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From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	aniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	bfields@fieldses.org, Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>,
	Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>,
	"Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>,
	Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 7/7] proc: add option to mount only a pids subset
Date: Mon, 14 May 2018 11:01:17 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180514090117.GC28179@comp-core-i7-2640m-0182e6> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez0bXvp1iF=HqyhEP1p5B6PRR07_j0qRoypJqs8x3Z+=mw@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, May 11, 2018 at 03:58:39PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Fri, May 11, 2018 at 11:37 AM, Alexey Gladkov
> <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> wrote:
> > This allows to hide all files and directories in the procfs that are not
> > related to tasks.
> 
> /proc/$pid/net and /proc/$pid/task/$tid/net aren't in scope for this
> protection, even though they contain information about the whole
> network namespace of the task, right?

Yes. The pidonly makes visible only pids subset. You can still access the
process namespaces via /proc/$pid/ns.

We can think of additional constraints since the parameters are not
stored in the pid namespace anymore.

-- 
Rgrds, legion

  reply	other threads:[~2018-05-14  9:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-11  9:37 [PATCH v5 7/7] proc: add option to mount only a pids subset Alexey Gladkov
2018-05-11 13:58 ` Jann Horn
2018-05-14  9:01   ` Alexey Gladkov [this message]
2018-05-14 13:13     ` Eric W. Biederman

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