From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
tomoyo-dev-en@lists.sourceforge.jp,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, dhowells@redhat.com,
ebiederm@xmission.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mszeredi@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH 13/34] tomoyo: Implement security hooks for the new mount API [ver #12]
Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2018 17:31:52 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <153754751210.17872.3528992278981930255.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <153754740781.17872.7869536526927736855.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Implement the security hook to check the creation of a new mountpoint for
Tomoyo.
As far as I can tell, Tomoyo doesn't make use of the mount data or parse
any mount options, so I haven't implemented any of the fs_context hooks for
it.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
cc: tomoyo-dev-en@lists.sourceforge.jp
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
---
security/tomoyo/common.h | 3 +++
security/tomoyo/mount.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 63 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 539bcdd30bb8..e637ce73f7f9 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -971,6 +971,9 @@ int tomoyo_init_request_info(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
const u8 index);
int tomoyo_mkdev_perm(const u8 operation, const struct path *path,
const unsigned int mode, unsigned int dev);
+int tomoyo_mount_permission_fc(struct fs_context *fc,
+ const struct path *mountpoint,
+ unsigned int mnt_flags);
int tomoyo_mount_permission(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
const char *type, unsigned long flags,
void *data_page);
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/mount.c b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
index 7dc7f59b7dde..9ec84ab6f5e1 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/mount.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include "common.h"
@@ -236,3 +237,47 @@ int tomoyo_mount_permission(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
return error;
}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_mount_permission_fc - Check permission to create a new mount.
+ * @fc: Context describing the object to be mounted.
+ * @mountpoint: The target object to mount on.
+ * @mnt: The MNT_* flags to be set on the mountpoint.
+ *
+ * Check the permission to create a mount of the object described in @fc. Note
+ * that the source object may be a newly created superblock or may be an
+ * existing one picked from the filesystem (bind mount).
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_mount_permission_fc(struct fs_context *fc,
+ const struct path *mountpoint,
+ unsigned int mnt_flags)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_request_info r;
+ unsigned int ms_flags = 0;
+ int error;
+ int idx;
+
+ if (tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, NULL, TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MOUNT) ==
+ TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Convert MNT_* flags to MS_* equivalents. */
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) ms_flags |= MS_NOSUID;
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV) ms_flags |= MS_NODEV;
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) ms_flags |= MS_NOEXEC;
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_NOATIME) ms_flags |= MS_NOATIME;
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_NODIRATIME) ms_flags |= MS_NODIRATIME;
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_RELATIME) ms_flags |= MS_RELATIME;
+ if (mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY) ms_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
+
+ idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
+ /* TODO: There may be multiple sources; for the moment, just pick the
+ * first if there is one.
+ */
+ error = tomoyo_mount_acl(&r, fc->source, mountpoint, fc->fs_type->name,
+ ms_flags);
+ tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
+ return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 07f1a0d3dd32..e1cf21e481ce 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -391,6 +391,20 @@ static int tomoyo_path_chroot(const struct path *path)
return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHROOT, path, NULL);
}
+/**
+ * tomoyo_sb_mount - Target for security_sb_mountpoint().
+ * @fc: Context describing the object to be mounted.
+ * @mountpoint: The target object to mount on.
+ * @mnt_flags: Mountpoint specific options (as MNT_* flags).
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_sb_mountpoint(struct fs_context *fc, struct path *mountpoint,
+ unsigned int mnt_flags)
+{
+ return tomoyo_mount_permission_fc(fc, mountpoint, mnt_flags);
+}
+
/**
* tomoyo_sb_mount - Target for security_sb_mount().
*
@@ -521,6 +535,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list tomoyo_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, tomoyo_path_chmod),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, tomoyo_path_chown),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chroot, tomoyo_path_chroot),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mountpoint, tomoyo_sb_mountpoint),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, tomoyo_sb_mount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, tomoyo_sb_umount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, tomoyo_sb_pivotroot),
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-21 22:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 98+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-21 16:30 [PATCH 00/34] VFS: Introduce filesystem context [ver #12] David Howells
2018-09-21 16:30 ` [PATCH 01/34] vfs: syscall: Add open_tree(2) to reference or clone a mount " David Howells
2018-10-21 16:41 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-09-21 16:30 ` [PATCH 02/34] vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:30 ` [PATCH 03/34] teach move_mount(2) to work with OPEN_TREE_CLONE " David Howells
2018-10-05 18:24 ` Alan Jenkins
2018-10-07 10:48 ` Alan Jenkins
2018-10-07 19:20 ` Alan Jenkins
2018-10-10 12:36 ` David Howells
2018-10-12 14:22 ` Alan Jenkins
2018-10-12 14:54 ` David Howells
2018-10-12 14:57 ` Alan Jenkins
2018-10-11 9:17 ` David Howells
2018-10-11 11:48 ` Alan Jenkins
2018-10-11 13:10 ` David Howells
2018-10-11 12:14 ` David Howells
2018-10-11 12:23 ` Alan Jenkins
2018-10-11 15:33 ` David Howells
2018-10-11 18:38 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-10-11 20:17 ` David Howells
2018-10-13 6:06 ` Al Viro
2018-10-17 17:45 ` Alan Jenkins
2018-10-18 20:09 ` David Howells
2018-10-18 20:58 ` David Howells
2018-10-19 11:57 ` David Howells
2018-10-19 13:37 ` David Howells
2018-10-19 17:35 ` Alan Jenkins
2018-10-19 21:35 ` David Howells
2018-10-19 21:40 ` David Howells
2018-10-19 22:36 ` David Howells
2018-10-20 5:25 ` Al Viro
2018-10-20 11:06 ` Alan Jenkins
2018-10-20 11:48 ` Al Viro
2018-10-20 12:26 ` Al Viro
2018-10-21 0:40 ` David Howells
2018-10-10 11:56 ` David Howells
2018-10-10 12:31 ` David Howells
2018-10-10 12:39 ` Alan Jenkins
2018-10-10 12:50 ` David Howells
2018-10-10 13:02 ` David Howells
2018-10-10 13:06 ` Alan Jenkins
2018-10-21 16:57 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-10-23 11:19 ` Alan Jenkins
2018-10-23 16:22 ` Al Viro
2018-09-21 16:30 ` [PATCH 04/34] vfs: Suppress MS_* flag defs within the kernel unless explicitly enabled " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:30 ` [PATCH 05/34] vfs: Introduce the basic header for the new mount API's filesystem context " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:30 ` [PATCH 06/34] vfs: Introduce logging functions " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:31 ` [PATCH 07/34] vfs: Add configuration parser helpers " David Howells
2019-03-14 7:46 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2019-03-14 10:27 ` David Howells
2019-03-14 10:49 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2018-09-21 16:31 ` [PATCH 08/34] vfs: Add LSM hooks for the new mount API " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:31 ` [PATCH 09/34] vfs: Put security flags into the fs_context struct " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:31 ` [PATCH 10/34] selinux: Implement the new mount API LSM hooks " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:31 ` [PATCH 11/34] smack: Implement filesystem context security " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:31 ` [PATCH 12/34] apparmor: Implement security hooks for the new mount API " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:31 ` David Howells [this message]
2018-09-21 16:32 ` [PATCH 14/34] vfs: Separate changing mount flags full remount " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:32 ` [PATCH 15/34] vfs: Implement a filesystem superblock creation/configuration context " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:32 ` [PATCH 16/34] vfs: Remove unused code after filesystem context changes " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:32 ` [PATCH 17/34] procfs: Move proc_fill_super() to fs/proc/root.c " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:32 ` [PATCH 18/34] proc: Add fs_context support to procfs " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:32 ` [PATCH 19/34] ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:32 ` [PATCH 20/34] cpuset: Use " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:33 ` [PATCH 21/34] kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support " David Howells
2018-11-19 4:23 ` Andrei Vagin
2018-12-06 17:08 ` Andrei Vagin
2018-09-21 16:33 ` [PATCH 22/34] hugetlbfs: Convert to " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:33 ` [PATCH 23/34] vfs: Remove kern_mount_data() " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:33 ` [PATCH 24/34] vfs: Provide documentation for new mount API " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:33 ` [PATCH 25/34] Make anon_inodes unconditional " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:33 ` [PATCH 26/34] vfs: syscall: Add fsopen() to prepare for superblock creation " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:33 ` [PATCH 27/34] vfs: Implement logging through fs_context " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:33 ` [PATCH 28/34] vfs: Add some logging to the core users of the fs_context log " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:34 ` [PATCH 29/34] vfs: syscall: Add fsconfig() for configuring and managing a context " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:34 ` [PATCH 30/34] vfs: syscall: Add fsmount() to create a mount for a superblock " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:34 ` [PATCH 31/34] vfs: syscall: Add fspick() to select a superblock for reconfiguration " David Howells
2018-10-12 14:49 ` Alan Jenkins
2018-10-13 6:11 ` Al Viro
2018-10-13 9:45 ` Alan Jenkins
2018-10-13 23:04 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-17 13:15 ` David Howells
2018-10-17 13:20 ` David Howells
2018-10-17 14:31 ` Alan Jenkins
2018-10-17 14:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-10-17 14:55 ` Alan Jenkins
2018-10-17 15:24 ` David Howells
2018-10-17 15:38 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-10-17 15:45 ` David Howells
2018-10-17 17:41 ` Alan Jenkins
2018-10-17 21:20 ` David Howells
2018-10-17 22:13 ` Alan Jenkins
2018-09-21 16:34 ` [PATCH 32/34] afs: Add fs_context support " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:34 ` [PATCH 33/34] afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount " David Howells
2018-09-21 16:34 ` [PATCH 34/34] vfs: Add a sample program for the new mount API " David Howells
2018-12-17 14:12 ` Anders Roxell
2018-12-20 16:36 ` David Howells
2018-10-04 18:37 ` [PATCH 00/34] VFS: Introduce filesystem context " Eric W. Biederman
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