From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-wm1-f67.google.com ([209.85.128.67]:35451 "EHLO mail-wm1-f67.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726348AbeJHXe2 (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Oct 2018 19:34:28 -0400 Received: by mail-wm1-f67.google.com with SMTP id e187-v6so8925372wmf.0 for ; Mon, 08 Oct 2018 09:21:56 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 8 Oct 2018 18:21:48 +0200 From: Christian Brauner To: Jann Horn Cc: Tycho Andersen , Kees Cook , Linux API , containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, suda.akihiro@lab.ntt.co.jp, Oleg Nesterov , kernel list , "Eric W. Biederman" , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Christian Brauner , Andy Lutomirski Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] seccomp: add a way to get a listener fd from ptrace Message-ID: <20181008162147.ubfxxsv2425l2zsp@brauner.io> References: <20180927151119.9989-1-tycho@tycho.ws> <20180927151119.9989-4-tycho@tycho.ws> <20181008151629.hkgzzsluevwtuclw@brauner.io> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Mon, Oct 08, 2018 at 05:33:22PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote: > On Mon, Oct 8, 2018 at 5:16 PM Christian Brauner wrote: > > > > On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 09:11:16AM -0600, Tycho Andersen wrote: > > > As an alternative to SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_GET_LISTENER, perhaps a ptrace() > > > version which can acquire filters is useful. There are at least two reasons > > > this is preferable, even though it uses ptrace: > > > > > > 1. You can control tasks that aren't cooperating with you > > > 2. You can control tasks whose filters block sendmsg() and socket(); if the > > > task installs a filter which blocks these calls, there's no way with > > > SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_GET_LISTENER to get the fd out to the privileged task. > > > > So for the slow of mind aka me: > > I'm not sure I completely understand this problem. Can you outline how > > sendmsg() and socket() are involved in this? > > > > I'm also not sure that this holds (but I might misunderstand the > > problem) afaict, you could do try to get the fd out via CLONE_FILES and > > other means so something like: > > > > // let's pretend the libc wrapper for clone actually has sane semantics > > pid = clone(CLONE_FILES); > > if (pid == 0) { > > fd = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER, &prog); > > > > // Now this fd will be valid in both parent and child. > > // If you haven't blocked it you can inform the parent what > > // the fd number is via pipe2(). If you have blocked it you can > > // use dup2() and dup to a known fd number. > > } > > > > > > > > v2: fix a bug where listener mode was not unset when an unused fd was not > > > available > > > v3: fix refcounting bug (Oleg) > > > v4: * change the listener's fd flags to be 0 > > > * rename GET_LISTENER to NEW_LISTENER (Matthew) > > > v5: * add capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) requirement > > > v7: * point the new listener at the right filter (Jann) > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen > > > CC: Kees Cook > > > CC: Andy Lutomirski > > > CC: Oleg Nesterov > > > CC: Eric W. Biederman > > > CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" > > > CC: Christian Brauner > > > CC: Tyler Hicks > > > CC: Akihiro Suda > > > --- > > > include/linux/seccomp.h | 7 ++ > > > include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h | 2 + > > > kernel/ptrace.c | 4 ++ > > > kernel/seccomp.c | 31 +++++++++ > > > tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++ > > > 5 files changed, 112 insertions(+) > > > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h > > > index 017444b5efed..234c61b37405 100644 > > > --- a/include/linux/seccomp.h > > > +++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h > > > @@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s) > > > #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER > > > extern void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk); > > > extern void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk); > > > +extern long seccomp_new_listener(struct task_struct *task, > > > + unsigned long filter_off); > > > #else /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */ > > > static inline void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk) > > > { > > > @@ -92,6 +94,11 @@ static inline void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk) > > > { > > > return; > > > } > > > +static inline long seccomp_new_listener(struct task_struct *task, > > > + unsigned long filter_off) > > > +{ > > > + return -EINVAL; > > > +} > > > #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */ > > > > > > #if defined(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER) && defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) > > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h b/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h > > > index d5a1b8a492b9..e80ecb1bd427 100644 > > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h > > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h > > > @@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ struct seccomp_metadata { > > > __u64 flags; /* Output: filter's flags */ > > > }; > > > > > > +#define PTRACE_SECCOMP_NEW_LISTENER 0x420e > > > + > > > /* Read signals from a shared (process wide) queue */ > > > #define PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO_SHARED (1 << 0) > > > > > > diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c > > > index 21fec73d45d4..289960ac181b 100644 > > > --- a/kernel/ptrace.c > > > +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c > > > @@ -1096,6 +1096,10 @@ int ptrace_request(struct task_struct *child, long request, > > > ret = seccomp_get_metadata(child, addr, datavp); > > > break; > > > > > > + case PTRACE_SECCOMP_NEW_LISTENER: > > > + ret = seccomp_new_listener(child, addr); > > > + break; > > > + > > > default: > > > break; > > > } > > > diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c > > > index 44a31ac8373a..17685803a2af 100644 > > > --- a/kernel/seccomp.c > > > +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c > > > @@ -1777,4 +1777,35 @@ static struct file *init_listener(struct task_struct *task, > > > > > > return ret; > > > } > > > + > > > +long seccomp_new_listener(struct task_struct *task, > > > + unsigned long filter_off) > > > +{ > > > + struct seccomp_filter *filter; > > > + struct file *listener; > > > + int fd; > > > + > > > + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > > > + return -EACCES; > > > > I know this might have been discussed a while back but why exactly do we > > require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in init_userns and not in the target userns? What > > if I want to do a setns()fd, CLONE_NEWUSER) to the target process and > > use ptrace from in there? > > See https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3R+ZJ1vwGkDfGzKX2mz6f=jjJWsO5pCvnH68P+RKO8Ow@mail.gmail.com/ > . Basically, the problem is that this doesn't just give you capability > over the target task, but also over every other task that has the same > filter installed; you need some sort of "is the caller capable over > the filter and anyone who uses it" check. Thanks. But then this new ptrace feature as it stands is imho currently broken. If you can install a seccomp filter with SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF if you are ns_cpabable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) and also get an fd via seccomp() itself if you are ns_cpabable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) then either the new ptrace() api extension should be fixed to allow for this too or the seccomp() way of retrieving the pid - which I really think we want - needs to be fixed to require capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) too. The solution where both require ns_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) is - imho - the preferred way to solve this. Everything else will just be confusing.