From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
To: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v6 20/20] ceph: add fscrypt ioctls
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2021 08:19:59 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f6fa8d02d31099a688ae97450143aa0eed4b73f8.camel@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87lf9emvqv.fsf@suse.de>
On Mon, 2021-04-19 at 11:09 +0100, Luis Henriques wrote:
> Hi Jeff!
>
> Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> writes:
> <...>
> > +
> > + case FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY:
> > + ret = vet_mds_for_fscrypt(file);
> > + if (ret)
> > + return ret;
> > + atomic_inc(&ci->i_shared_gen);
>
> After spending some (well... a lot, actually) time looking at the MDS code
> to try to figure out my bug, I'm back at this point in the kernel client
> code. I understand that this code is trying to invalidate the directory
> dentries here. However, I just found that the directory we get at this
> point is the filesystem root directory, and not the directory we're trying
> to unlock.
>
> So, I still don't fully understand the issue I'm seeing, but I believe the
> code above is assuming 'ci' is the inode being unlocked, which isn't
> correct.
>
> (Note: I haven't checked if there are other ioctls getting the FS root.)
>
> Cheers,
Oh, interesting. That was my assumption. I'll have to take a look more
closely at what effect that might have then.
Thanks,
--
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-04-19 12:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-04-13 17:50 [RFC PATCH v6 00/20] ceph+fscrypt: context, filename and symlink support Jeff Layton
2021-04-13 17:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 01/20] vfs: export new_inode_pseudo Jeff Layton
2021-04-13 17:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 02/20] fscrypt: export fscrypt_base64_encode and fscrypt_base64_decode Jeff Layton
2021-04-13 17:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 03/20] fscrypt: export fscrypt_fname_encrypt and fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size Jeff Layton
2021-04-13 17:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 04/20] fscrypt: add fscrypt_context_for_new_inode Jeff Layton
2021-04-13 17:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 05/20] ceph: crypto context handling for ceph Jeff Layton
2021-04-13 17:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 06/20] ceph: implement -o test_dummy_encryption mount option Jeff Layton
2021-04-13 17:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 07/20] ceph: preallocate inode for ops that may create one Jeff Layton
2021-04-13 17:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 08/20] ceph: add routine to create fscrypt context prior to RPC Jeff Layton
2021-04-13 17:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 09/20] ceph: make ceph_msdc_build_path use ref-walk Jeff Layton
2021-04-13 17:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 10/20] ceph: add encrypted fname handling to ceph_mdsc_build_path Jeff Layton
2021-04-13 17:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 11/20] ceph: decode alternate_name in lease info Jeff Layton
2021-04-13 17:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 12/20] ceph: send altname in MClientRequest Jeff Layton
2021-04-13 17:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 13/20] ceph: properly set DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME flag in lookup Jeff Layton
2021-04-13 17:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 14/20] ceph: make d_revalidate call fscrypt revalidator for encrypted dentries Jeff Layton
2021-04-13 17:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 15/20] ceph: add helpers for converting names for userland presentation Jeff Layton
2021-04-13 17:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 16/20] ceph: add fscrypt support to ceph_fill_trace Jeff Layton
2021-04-13 17:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 17/20] ceph: add support to readdir for encrypted filenames Jeff Layton
2021-04-13 17:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 18/20] ceph: create symlinks with encrypted and base64-encoded targets Jeff Layton
2021-04-13 17:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 19/20] ceph: make ceph_get_name decrypt filenames Jeff Layton
2021-04-13 17:50 ` [RFC PATCH v6 20/20] ceph: add fscrypt ioctls Jeff Layton
2021-04-19 10:09 ` Luis Henriques
2021-04-19 12:19 ` Jeff Layton [this message]
2021-04-19 19:54 ` Eric Biggers
2021-04-20 9:34 ` Luis Henriques
2021-04-20 11:45 ` Jeff Layton
2021-04-19 10:30 ` [RFC PATCH v6 00/20] ceph+fscrypt: context, filename and symlink support Luis Henriques
2021-04-19 12:23 ` Jeff Layton
2021-04-19 16:03 ` Luis Henriques
2021-04-19 16:28 ` Jeff Layton
2021-04-20 10:11 ` Luis Henriques
2021-04-20 15:52 ` Jeff Layton
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