From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
To: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com>,
Maya Gokhale <gokhale2@llnl.gov>,
Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>,
Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
Martin Cracauer <cracauer@cons.org>,
Denis Plotnikov <dplotnikov@virtuozzo.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, Marty McFadden <mcfadden8@llnl.gov>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] userfaultfd/sysctl: add vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 09:11:04 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190319071104.GA6392@rapoport-lnx> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190319030722.12441-2-peterx@redhat.com>
Hi Peter,
On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 11:07:22AM +0800, Peter Xu wrote:
> Add a global sysctl knob "vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd" to control
> whether userfaultfd is allowed by unprivileged users. When this is
> set to zero, only privileged users (root user, or users with the
> CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability) will be able to use the userfaultfd
> syscalls.
>
> Suggested-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
> Suggested-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Just one minor note below
> ---
> Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt | 12 ++++++++++++
> fs/userfaultfd.c | 5 +++++
> include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h | 2 ++
> kernel/sysctl.c | 12 ++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt
> index 187ce4f599a2..f146712f67bb 100644
> --- a/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt
> @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/vm:
> - stat_refresh
> - numa_stat
> - swappiness
> +- unprivileged_userfaultfd
> - user_reserve_kbytes
> - vfs_cache_pressure
> - watermark_boost_factor
> @@ -818,6 +819,17 @@ The default value is 60.
>
> ==============================================================
>
> +unprivileged_userfaultfd
> +
> +This flag controls whether unprivileged users can use the userfaultfd
> +syscalls. Set this to 1 to allow unprivileged users to use the
> +userfaultfd syscalls, or set this to 0 to restrict userfaultfd to only
> +privileged users (with SYS_CAP_PTRACE capability).
Can you please fully spell "system call"?
> +
> +The default value is 1.
> +
> +==============================================================
> +
> - user_reserve_kbytes
>
> When overcommit_memory is set to 2, "never overcommit" mode, reserve
> diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c
> index 89800fc7dc9d..7e856a25cc2f 100644
> --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c
> +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c
> @@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
> #include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
>
> +int sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd __read_mostly = 1;
> +
> static struct kmem_cache *userfaultfd_ctx_cachep __read_mostly;
>
> enum userfaultfd_state {
> @@ -1921,6 +1923,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
> struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx;
> int fd;
>
> + if (!sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> BUG_ON(!current->mm);
>
> /* Check the UFFD_* constants for consistency. */
> diff --git a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h b/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h
> index 37c9eba75c98..ac9d71e24b81 100644
> --- a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h
> +++ b/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h
> @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
> #define UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS (O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK)
> #define UFFD_FLAGS_SET (EFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS)
>
> +extern int sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd;
> +
> extern vm_fault_t handle_userfault(struct vm_fault *vmf, unsigned long reason);
>
> extern ssize_t mcopy_atomic(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned long dst_start,
> diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
> index 7578e21a711b..9b8ff1881df9 100644
> --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
> #include <linux/kexec.h>
> #include <linux/bpf.h>
> #include <linux/mount.h>
> +#include <linux/userfaultfd_k.h>
>
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> #include <asm/processor.h>
> @@ -1704,6 +1705,17 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = {
> .extra1 = (void *)&mmap_rnd_compat_bits_min,
> .extra2 = (void *)&mmap_rnd_compat_bits_max,
> },
> +#endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_USERFAULTFD
> + {
> + .procname = "unprivileged_userfaultfd",
> + .data = &sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd,
> + .maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd),
> + .mode = 0644,
> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
> + .extra1 = &zero,
> + .extra2 = &one,
> + },
> #endif
> { }
> };
> --
> 2.17.1
>
--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-19 7:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-03-19 3:07 [PATCH v2 0/1] userfaultfd: allow to forbid unprivileged users Peter Xu
2019-03-19 3:07 ` [PATCH v2 1/1] userfaultfd/sysctl: add vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd Peter Xu
2019-03-19 7:11 ` Mike Rapoport [this message]
2019-03-19 18:07 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-03-19 18:02 ` Andrew Morton
2019-03-19 18:28 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-03-20 0:20 ` Peter Xu
2019-03-20 19:01 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-03-21 13:43 ` Luis Chamberlain
2019-03-21 21:06 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-04-23 22:19 ` Kees Cook
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20190319071104.GA6392@rapoport-lnx \
--to=rppt@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=cracauer@cons.org \
--cc=dgilbert@redhat.com \
--cc=dplotnikov@virtuozzo.com \
--cc=gokhale2@llnl.gov \
--cc=hannes@cmpxchg.org \
--cc=hughd@google.com \
--cc=jglisse@redhat.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kirill@shutemov.name \
--cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=maxime.coquelin@redhat.com \
--cc=mcfadden8@llnl.gov \
--cc=mcgrof@kernel.org \
--cc=mgorman@suse.de \
--cc=mike.kravetz@oracle.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=peterx@redhat.com \
--cc=rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
--cc=xemul@virtuozzo.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).