From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Paul Moore <aul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Janis Danisevskis <jdanis@google.com>,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>,
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/8] exec: introduce cred_guard_light
Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2016 19:12:25 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161103181225.GA11212@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161102205011.GF8196@pc.thejh.net>
On 11/02, Jann Horn wrote:
>
> On Wed, Nov 02, 2016 at 07:18:06PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> > On 10/30, Jann Horn wrote:
> > >
> > > This is a new per-threadgroup lock that can often be taken instead of
> > > cred_guard_mutex and has less deadlock potential. I'm doing this because
> > > Oleg Nesterov mentioned the potential for deadlocks, in particular if a
> > > debugged task is stuck in execve, trying to get rid of a ptrace-stopped
> > > thread, and the debugger attempts to inspect procfs files of the debugged
> > > task.
> >
> > Yes, but let me repeat that we need to fix this anyway. So I don't really
> > understand why should we add yet another mutex.
>
> execve() only takes the new mutex immediately after de_thread(), so this
> problem shouldn't occur there.
Yes, I see.
> Basically, I think that I'm not making the
> problem worse with my patches this way.
In a sense that it doesn't add the new deadlocks, I agree. But it adds
yet another per-process mutex while we already have the similar one,
> I believe that it should be possible to convert most existing users of the
> cred_guard_mutex to the new cred_guard_light - exceptions to that that I
> see are:
>
> - PTRACE_ATTACH
This is the main problem afaics. So "strace -f" can hang if it races
with mt-exec. And we need to fix this. I constantly forget about this
problem, but I tried many times to find a reasonable solution, still
can't.
IMO, it would be nice to rework the lsm hooks, so that we could take
cred_guard_mutex after de_thread() (like your cred_guard_light) or
at least drop it earlier, but unlikely this is possible...
So the only plan I currently have is change de_thread() to wait until
other threads pass exit_notify() or even exit_signals(), but I don't
like this.
> - SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC (sets NO_NEW_PRIVS on remote task)
I forgot about this one... Need to re-check but at first glance this
is not a real problem.
> Beyond that, conceptually, the new cred_guard_light could also be turned
> into a read-write mutex
Not sure I understand how this can help... doesn't matter.
My point is, imo you should not add the new mutex. Just use the old
one in (say) 4/8 (which I do not personally like as you know ;), this
won't add the new problem.
> It seems to me like SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC doesn't really have
> deadlocking issues.
Yes, agreed.
> PTRACE_ATTACH isn't that clear to me; if a debugger
> tries to attach to a newly spawned thread while another ptraced thread is
> dying because of de_thread() in a third thread, that might still cause
> the debugger to deadlock, right?
This is the trivial test-case I wrote when the problem was initially
reported. And damn, I always knew that cred_guard_mutex needs fixes,
but somehow I completely forgot that it is used by PTRACE_ATTACH when
I was going to try to remove from fs/proc a long ago.
void *thread(void *arg)
{
ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0,0,0);
return NULL;
}
int main(void)
{
int pid = fork();
if (!pid) {
pthread_t pt;
pthread_create(&pt, NULL, thread, NULL);
pthread_join(pt, NULL);
execlp("echo", "echo", "passed", NULL);
}
sleep(1);
// or anything else which needs ->cred_guard_mutex,
// say open(/proc/$pid/mem)
ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0,0);
kill(pid, SIGCONT);
return 0;
}
The problem is trivial. The execing thread waits until its sub-thread
goes away, it should be reaped by the tracer, the tracer waits for
cred_guard_mutex.
> security_bprm_set_creds() is called in prepare_binprm(), which is
> executed very early in do_execveat_common(), at a point where failures
> should still be graceful (return an error code instead of killing the
> whole process),
Yes, yes.
Oleg.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-03 17:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-10-30 21:46 [PATCH v3 0/8] Various fixes related to ptrace_may_access() Jann Horn
2016-10-30 21:46 ` [PATCH v3 1/8] exec: introduce cred_guard_light Jann Horn
2016-11-02 18:18 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-11-02 20:50 ` Jann Horn
2016-11-02 21:38 ` Ben Hutchings
2016-11-02 21:54 ` Jann Horn
2016-11-03 18:12 ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2016-11-03 21:17 ` Jann Horn
2016-11-04 13:26 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-04 15:00 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-04 18:04 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-11-04 18:45 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-11-05 14:56 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-11-09 0:34 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-16 20:03 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-08 22:02 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-08 22:46 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-08 22:56 ` Benjamin LaHaise
2016-11-08 23:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-30 21:46 ` [PATCH v3 2/8] exec: add privunit to task_struct Jann Horn
2016-10-30 21:46 ` [PATCH v3 3/8] proc: use open()-time creds for ptrace checks Jann Horn
2016-10-30 21:46 ` [PATCH v3 4/8] futex: don't leak robust_list pointer Jann Horn
2016-10-30 21:46 ` [PATCH v3 5/8] proc: lock properly in ptrace_may_access callers Jann Horn
2016-10-30 21:46 ` [PATCH v3 6/8] fs/proc: fix attr access check Jann Horn
2016-10-30 21:46 ` [PATCH v3 7/8] proc: fix timerslack_ns handling Jann Horn
2016-10-30 21:46 ` [PATCH v3 8/8] Documentation: add security/ptrace_checks.txt Jann Horn
2016-11-01 23:57 ` [PATCH v3 0/8] Various fixes related to ptrace_may_access() Linus Torvalds
2016-11-02 18:38 ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-11-02 21:40 ` Jann Horn
2016-11-03 19:09 ` Andrew Morton
2016-11-03 20:01 ` Jann Horn
2016-11-04 0:57 ` James Morris
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