3e"
+ "\xfe\xd6\x47\x30\x11\x68\x7d\x99"
+ "\xad\x69\x6a\xe8\x41\x5f\x1e\x16"
+ "\x00\x3a\x47\xdf\x8e\x7d\x23\x1c"
+ "\x19\x5b\x32\x76\x60\x03\x05\xc1"
+ "\xa0\xff\xcf\xcc\x74\x39\x46\x63"
+ "\xfe\x5f\xa6\x35\xa7\xb4\xc1\xf9"
+ "\x4b\x5e\x38\xcc\x8c\xc1\xa2\xcf"
+ "\x9a\xc3\xae\x55\x42\x46\x93\xd9"
+ "\xbd\x22\xd3\x8a\x19\x96\xc3\xb3"
+ "\x7d\x03\x18\xf9\x45\x09\x9c\xc8"
+ "\x90\xf3\x22\xb3\x25\x83\x9a\x75"
+ "\xbb\x04\x48\x97\x3a\x63\x08\x04"
+ "\xa0\x69\xf6\x52\xd4\x89\x93\x69"
+ "\xb4\x33\xa2\x16\x58\xec\x4b\x26"
+ "\x76\x54\x10\x0b\x6e\x53\x1e\xbc"
+ "\x16\x18\x42\xb1\xb1\xd3\x4b\xda"
+ "\x06\x9f\x8b\x77\xf7\xab\xd6\xed"
+ "\xa3\x1d\x90\xda\x49\x38\x20\xb8"
+ "\x6c\xee\xae\x3e\xae\x6c\x03\xb8"
+ "\x0b\xed\xc8\xaa\x0e\xc5\x1f\x90"
+ "\x60\xe2\xec\x1b\x76\xd0\xcf\xda"
+ "\x29\x1b\xb8\x5a\xbc\xf4\xba\x13"
+ "\x91\xa6\xcb\x83\x3f\xeb\xe9\x7b"
+ "\x03\xba\x40\x9e\xe6\x7a\xb2\x4a"
+ "\x73\x49\xfc\xed\xfb\x55\xa4\x24"
+ "\xc7\xa4\xd7\x4b\xf5\xf7\x16\x62"
+ "\x80\xd3\x19\x31\x52\x25\xa8\x69"
+ "\xda\x9a\x87\xf5\xf2\xee\x5d\x61"
+ "\xc1\x12\x72\x3e\x52\x26\x45\x3a"
+ "\xd8\x9d\x57\xfa\x14\xe2\x9b\x2f"
+ "\xd4\xaa\x5e\x31\xf4\x84\x89\xa4"
+ "\xe3\x0e\xb0\x58\x41\x75\x6a\xcb"
+ "\x30\x01\x98\x90\x15\x80\xf5\x27"
+ "\x92\x13\x81\xf0\x1c\x1e\xfc\xb1"
+ "\x33\xf7\x63\xb0\x67\xec\x2e\x5c"
+ "\x85\xe3\x5b\xd0\x43\x8a\xb8\x5f"
+ "\x44\x9f\xec\x19\xc9\x8f\xde\xdf"
+ "\x79\xef\xf8\xee\x14\x87\xb3\x34"
+ "\x76\x00\x3a\x9b\xc7\xed\xb1\x3d"
+ "\xef\x07\xb0\xe4\xfd\x68\x9e\xeb"
+ "\xc2\xb4\x1a\x85\x9a\x7d\x11\x88"
+ "\xf8\xab\x43\x55\x2b\x8a\x4f\x60"
+ "\x85\x9a\xf4\xba\xae\x48\x81\xeb"
+ "\x93\x07\x97\x9e\xde\x2a\xfc\x4e"
+ "\x31\xde\xaa\x44\xf7\x2a\xc3\xee"
+ "\x60\xa2\x98\x2c\x0a\x88\x50\xc5"
+ "\x6d\x89\xd3\xe4\xb6\xa7\xf4\xb0"
+ "\xcf\x0e\x89\xe3\x5e\x8f\x82\xf4"
+ "\x9d\xd1\xa9\x51\x50\x8a\xd2\x18"
+ "\x07\xb2\xaa\x3b\x7f\x58\x9b\xf4"
+ "\xb7\x24\x39\xd3\x66\x2f\x1e\xc0"
+ "\x11\xa3\x56\x56\x2a\x10\x73\xbc"
+ "\xe1\x23\xbf\xa9\x37\x07\x9c\xc3"
+ "\xb2\xc9\xa8\x1c\x5b\x5c\x58\xa4"
+ "\x77\x02\x26\xad\xc3\x40\x11\x53"
+ "\x93\x68\x72\xde\x05\x8b\x10\xbc"
+ "\xa6\xd4\x1b\xd9\x27\xd8\x16\x12"
+ "\x61\x2b\x31\x2a\x44\x87\x96\x58",
+ .len = 496,
+ },
+};
+
+/* based on hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp */
+static const struct aead_testvec essiv_hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp[] = {
+ {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ .key = "\x08\x00" /* rta length */
+ "\x01\x00" /* rta type */
+#else
+ .key = "\x00\x08" /* rta length */
+ "\x00\x01" /* rta type */
+#endif
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x10" /* enc key length */
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+ "\x06\xa9\x21\x40\x36\xb8\xa1\x5b"
+ "\x51\x2e\x03\xd5\x34\x12\x00\x06",
+ .klen = 8 + 32 + 16,
+ .iv = "\xb3\x0c\x5a\x11\x41\xad\xc1\x04"
+ "\xbc\x1e\x7e\x35\xb0\x5d\x78\x29",
+ .assoc = "\x3d\xaf\xba\x42\x9d\x9e\xb4\x30"
+ "\xb4\x22\xda\x80\x2c\x9f\xac\x41",
+ .alen = 16,
+ .ptext = "Single block msg",
+ .plen = 16,
+ .ctext = "\xe3\x53\x77\x9c\x10\x79\xae\xb8"
+ "\x27\x08\x94\x2d\xbe\x77\x18\x1a"
+ "\xcc\xde\x2d\x6a\xae\xf1\x0b\xcc"
+ "\x38\x06\x38\x51\xb4\xb8\xf3\x5b"
+ "\x5c\x34\xa6\xa3\x6e\x0b\x05\xe5"
+ "\x6a\x6d\x44\xaa\x26\xa8\x44\xa5",
+ .clen = 16 + 32,
+ }, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ .key = "\x08\x00" /* rta length */
+ "\x01\x00" /* rta type */
+#else
+ .key = "\x00\x08" /* rta length */
+ "\x00\x01" /* rta type */
+#endif
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x10" /* enc key length */
+ "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27"
+ "\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f"
+ "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37"
+ "\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f"
+ "\xc2\x86\x69\x6d\x88\x7c\x9a\xa0"
+ "\x61\x1b\xbb\x3e\x20\x25\xa4\x5a",
+ .klen = 8 + 32 + 16,
+ .iv = "\x56\xe8\x14\xa5\x74\x18\x75\x13"
+ "\x2f\x79\xe7\xc8\x65\xe3\x48\x45",
+ .assoc = "\x56\x2e\x17\x99\x6d\x09\x3d\x28"
+ "\xdd\xb3\xba\x69\x5a\x2e\x6f\x58",
+ .alen = 16,
+ .ptext = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+ "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+ "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17"
+ "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f",
+ .plen = 32,
+ .ctext = "\xd2\x96\xcd\x94\xc2\xcc\xcf\x8a"
+ "\x3a\x86\x30\x28\xb5\xe1\xdc\x0a"
+ "\x75\x86\x60\x2d\x25\x3c\xff\xf9"
+ "\x1b\x82\x66\xbe\xa6\xd6\x1a\xb1"
+ "\xf5\x33\x53\xf3\x68\x85\x2a\x99"
+ "\x0e\x06\x58\x8f\xba\xf6\x06\xda"
+ "\x49\x69\x0d\x5b\xd4\x36\x06\x62"
+ "\x35\x5e\x54\x58\x53\x4d\xdf\xbf",
+ .clen = 32 + 32,
+ }, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ .key = "\x08\x00" /* rta length */
+ "\x01\x00" /* rta type */
+#else
+ .key = "\x00\x08" /* rta length */
+ "\x00\x01" /* rta type */
+#endif
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x10" /* enc key length */
+ "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+ "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+ "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+ "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+ "\x6c\x3e\xa0\x47\x76\x30\xce\x21"
+ "\xa2\xce\x33\x4a\xa7\x46\xc2\xcd",
+ .klen = 8 + 32 + 16,
+ .iv = "\x1f\x6b\xfb\xd6\x6b\x72\x2f\xc9"
+ "\xb6\x9f\x8c\x10\xa8\x96\x15\x64",
+ .assoc = "\xc7\x82\xdc\x4c\x09\x8c\x66\xcb"
+ "\xd9\xcd\x27\xd8\x25\x68\x2c\x81",
+ .alen = 16,
+ .ptext = "This is a 48-byte message (exactly 3 AES blocks)",
+ .plen = 48,
+ .ctext = "\xd0\xa0\x2b\x38\x36\x45\x17\x53"
+ "\xd4\x93\x66\x5d\x33\xf0\xe8\x86"
+ "\x2d\xea\x54\xcd\xb2\x93\xab\xc7"
+ "\x50\x69\x39\x27\x67\x72\xf8\xd5"
+ "\x02\x1c\x19\x21\x6b\xad\x52\x5c"
+ "\x85\x79\x69\x5d\x83\xba\x26\x84"
+ "\x68\xb9\x3e\x90\x38\xa0\x88\x01"
+ "\xe7\xc6\xce\x10\x31\x2f\x9b\x1d"
+ "\x24\x78\xfb\xbe\x02\xe0\x4f\x40"
+ "\x10\xbd\xaa\xc6\xa7\x79\xe0\x1a",
+ .clen = 48 + 32,
+ }, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ .key = "\x08\x00" /* rta length */
+ "\x01\x00" /* rta type */
+#else
+ .key = "\x00\x08" /* rta length */
+ "\x00\x01" /* rta type */
+#endif
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x10" /* enc key length */
+ "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+ "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+ "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+ "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+ "\x56\xe4\x7a\x38\xc5\x59\x89\x74"
+ "\xbc\x46\x90\x3d\xba\x29\x03\x49",
+ .klen = 8 + 32 + 16,
+ .iv = "\x13\xe5\xf2\xef\x61\x97\x59\x35"
+ "\x9b\x36\x84\x46\x4e\x63\xd1\x41",
+ .assoc = "\x8c\xe8\x2e\xef\xbe\xa0\xda\x3c"
+ "\x44\x69\x9e\xd7\xdb\x51\xb7\xd9",
+ .alen = 16,
+ .ptext = "\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7"
+ "\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf"
+ "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7"
+ "\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf"
+ "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7"
+ "\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf"
+ "\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7"
+ "\xd8\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf",
+ .plen = 64,
+ .ctext = "\xc3\x0e\x32\xff\xed\xc0\x77\x4e"
+ "\x6a\xff\x6a\xf0\x86\x9f\x71\xaa"
+ "\x0f\x3a\xf0\x7a\x9a\x31\xa9\xc6"
+ "\x84\xdb\x20\x7e\xb0\xef\x8e\x4e"
+ "\x35\x90\x7a\xa6\x32\xc3\xff\xdf"
+ "\x86\x8b\xb7\xb2\x9d\x3d\x46\xad"
+ "\x83\xce\x9f\x9a\x10\x2e\xe9\x9d"
+ "\x49\xa5\x3e\x87\xf4\xc3\xda\x55"
+ "\x7a\x1b\xd4\x3c\xdb\x17\x95\xe2"
+ "\xe0\x93\xec\xc9\x9f\xf7\xce\xd8"
+ "\x3f\x54\xe2\x49\x39\xe3\x71\x25"
+ "\x2b\x6c\xe9\x5d\xec\xec\x2b\x64",
+ .clen = 64 + 32,
+ }, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ .key = "\x08\x00" /* rta length */
+ "\x01\x00" /* rta type */
+#else
+ .key = "\x00\x08" /* rta length */
+ "\x00\x01" /* rta type */
+#endif
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x10" /* enc key length */
+ "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+ "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+ "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+ "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+ "\x90\xd3\x82\xb4\x10\xee\xba\x7a"
+ "\xd9\x38\xc4\x6c\xec\x1a\x82\xbf",
+ .klen = 8 + 32 + 16,
+ .iv = "\xe4\x13\xa1\x15\xe9\x6b\xb8\x23"
+ "\x81\x7a\x94\x29\xab\xfd\xd2\x2c",
+ .assoc = "\x00\x00\x43\x21\x00\x00\x00\x01"
+ "\xe9\x6e\x8c\x08\xab\x46\x57\x63"
+ "\xfd\x09\x8d\x45\xdd\x3f\xf8\x93",
+ .alen = 24,
+ .ptext = "\x08\x00\x0e\xbd\xa7\x0a\x00\x00"
+ "\x8e\x9c\x08\x3d\xb9\x5b\x07\x00"
+ "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+ "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17"
+ "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f"
+ "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27"
+ "\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f"
+ "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37"
+ "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08"
+ "\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0e\x01",
+ .plen = 80,
+ .ctext = "\xf6\x63\xc2\x5d\x32\x5c\x18\xc6"
+ "\xa9\x45\x3e\x19\x4e\x12\x08\x49"
+ "\xa4\x87\x0b\x66\xcc\x6b\x99\x65"
+ "\x33\x00\x13\xb4\x89\x8d\xc8\x56"
+ "\xa4\x69\x9e\x52\x3a\x55\xdb\x08"
+ "\x0b\x59\xec\x3a\x8e\x4b\x7e\x52"
+ "\x77\x5b\x07\xd1\xdb\x34\xed\x9c"
+ "\x53\x8a\xb5\x0c\x55\x1b\x87\x4a"
+ "\xa2\x69\xad\xd0\x47\xad\x2d\x59"
+ "\x13\xac\x19\xb7\xcf\xba\xd4\xa6"
+ "\xbb\xd4\x0f\xbe\xa3\x3b\x4c\xb8"
+ "\x3a\xd2\xe1\x03\x86\xa5\x59\xb7"
+ "\x73\xc3\x46\x20\x2c\xb1\xef\x68"
+ "\xbb\x8a\x32\x7e\x12\x8c\x69\xcf",
+ .clen = 80 + 32,
+ }, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ .key = "\x08\x00" /* rta length */
+ "\x01\x00" /* rta type */
+#else
+ .key = "\x00\x08" /* rta length */
+ "\x00\x01" /* rta type */
+#endif
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x18" /* enc key length */
+ "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+ "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+ "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+ "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+ "\x8e\x73\xb0\xf7\xda\x0e\x64\x52"
+ "\xc8\x10\xf3\x2b\x80\x90\x79\xe5"
+ "\x62\xf8\xea\xd2\x52\x2c\x6b\x7b",
+ .klen = 8 + 32 + 24,
+ .iv = "\x49\xca\x41\xc9\x6b\xbf\x6c\x98"
+ "\x38\x2f\xa7\x3d\x4d\x80\x49\xb0",
+ .assoc = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+ "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f",
+ .alen = 16,
+ .ptext = "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+ "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+ "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+ "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+ "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+ "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+ "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+ "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+ .plen = 64,
+ .ctext = "\x4f\x02\x1d\xb2\x43\xbc\x63\x3d"
+ "\x71\x78\x18\x3a\x9f\xa0\x71\xe8"
+ "\xb4\xd9\xad\xa9\xad\x7d\xed\xf4"
+ "\xe5\xe7\x38\x76\x3f\x69\x14\x5a"
+ "\x57\x1b\x24\x20\x12\xfb\x7a\xe0"
+ "\x7f\xa9\xba\xac\x3d\xf1\x02\xe0"
+ "\x08\xb0\xe2\x79\x88\x59\x88\x81"
+ "\xd9\x20\xa9\xe6\x4f\x56\x15\xcd"
+ "\x2f\xee\x5f\xdb\x66\xfe\x79\x09"
+ "\x61\x81\x31\xea\x5b\x3d\x8e\xfb"
+ "\xca\x71\x85\x93\xf7\x85\x55\x8b"
+ "\x7a\xe4\x94\xca\x8b\xba\x19\x33",
+ .clen = 64 + 32,
+ }, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ .key = "\x08\x00" /* rta length */
+ "\x01\x00" /* rta type */
+#else
+ .key = "\x00\x08" /* rta length */
+ "\x00\x01" /* rta type */
+#endif
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x20" /* enc key length */
+ "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+ "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+ "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+ "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+ "\x60\x3d\xeb\x10\x15\xca\x71\xbe"
+ "\x2b\x73\xae\xf0\x85\x7d\x77\x81"
+ "\x1f\x35\x2c\x07\x3b\x61\x08\xd7"
+ "\x2d\x98\x10\xa3\x09\x14\xdf\xf4",
+ .klen = 8 + 32 + 32,
+ .iv = "\xdf\xab\xf2\x7c\xdc\xe0\x33\x4c"
+ "\xf9\x75\xaf\xf9\x2f\x60\x3a\x9b",
+ .assoc = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+ "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f",
+ .alen = 16,
+ .ptext = "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+ "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+ "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+ "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+ "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+ "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+ "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+ "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+ .plen = 64,
+ .ctext = "\xf5\x8c\x4c\x04\xd6\xe5\xf1\xba"
+ "\x77\x9e\xab\xfb\x5f\x7b\xfb\xd6"
+ "\x9c\xfc\x4e\x96\x7e\xdb\x80\x8d"
+ "\x67\x9f\x77\x7b\xc6\x70\x2c\x7d"
+ "\x39\xf2\x33\x69\xa9\xd9\xba\xcf"
+ "\xa5\x30\xe2\x63\x04\x23\x14\x61"
+ "\xb2\xeb\x05\xe2\xc3\x9b\xe9\xfc"
+ "\xda\x6c\x19\x07\x8c\x6a\x9d\x1b"
+ "\x24\x29\xed\xc2\x31\x49\xdb\xb1"
+ "\x8f\x74\xbd\x17\x92\x03\xbe\x8f"
+ "\xf3\x61\xde\x1c\xe9\xdb\xcd\xd0"
+ "\xcc\xce\xe9\x85\x57\xcf\x6f\x5f",
+ .clen = 64 + 32,
+ },
+};
+
#endif /* _CRYPTO_TESTMGR_H */
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 3/6] crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk
2019-08-19 14:17 [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 0/6] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 1/6] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template " Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [PATCH v13 2/6] crypto: essiv - add tests for essiv in cbc(aes)+sha256 mode Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-08-19 14:17 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [PATCH v13 4/6] crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode Ard Biesheuvel
` (4 subsequent siblings)
7 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-19 14:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz
The plain CBC driver and the CTS one share some code that iterates over
a scatterwalk and invokes the CBC asm code to do the processing. The
upcoming ESSIV/CBC mode will clone that pattern for the third time, so
let's factor it out first.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c | 82 ++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
index 55d6d4838708..23abf335f1ee 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
@@ -186,46 +186,64 @@ static int ecb_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
return err;
}
-static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+static int cbc_encrypt_walk(struct skcipher_request *req,
+ struct skcipher_walk *walk)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
- int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
- struct skcipher_walk walk;
+ int err = 0, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
unsigned int blocks;
- err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
-
- while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
+ while ((blocks = (walk->nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
kernel_neon_begin();
- aes_cbc_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
- ctx->key_enc, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
+ aes_cbc_encrypt(walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr,
+ ctx->key_enc, rounds, blocks, walk->iv);
kernel_neon_end();
- err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ err = skcipher_walk_done(walk, walk->nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
return err;
}
-static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
- struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
- struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
- int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
struct skcipher_walk walk;
- unsigned int blocks;
+ int err;
err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ return cbc_encrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
- while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
+static int cbc_decrypt_walk(struct skcipher_request *req,
+ struct skcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+ int err = 0, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
+ unsigned int blocks;
+
+ while ((blocks = (walk->nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
kernel_neon_begin();
- aes_cbc_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
- ctx->key_dec, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
+ aes_cbc_decrypt(walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr,
+ ctx->key_dec, rounds, blocks, walk->iv);
kernel_neon_end();
- err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ err = skcipher_walk_done(walk, walk->nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
return err;
}
+static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+ struct skcipher_walk walk;
+ int err;
+
+ err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ return cbc_decrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
+
static int cts_cbc_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
{
crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct cts_cbc_req_ctx));
@@ -251,22 +269,12 @@ static int cts_cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
}
if (cbc_blocks > 0) {
- unsigned int blocks;
-
skcipher_request_set_crypt(&rctx->subreq, req->src, req->dst,
cbc_blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
req->iv);
- err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false);
-
- while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
- kernel_neon_begin();
- aes_cbc_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
- ctx->key_enc, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
- kernel_neon_end();
- err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk,
- walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- }
+ err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false) ?:
+ cbc_encrypt_walk(&rctx->subreq, &walk);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -316,22 +324,12 @@ static int cts_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
}
if (cbc_blocks > 0) {
- unsigned int blocks;
-
skcipher_request_set_crypt(&rctx->subreq, req->src, req->dst,
cbc_blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
req->iv);
- err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false);
-
- while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
- kernel_neon_begin();
- aes_cbc_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
- ctx->key_dec, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
- kernel_neon_end();
- err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk,
- walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- }
+ err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false) ?:
+ cbc_decrypt_walk(&rctx->subreq, &walk);
if (err)
return err;
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 4/6] crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode
2019-08-19 14:17 [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 0/6] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [PATCH v13 3/6] crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-08-19 14:17 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [PATCH v13 5/6] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template Ard Biesheuvel
` (3 subsequent siblings)
7 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-19 14:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz
Add an accelerated version of the 'essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)' skcipher,
which is used by fscrypt or dm-crypt on systems where CBC mode is
signficantly more performant than XTS mode (e.g., when using a h/w
accelerator which supports the former but not the latter) This avoids
a separate call into the AES cipher for every invocation.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c | 124 ++++++++++++++++++++
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S | 28 +++++
2 files changed, 152 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
index 23abf335f1ee..ca0c84d56cba 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <asm/simd.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include <crypto/ctr.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
@@ -30,6 +31,8 @@
#define aes_cbc_decrypt ce_aes_cbc_decrypt
#define aes_cbc_cts_encrypt ce_aes_cbc_cts_encrypt
#define aes_cbc_cts_decrypt ce_aes_cbc_cts_decrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt ce_aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt ce_aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt
#define aes_ctr_encrypt ce_aes_ctr_encrypt
#define aes_xts_encrypt ce_aes_xts_encrypt
#define aes_xts_decrypt ce_aes_xts_decrypt
@@ -44,6 +47,8 @@ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("AES-ECB/CBC/CTR/XTS using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions");
#define aes_cbc_decrypt neon_aes_cbc_decrypt
#define aes_cbc_cts_encrypt neon_aes_cbc_cts_encrypt
#define aes_cbc_cts_decrypt neon_aes_cbc_cts_decrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt neon_aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt neon_aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt
#define aes_ctr_encrypt neon_aes_ctr_encrypt
#define aes_xts_encrypt neon_aes_xts_encrypt
#define aes_xts_decrypt neon_aes_xts_decrypt
@@ -51,6 +56,7 @@ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("AES-ECB/CBC/CTR/XTS using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("AES-ECB/CBC/CTR/XTS using ARMv8 NEON");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ecb(aes)");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("cbc(aes)");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ctr(aes)");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xts(aes)");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("cmac(aes)");
@@ -87,6 +93,13 @@ asmlinkage void aes_xts_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
int rounds, int blocks, u32 const rk2[], u8 iv[],
int first);
+asmlinkage void aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+ int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+ u32 const rk2[]);
+asmlinkage void aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+ int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+ u32 const rk2[]);
+
asmlinkage void aes_mac_update(u8 const in[], u32 const rk[], int rounds,
int blocks, u8 dg[], int enc_before,
int enc_after);
@@ -102,6 +115,12 @@ struct crypto_aes_xts_ctx {
struct crypto_aes_ctx __aligned(8) key2;
};
+struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx {
+ struct crypto_aes_ctx key1;
+ struct crypto_aes_ctx __aligned(8) key2;
+ struct crypto_shash *hash;
+};
+
struct mac_tfm_ctx {
struct crypto_aes_ctx key;
u8 __aligned(8) consts[];
@@ -146,6 +165,31 @@ static int xts_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
return -EINVAL;
}
+static int essiv_cbc_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+ unsigned int key_len)
+{
+ struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, ctx->hash);
+ u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = aes_expandkey(&ctx->key1, in_key, key_len);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ desc->tfm = ctx->hash;
+ crypto_shash_digest(desc, in_key, key_len, digest);
+
+ ret = aes_expandkey(&ctx->key2, digest, sizeof(digest));
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ return 0;
+out:
+ crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
static int ecb_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
@@ -360,6 +404,68 @@ static int cts_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0);
}
+static int essiv_cbc_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+ struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+ ctx->hash = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(ctx->hash))
+ return PTR_ERR(ctx->hash);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void essiv_cbc_exit_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+ struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+ crypto_free_shash(ctx->hash);
+}
+
+static int essiv_cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+ int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key1.key_length / 4;
+ struct skcipher_walk walk;
+ unsigned int blocks;
+
+ err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+
+ blocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ if (blocks) {
+ kernel_neon_begin();
+ aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+ ctx->key1.key_enc, rounds, blocks,
+ req->iv, ctx->key2.key_enc);
+ kernel_neon_end();
+ err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ }
+ return err ?: cbc_encrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
+
+static int essiv_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+ int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key1.key_length / 4;
+ struct skcipher_walk walk;
+ unsigned int blocks;
+
+ err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+
+ blocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ if (blocks) {
+ kernel_neon_begin();
+ aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+ ctx->key1.key_dec, rounds, blocks,
+ req->iv, ctx->key2.key_enc);
+ kernel_neon_end();
+ err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ }
+ return err ?: cbc_decrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
+
static int ctr_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
@@ -515,6 +621,24 @@ static struct skcipher_alg aes_algs[] = { {
.encrypt = cts_cbc_encrypt,
.decrypt = cts_cbc_decrypt,
.init = cts_cbc_init_tfm,
+}, {
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "__essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "__essiv-cbc-aes-sha256-" MODE,
+ .cra_priority = PRIO + 1,
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
+ .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx),
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ },
+ .min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+ .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .setkey = essiv_cbc_set_key,
+ .encrypt = essiv_cbc_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = essiv_cbc_decrypt,
+ .init = essiv_cbc_init_tfm,
+ .exit = essiv_cbc_exit_tfm,
}, {
.base = {
.cra_name = "__ctr(aes)",
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S
index 324039b72094..2879f030a749 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S
@@ -118,8 +118,23 @@ AES_ENDPROC(aes_ecb_decrypt)
* int blocks, u8 iv[])
* aes_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u8 const rk[], int rounds,
* int blocks, u8 iv[])
+ * aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+ * int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+ * u32 const rk2[]);
+ * aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+ * int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+ * u32 const rk2[]);
*/
+AES_ENTRY(aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt)
+ ld1 {v4.16b}, [x5] /* get iv */
+
+ mov w8, #14 /* AES-256: 14 rounds */
+ enc_prepare w8, x6, x7
+ encrypt_block v4, w8, x6, x7, w9
+ enc_switch_key w3, x2, x6
+ b .Lcbcencloop4x
+
AES_ENTRY(aes_cbc_encrypt)
ld1 {v4.16b}, [x5] /* get iv */
enc_prepare w3, x2, x6
@@ -153,13 +168,25 @@ AES_ENTRY(aes_cbc_encrypt)
st1 {v4.16b}, [x5] /* return iv */
ret
AES_ENDPROC(aes_cbc_encrypt)
+AES_ENDPROC(aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt)
+
+AES_ENTRY(aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt)
+ stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
+ mov x29, sp
+
+ ld1 {cbciv.16b}, [x5] /* get iv */
+ mov w8, #14 /* AES-256: 14 rounds */
+ enc_prepare w8, x6, x7
+ encrypt_block cbciv, w8, x6, x7, w9
+ b .Lessivcbcdecstart
AES_ENTRY(aes_cbc_decrypt)
stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
mov x29, sp
ld1 {cbciv.16b}, [x5] /* get iv */
+.Lessivcbcdecstart:
dec_prepare w3, x2, x6
.LcbcdecloopNx:
@@ -212,6 +239,7 @@ ST5( st1 {v4.16b}, [x0], #16 )
ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16
ret
AES_ENDPROC(aes_cbc_decrypt)
+AES_ENDPROC(aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt)
/*
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 5/6] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
2019-08-19 14:17 [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 0/6] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [PATCH v13 4/6] crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-08-19 14:17 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-09-03 18:55 ` [dm-devel] " Mike Snitzer
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [PATCH v13 6/6] md: dm-crypt: omit parsing of the encapsulated cipher Ard Biesheuvel
` (2 subsequent siblings)
7 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-19 14:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz
Replace the explicit ESSIV handling in the dm-crypt driver with calls
into the crypto API, which now possesses the capability to perform
this processing within the crypto subsystem.
Note that we reorder the AEAD cipher_api string parsing with the TFM
instantiation: this is needed because cipher_api is mangled by the
ESSIV handling, and throws off the parsing of "authenc(" otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
drivers/md/Kconfig | 1 +
drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 213 ++++----------------
2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 170 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/md/Kconfig b/drivers/md/Kconfig
index 3834332f4963..b727e8f15264 100644
--- a/drivers/md/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/md/Kconfig
@@ -271,6 +271,7 @@ config DM_CRYPT
depends on BLK_DEV_DM
select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_CBC
+ select CRYPTO_ESSIV
---help---
This device-mapper target allows you to create a device that
transparently encrypts the data on it. You'll need to activate
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index d5216bcc4649..e3e6e111edfc 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -98,11 +98,6 @@ struct crypt_iv_operations {
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq);
};
-struct iv_essiv_private {
- struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
- u8 *salt;
-};
-
struct iv_benbi_private {
int shift;
};
@@ -159,7 +154,6 @@ struct crypt_config {
const struct crypt_iv_operations *iv_gen_ops;
union {
- struct iv_essiv_private essiv;
struct iv_benbi_private benbi;
struct iv_lmk_private lmk;
struct iv_tcw_private tcw;
@@ -170,8 +164,6 @@ struct crypt_config {
unsigned short int sector_size;
unsigned char sector_shift;
- /* ESSIV: struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm */
- void *iv_private;
union {
struct crypto_skcipher **tfms;
struct crypto_aead **tfms_aead;
@@ -329,157 +321,15 @@ static int crypt_iv_plain64be_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
return 0;
}
-/* Initialise ESSIV - compute salt but no local memory allocations */
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_init(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
- struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
- SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, essiv->hash_tfm);
- struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
- int err;
-
- desc->tfm = essiv->hash_tfm;
-
- err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cc->key, cc->key_size, essiv->salt);
- shash_desc_zero(desc);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
- err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, essiv->salt,
- crypto_shash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm));
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Wipe salt and reset key derived from volume key */
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
- struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
- unsigned salt_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm);
- struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
- int r, err = 0;
-
- memset(essiv->salt, 0, salt_size);
-
- essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
- r = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, essiv->salt, salt_size);
- if (r)
- err = r;
-
- return err;
-}
-
-/* Allocate the cipher for ESSIV */
-static struct crypto_cipher *alloc_essiv_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc,
- struct dm_target *ti,
- const u8 *salt,
- unsigned int saltsize)
-{
- struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
- int err;
-
- /* Setup the essiv_tfm with the given salt */
- essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher(cc->cipher, 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm)) {
- ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm for ESSIV";
- return essiv_tfm;
- }
-
- if (crypto_cipher_blocksize(essiv_tfm) != cc->iv_size) {
- ti->error = "Block size of ESSIV cipher does "
- "not match IV size of block cipher";
- crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
- return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- }
-
- err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, salt, saltsize);
- if (err) {
- ti->error = "Failed to set key for ESSIV cipher";
- crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
- return ERR_PTR(err);
- }
-
- return essiv_tfm;
-}
-
-static void crypt_iv_essiv_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
- struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
- struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
-
- crypto_free_shash(essiv->hash_tfm);
- essiv->hash_tfm = NULL;
-
- kzfree(essiv->salt);
- essiv->salt = NULL;
-
- essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
- if (essiv_tfm)
- crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
-
- cc->iv_private = NULL;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
- const char *opts)
-{
- struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm = NULL;
- struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm = NULL;
- u8 *salt = NULL;
- int err;
-
- if (!opts) {
- ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- /* Allocate hash algorithm */
- hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(opts, 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm)) {
- ti->error = "Error initializing ESSIV hash";
- err = PTR_ERR(hash_tfm);
- goto bad;
- }
-
- salt = kzalloc(crypto_shash_digestsize(hash_tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!salt) {
- ti->error = "Error kmallocing salt storage in ESSIV";
- err = -ENOMEM;
- goto bad;
- }
-
- cc->iv_gen_private.essiv.salt = salt;
- cc->iv_gen_private.essiv.hash_tfm = hash_tfm;
-
- essiv_tfm = alloc_essiv_cipher(cc, ti, salt,
- crypto_shash_digestsize(hash_tfm));
- if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm)) {
- crypt_iv_essiv_dtr(cc);
- return PTR_ERR(essiv_tfm);
- }
- cc->iv_private = essiv_tfm;
-
- return 0;
-
-bad:
- if (hash_tfm && !IS_ERR(hash_tfm))
- crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm);
- kfree(salt);
- return err;
-}
-
static int crypt_iv_essiv_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
{
- struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
+ /*
+ * ESSIV encryption of the IV is now handled by the crypto API,
+ * so just pass the plain sector number here.
+ */
memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size);
*(__le64 *)iv = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector);
- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(essiv_tfm, iv, iv);
return 0;
}
@@ -921,10 +771,6 @@ static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_plain64be_ops = {
};
static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_essiv_ops = {
- .ctr = crypt_iv_essiv_ctr,
- .dtr = crypt_iv_essiv_dtr,
- .init = crypt_iv_essiv_init,
- .wipe = crypt_iv_essiv_wipe,
.generator = crypt_iv_essiv_gen
};
@@ -2490,7 +2336,7 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
char **ivmode, char **ivopts)
{
struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
- char *tmp, *cipher_api;
+ char *tmp, *cipher_api, buf[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
int ret = -EINVAL;
cc->tfms_count = 1;
@@ -2516,9 +2362,32 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
/* The rest is crypto API spec */
cipher_api = tmp;
+ /* Alloc AEAD, can be used only in new format. */
+ if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
+ ret = crypt_ctr_auth_cipher(cc, cipher_api);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ti->error = "Invalid AEAD cipher spec";
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ }
+
if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "lmk"))
cc->tfms_count = 64;
+ if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "essiv")) {
+ if (!*ivopts) {
+ ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ ret = snprintf(buf, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "essiv(%s,%s)",
+ cipher_api, *ivopts);
+ if (ret < 0 || ret >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) {
+ ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher string";
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ cipher_api = buf;
+ }
+
cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count;
/* Allocate cipher */
@@ -2528,15 +2397,9 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
return ret;
}
- /* Alloc AEAD, can be used only in new format. */
- if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
- ret = crypt_ctr_auth_cipher(cc, cipher_api);
- if (ret < 0) {
- ti->error = "Invalid AEAD cipher spec";
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
+ if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
cc->iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(any_tfm_aead(cc));
- } else
+ else
cc->iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(any_tfm(cc));
ret = crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(cc);
@@ -2605,9 +2468,19 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_old(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
if (!cipher_api)
goto bad_mem;
- ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
- "%s(%s)", chainmode, cipher);
- if (ret < 0) {
+ if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "essiv")) {
+ if (!*ivopts) {
+ ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
+ kfree(cipher_api);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+ "essiv(%s(%s),%s)", chainmode, cipher, *ivopts);
+ } else {
+ ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+ "%s(%s)", chainmode, cipher);
+ }
+ if (ret < 0 || ret >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) {
kfree(cipher_api);
goto bad_mem;
}
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v13 6/6] md: dm-crypt: omit parsing of the encapsulated cipher
2019-08-19 14:17 [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 0/6] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [PATCH v13 5/6] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-08-19 14:17 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-09-03 18:58 ` Mike Snitzer
2019-08-20 11:03 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 0/6] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-30 8:18 ` Herbert Xu
7 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-19 14:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz
Only the ESSIV IV generation mode used to use cc->cipher so it could
instantiate the bare cipher used to encrypt the IV. However, this is
now taken care of by the ESSIV template, and so no users of cc->cipher
remain. So remove it altogether.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 58 --------------------
1 file changed, 58 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index e3e6e111edfc..0dd1fb027ac0 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -147,7 +147,6 @@ struct crypt_config {
struct task_struct *write_thread;
struct rb_root write_tree;
- char *cipher;
char *cipher_string;
char *cipher_auth;
char *key_string;
@@ -2166,7 +2165,6 @@ static void crypt_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)
if (cc->dev)
dm_put_device(ti, cc->dev);
- kzfree(cc->cipher);
kzfree(cc->cipher_string);
kzfree(cc->key_string);
kzfree(cc->cipher_auth);
@@ -2247,52 +2245,6 @@ static int crypt_ctr_ivmode(struct dm_target *ti, const char *ivmode)
return 0;
}
-/*
- * Workaround to parse cipher algorithm from crypto API spec.
- * The cc->cipher is currently used only in ESSIV.
- * This should be probably done by crypto-api calls (once available...)
- */
-static int crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
- const char *alg_name = NULL;
- char *start, *end;
-
- if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
- alg_name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_aead_tfm(any_tfm_aead(cc)));
- if (!alg_name)
- return -EINVAL;
- if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc)) {
- alg_name = strchr(alg_name, ',');
- if (!alg_name)
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- alg_name++;
- } else {
- alg_name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_skcipher_tfm(any_tfm(cc)));
- if (!alg_name)
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- start = strchr(alg_name, '(');
- end = strchr(alg_name, ')');
-
- if (!start && !end) {
- cc->cipher = kstrdup(alg_name, GFP_KERNEL);
- return cc->cipher ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
- }
-
- if (!start || !end || ++start >= end)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- cc->cipher = kzalloc(end - start + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!cc->cipher)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- strncpy(cc->cipher, start, end - start);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/*
* Workaround to parse HMAC algorithm from AEAD crypto API spec.
* The HMAC is needed to calculate tag size (HMAC digest size).
@@ -2402,12 +2354,6 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
else
cc->iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(any_tfm(cc));
- ret = crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(cc);
- if (ret < 0) {
- ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher string";
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
return 0;
}
@@ -2442,10 +2388,6 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_old(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
}
cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count;
- cc->cipher = kstrdup(cipher, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!cc->cipher)
- goto bad_mem;
-
chainmode = strsep(&tmp, "-");
*ivmode = strsep(&tmp, ":");
*ivopts = tmp;
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 0/6] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation
2019-08-19 14:17 [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 0/6] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [PATCH v13 6/6] md: dm-crypt: omit parsing of the encapsulated cipher Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-08-20 11:03 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-30 8:18 ` Herbert Xu
7 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-20 11:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE
Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef,
device-mapper development, Milan Broz
On Mon, 19 Aug 2019 at 17:17, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> This series creates an ESSIV template that produces a skcipher or AEAD
> transform based on a tuple of the form '<skcipher>,<shash>' (or '<aead>,<shash>'
> for the AEAD case). It exposes the encapsulated sync or async skcipher/aead by
> passing through all operations, while using the cipher/shash pair to transform
> the input IV into an ESSIV output IV.
>
> Changes since v12:
> - don't use a per-instance shash but only record the cra_driver_name of the
> shash when instantiating the template, and allocate the shash for each
> allocated transform instead
> - add back the dm-crypt patch -> as Milan has indicated, his preference would
> be to queue these changes for v5.4 (with the first patch shared between the
> cryptodev and md trees on a stable branch based on v5.3-rc1 - if needed,
> I can provide a signed tag)
>
Actually, since Eric has indicated that he does not want to take the
associated fscrypt change for v5.4 anyway, patch #1 could simply be
routed through the md tree instead, while the others are taken through
cryptodev.
--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v13 1/6] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 1/6] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template " Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-08-30 4:58 ` Herbert Xu
2019-08-31 16:37 ` Ard Biesheuvel
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2019-08-30 4:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ard Biesheuvel
Cc: linux-crypto, Eric Biggers, dm-devel, linux-fscrypt,
Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz
On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 05:17:33PM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> Implement a template that wraps a (skcipher,shash) or (aead,shash) tuple
> so that we can consolidate the ESSIV handling in fscrypt and dm-crypt and
> move it into the crypto API. This will result in better test coverage, and
> will allow future changes to make the bare cipher interface internal to the
> crypto subsystem, in order to increase robustness of the API against misuse.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> ---
> crypto/Kconfig | 28 +
> crypto/Makefile | 1 +
> crypto/essiv.c | 663 ++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 692 insertions(+)
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v13 0/6] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation
2019-08-19 14:17 [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 0/6] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2019-08-20 11:03 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 0/6] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-08-30 8:18 ` Herbert Xu
7 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2019-08-30 8:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ard Biesheuvel
Cc: linux-crypto, Eric Biggers, dm-devel, linux-fscrypt,
Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz
On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 05:17:32PM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> This series creates an ESSIV template that produces a skcipher or AEAD
> transform based on a tuple of the form '<skcipher>,<shash>' (or '<aead>,<shash>'
> for the AEAD case). It exposes the encapsulated sync or async skcipher/aead by
> passing through all operations, while using the cipher/shash pair to transform
> the input IV into an ESSIV output IV.
>
> Changes since v12:
> - don't use a per-instance shash but only record the cra_driver_name of the
> shash when instantiating the template, and allocate the shash for each
> allocated transform instead
> - add back the dm-crypt patch -> as Milan has indicated, his preference would
> be to queue these changes for v5.4 (with the first patch shared between the
> cryptodev and md trees on a stable branch based on v5.3-rc1 - if needed,
> I can provide a signed tag)
>
> Changes since v11:
> - Avoid spawns for the ESSIV shash and cipher algos. Instead, the shash TFM is
> allocated per-instance (which is appropriate since it is unkeyed and thus
> stateless), and the cipher is allocated explicitly based on the parsed
> skcipher/aead cra_name.
>
> Changes since v10:
> - Drop patches against fscrypt and dm-crypt - these will be routed via the
> respective maintainer trees during the next cycle
> - Fix error handling when parsing the cipher name from the skcipher cra_name
> - Use existing ivsize temporary instead of retrieving it again
> - Expose cra_name via module alias (#4)
>
> Changes since v9:
> - Fix cipher_api parsing bug that was introduced by dropping the cipher name
> parsing patch in v9 (#3). Thanks to Milan for finding it.
> - Fix a couple of instances where the old essiv(x,y,z) format was used in
> comments instead of the essiv(x,z) format we adopted in v9
>
> Changes since v8:
> - Remove 'cipher' argument from essiv() template, and instead, parse the
> cra_name of the skcipher to obtain the cipher. This is slightly cleaner
> than what dm-crypt currently does, since we can get the cra_name from the
> spawn, and we don't have to actually allocate the TFM. Since this implies
> that dm-crypt does not need to provide the cipher, we can drop the parsing
> code from it entirely (assuming the eboiv patch I sent out recently is
> applied first) (patch #7)
> - Restrict the essiv() AEAD instantiation to AEADs whose cra_name starts with
> 'authenc('
> - Rebase onto cryptodev/master
> - Drop dm-crypt to reorder/refactor cipher name parsing, since it was wrong
> and it is no longer needed.
> - Drop Milan's R-b since the code has changed
> - Fix bug in accelerated arm64 implementation.
>
> Changes since v7:
> - rebase onto cryptodev/master
> - drop change to ivsize in #2
> - add Milan's R-b's
>
> Changes since v6:
> - make CRYPTO_ESSIV user selectable so we can opt out of selecting it even
> if FS_ENCRYPTION (which cannot be built as a module) is enabled
> - move a comment along with the code it referred to (#3), not that this change
> and removing some redundant braces makes the diff look totally different
> - add Milan's R-b to #3 and #4
>
> Changes since v5:
> - drop redundant #includes and drop some unneeded braces (#2)
> - add test case for essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)
> - make ESSIV driver deal with assoc data that is described by more than two
> scatterlist entries - this only happens when the extended tests are being
> performed, so don't optimize for it
> - clarify that both fscrypt and dm-crypt only use ESSIV in special cases (#7)
>
> Changes since v4:
> - make the ESSIV template IV size equal the IV size of the encapsulated
> cipher - defining it as 8 bytes was needlessly restrictive, and also
> complicated the code for no reason
> - add a missing kfree() spotted by Smatch
> - add additional algo length name checks when constructing the essiv()
> cipher name
> - reinstate the 'essiv' IV generation implementation in dm-crypt, but
> make its generation function identical to plain64le (and drop the other
> methods)
> - fix a bug in the arm64 CE/NEON code
> - simplify the arm64 code by reusing more of the existing CBC implementation
> (patch #6 is new to this series and was added for this reason)
>
> Changes since v3:
> - address various review comments from Eric on patch #1
> - use Kconfig's 'imply' instead of 'select' to permit CRYPTO_ESSIV to be
> enabled as a module or disabled entirely even if fscrypt is compiled in (#2)
> - fix an issue in the AEAD encrypt path caused by the IV being clobbered by
> the inner skcipher before the hmac was being calculated
>
> Changes since v2:
> - fixed a couple of bugs that snuck in after I'd done the bulk of my
> testing
> - some cosmetic tweaks to the ESSIV template skcipher setkey function
> to align it with the aead one
> - add a test case for essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)
> - add an accelerated implementation for arm64 that combines the IV
> derivation and the actual en/decryption in a single asm routine
>
> Code can be found here
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ardb/linux.git/log/?h=essiv-v11
>
> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
> Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
> Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
> Cc: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
>
> Ard Biesheuvel (6):
> crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
> crypto: essiv - add tests for essiv in cbc(aes)+sha256 mode
> crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk
> crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode
> md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
> md: dm-crypt: omit parsing of the encapsulated cipher
>
> arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c | 206 ++++--
> arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S | 28 +
> crypto/Kconfig | 28 +
> crypto/Makefile | 1 +
> crypto/essiv.c | 663 ++++++++++++++++++++
> crypto/tcrypt.c | 9 +
> crypto/testmgr.c | 14 +
> crypto/testmgr.h | 497 +++++++++++++++
> drivers/md/Kconfig | 1 +
> drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 271 ++------
> 10 files changed, 1448 insertions(+), 270 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 crypto/essiv.c
Patches 2-4 applied. Thanks.
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v13 1/6] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
2019-08-30 4:58 ` Herbert Xu
@ 2019-08-31 16:37 ` Ard Biesheuvel
0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-31 16:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Herbert Xu, Milan Broz
Cc: open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE, Eric Biggers,
device-mapper development, linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef
On Fri, 30 Aug 2019 at 07:58, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 05:17:33PM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > Implement a template that wraps a (skcipher,shash) or (aead,shash) tuple
> > so that we can consolidate the ESSIV handling in fscrypt and dm-crypt and
> > move it into the crypto API. This will result in better test coverage, and
> > will allow future changes to make the bare cipher interface internal to the
> > crypto subsystem, in order to increase robustness of the API against misuse.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> > ---
> > crypto/Kconfig | 28 +
> > crypto/Makefile | 1 +
> > crypto/essiv.c | 663 ++++++++++++++++++++
> > 3 files changed, 692 insertions(+)
>
> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Milan,
Hopefully, this can still be taken for v5.4. If not, please coordinate
with Eric on how to get this queued for v5.5
Thanks,
Ard.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 5/6] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [PATCH v13 5/6] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-09-03 18:55 ` Mike Snitzer
2019-09-03 19:16 ` Ard Biesheuvel
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Mike Snitzer @ 2019-09-03 18:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ard Biesheuvel
Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel, Gilad Ben-Yossef,
linux-fscrypt, linux-crypto, Milan Broz
On Mon, Aug 19 2019 at 10:17am -0400,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> Replace the explicit ESSIV handling in the dm-crypt driver with calls
> into the crypto API, which now possesses the capability to perform
> this processing within the crypto subsystem.
>
> Note that we reorder the AEAD cipher_api string parsing with the TFM
> instantiation: this is needed because cipher_api is mangled by the
> ESSIV handling, and throws off the parsing of "authenc(" otherwise.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
I really like to see this type of factoring out to the crypto API;
nicely done.
Acked-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Herbert, please feel free to pull this, and the next 6/6 patch, into
your crypto tree for 5.4. I see no need to complicate matters by me
having to rebase my dm-5.4 branch ontop of the crypto tree, etc.
Thanks,
Mike
--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v13 6/6] md: dm-crypt: omit parsing of the encapsulated cipher
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [PATCH v13 6/6] md: dm-crypt: omit parsing of the encapsulated cipher Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-09-03 18:58 ` Mike Snitzer
2019-09-04 11:01 ` [dm-devel] " Milan Broz
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Mike Snitzer @ 2019-09-03 18:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ard Biesheuvel
Cc: linux-crypto, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, linux-fscrypt,
Gilad Ben-Yossef, dm-devel, Milan Broz
On Mon, Aug 19 2019 at 10:17am -0400,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> Only the ESSIV IV generation mode used to use cc->cipher so it could
> instantiate the bare cipher used to encrypt the IV. However, this is
> now taken care of by the ESSIV template, and so no users of cc->cipher
> remain. So remove it altogether.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Might be wise to bump the dm-crypt target's version number (from
{1, 19, 0} to {1, 20, 0}) at the end of this patch too though...
But again, Herbert please feel free to pull this into your 5.4 branch.
Thanks,
Mike
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v13 5/6] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
2019-09-03 18:55 ` [dm-devel] " Mike Snitzer
@ 2019-09-03 19:16 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-09-03 20:51 ` Mike Snitzer
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-09-03 19:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mike Snitzer
Cc: open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE, Herbert Xu,
Eric Biggers, linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef,
device-mapper development, Milan Broz
On Tue, 3 Sep 2019 at 11:55, Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Aug 19 2019 at 10:17am -0400,
> Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> > Replace the explicit ESSIV handling in the dm-crypt driver with calls
> > into the crypto API, which now possesses the capability to perform
> > this processing within the crypto subsystem.
> >
> > Note that we reorder the AEAD cipher_api string parsing with the TFM
> > instantiation: this is needed because cipher_api is mangled by the
> > ESSIV handling, and throws off the parsing of "authenc(" otherwise.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
>
> I really like to see this type of factoring out to the crypto API;
> nicely done.
>
> Acked-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
>
> Herbert, please feel free to pull this, and the next 6/6 patch, into
> your crypto tree for 5.4. I see no need to complicate matters by me
> having to rebase my dm-5.4 branch ontop of the crypto tree, etc.
>
Thanks Mike.
There is no need to rebase your branch - there is only a single
dependency, which is the essiv template itself, and the patch that
adds that (#1 in this series) was acked by Herbert, specifically so
that it can be taken via another tree. The crypto tree has no
interdependencies with this template, and the other patches in this
series are not required for essiv in dm-crypt.
If you feel it is too late in the cycle, we can defer to v5.5, but in
this case, we should align with Eric, which will depend on the essiv
template for fscrypt as well.
In any case, it is up to you, Eric and Herbert to align on this. For
me, it doesn't really matter whether this lands in v5.4 or v5.5. There
is some followup work based on this, but that is further out still.
Thanks,
Ard.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v13 5/6] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
2019-09-03 19:16 ` Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-09-03 20:51 ` Mike Snitzer
0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Mike Snitzer @ 2019-09-03 20:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ard Biesheuvel
Cc: open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE, Herbert Xu,
Eric Biggers, linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef,
device-mapper development, Milan Broz
On Tue, Sep 03 2019 at 3:16pm -0400,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> On Tue, 3 Sep 2019 at 11:55, Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Aug 19 2019 at 10:17am -0400,
> > Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> >
> > > Replace the explicit ESSIV handling in the dm-crypt driver with calls
> > > into the crypto API, which now possesses the capability to perform
> > > this processing within the crypto subsystem.
> > >
> > > Note that we reorder the AEAD cipher_api string parsing with the TFM
> > > instantiation: this is needed because cipher_api is mangled by the
> > > ESSIV handling, and throws off the parsing of "authenc(" otherwise.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> >
> > I really like to see this type of factoring out to the crypto API;
> > nicely done.
> >
> > Acked-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
> >
> > Herbert, please feel free to pull this, and the next 6/6 patch, into
> > your crypto tree for 5.4. I see no need to complicate matters by me
> > having to rebase my dm-5.4 branch ontop of the crypto tree, etc.
> >
>
> Thanks Mike.
>
> There is no need to rebase your branch - there is only a single
> dependency, which is the essiv template itself, and the patch that
> adds that (#1 in this series) was acked by Herbert, specifically so
> that it can be taken via another tree. The crypto tree has no
> interdependencies with this template, and the other patches in this
> series are not required for essiv in dm-crypt.
Ah ok, thanks for clarifying.
I just picked up patches 1, 5, and 6 and staged them in linux-next via
dm-5.4, please see:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm.git/log/?h=dm-5.4
Thanks,
Mike
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 6/6] md: dm-crypt: omit parsing of the encapsulated cipher
2019-09-03 18:58 ` Mike Snitzer
@ 2019-09-04 11:01 ` Milan Broz
2019-09-04 13:38 ` Mike Snitzer
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Milan Broz @ 2019-09-04 11:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mike Snitzer, Ard Biesheuvel
Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel, Gilad Ben-Yossef,
linux-fscrypt, linux-crypto
On 03/09/2019 20:58, Mike Snitzer wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 19 2019 at 10:17am -0400,
> Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
>
>> Only the ESSIV IV generation mode used to use cc->cipher so it could
>> instantiate the bare cipher used to encrypt the IV. However, this is
>> now taken care of by the ESSIV template, and so no users of cc->cipher
>> remain. So remove it altogether.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
>
> Acked-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
>
> Might be wise to bump the dm-crypt target's version number (from
> {1, 19, 0} to {1, 20, 0}) at the end of this patch too though...
The function should be exactly the same, dependencies on needed modules are set.
In cryptsetup we always report dm target + kernel version,
so we know that since version 5.4 it uses crypto API for ESSIV.
I think version bump here is really not so important.
Just my two cents :)
Anyway, thanks everyone.
Milan
--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v13 6/6] md: dm-crypt: omit parsing of the encapsulated cipher
2019-09-04 11:01 ` [dm-devel] " Milan Broz
@ 2019-09-04 13:38 ` Mike Snitzer
0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Mike Snitzer @ 2019-09-04 13:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Milan Broz
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, linux-crypto, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers,
linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, dm-devel
On Wed, Sep 04 2019 at 7:01am -0400,
Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 03/09/2019 20:58, Mike Snitzer wrote:
> > On Mon, Aug 19 2019 at 10:17am -0400,
> > Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> >
> >> Only the ESSIV IV generation mode used to use cc->cipher so it could
> >> instantiate the bare cipher used to encrypt the IV. However, this is
> >> now taken care of by the ESSIV template, and so no users of cc->cipher
> >> remain. So remove it altogether.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> >
> > Acked-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
> >
> > Might be wise to bump the dm-crypt target's version number (from
> > {1, 19, 0} to {1, 20, 0}) at the end of this patch too though...
>
> The function should be exactly the same, dependencies on needed modules are set.
>
> In cryptsetup we always report dm target + kernel version,
> so we know that since version 5.4 it uses crypto API for ESSIV.
> I think version bump here is really not so important.
>
> Just my two cents :)
Yes, that's fine.. I staged it for 5.4 yesterday without the version bump.
Thanks,
Mike
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2019-09-04 13:38 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2019-08-19 14:17 [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 0/6] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 1/6] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template " Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-30 4:58 ` Herbert Xu
2019-08-31 16:37 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [PATCH v13 2/6] crypto: essiv - add tests for essiv in cbc(aes)+sha256 mode Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [PATCH v13 3/6] crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [PATCH v13 4/6] crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [PATCH v13 5/6] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template Ard Biesheuvel
2019-09-03 18:55 ` [dm-devel] " Mike Snitzer
2019-09-03 19:16 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-09-03 20:51 ` Mike Snitzer
2019-08-19 14:17 ` [PATCH v13 6/6] md: dm-crypt: omit parsing of the encapsulated cipher Ard Biesheuvel
2019-09-03 18:58 ` Mike Snitzer
2019-09-04 11:01 ` [dm-devel] " Milan Broz
2019-09-04 13:38 ` Mike Snitzer
2019-08-20 11:03 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH v13 0/6] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-30 8:18 ` Herbert Xu
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