From: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Paul Moore <aul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Janis Danisevskis <jdanis@google.com>,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
"Eric . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>,
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 4/8] futex: don't leak robust_list pointer
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 22:40:34 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1474663238-22134-5-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1474663238-22134-1-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net>
This prevents an attacker from determining the robust_list or
compat_robust_list userspace pointer of a process created by executing
a setuid binary. Such an attack could be performed by racing
get_robust_list() with a setuid execution. The impact of this issue is that
an attacker could theoretically bypass ASLR when attacking setuid binaries.
changed in v2:
- only get_task_struct(p) if p!=NULL (Ben Hutchings)
- move the -ESRCH return check
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
---
kernel/futex.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
kernel/futex_compat.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c
index 46cb3a3..773806e 100644
--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -3007,31 +3007,43 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return -ENOSYS;
- rcu_read_lock();
-
- ret = -ESRCH;
- if (!pid)
+ if (!pid) {
p = current;
- else {
+ get_task_struct(p);
+ } else {
+ rcu_read_lock();
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
+ /* pin the task to permit dropping the RCU read lock before
+ * acquiring the mutex
+ */
+ if (p)
+ get_task_struct(p);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
if (!p)
- goto err_unlock;
+ return -ESRCH;
}
+ ret = mutex_lock_killable(&p->signal->cred_guard_light);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_put;
+
ret = -EPERM;
if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
goto err_unlock;
head = p->robust_list;
- rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ mutex_unlock(&p->signal->cred_guard_light);
+ put_task_struct(p);
if (put_user(sizeof(*head), len_ptr))
return -EFAULT;
return put_user(head, head_ptr);
err_unlock:
- rcu_read_unlock();
-
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_light);
+err_put:
+ put_task_struct(p);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/kernel/futex_compat.c b/kernel/futex_compat.c
index 4ae3232..92c350f 100644
--- a/kernel/futex_compat.c
+++ b/kernel/futex_compat.c
@@ -143,31 +143,43 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return -ENOSYS;
- rcu_read_lock();
-
- ret = -ESRCH;
- if (!pid)
+ if (!pid) {
p = current;
- else {
+ get_task_struct(p);
+ } else {
+ rcu_read_lock();
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
+ /* pin the task to permit dropping the RCU read lock before
+ * acquiring the mutex
+ */
+ if (p)
+ get_task_struct(p);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
if (!p)
- goto err_unlock;
+ return -ESRCH;
}
+ ret = mutex_lock_killable(&p->signal->cred_guard_light);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_put;
+
ret = -EPERM;
if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
goto err_unlock;
head = p->compat_robust_list;
- rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ mutex_unlock(&p->signal->cred_guard_light);
+ put_task_struct(p);
if (put_user(sizeof(*head), len_ptr))
return -EFAULT;
return put_user(ptr_to_compat(head), head_ptr);
err_unlock:
- rcu_read_unlock();
-
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_light);
+err_put:
+ put_task_struct(p);
return ret;
}
--
2.1.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-09-23 20:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-09-23 20:40 [PATCH v2 0/8] Various fixes related to ptrace_may_access() Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] exec: introduce cred_guard_light Jann Horn
2016-09-30 15:35 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-09-30 18:27 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-03 16:02 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-10-30 21:12 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] exec: turn self_exec_id into self_privunit Jann Horn
2016-09-23 21:04 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-23 21:33 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-30 13:20 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-09-30 13:44 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-09-30 18:30 ` Kees Cook
2016-09-30 18:59 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-30 19:05 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-03 16:37 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] proc: use open()-time creds for ptrace checks Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` Jann Horn [this message]
2016-09-30 14:52 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] futex: don't leak robust_list pointer Oleg Nesterov
2016-10-30 17:16 ` Jann Horn
2016-11-02 21:39 ` Jann Horn
2016-11-02 22:47 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] proc: lock properly in ptrace_may_access callers Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] ptrace: warn on ptrace_may_access without proper locking Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] fs/proc: fix attr access check Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] Documentation: add security/ptrace_checks.txt Jann Horn
2016-10-02 3:16 ` Krister Johansen
2016-10-30 19:09 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-31 4:14 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-31 13:39 ` Jann Horn
2016-11-03 20:43 ` Krister Johansen
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