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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org,
	Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 12/16] fscrypt: require that key be added when setting a v2 encryption policy
Date: Mon, 20 May 2019 10:25:48 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190520172552.217253-13-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190520172552.217253-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

By looking up the master keys in a filesystem-level keyring rather than
in the calling processes' key hierarchy, it becomes possible for a user
to set an encryption policy which refers to some key they don't actually
know, then encrypt their files using that key.  Cryptographically this
isn't much of a problem, but the semantics of this would be a bit weird.
Thus, enforce that a v2 encryption policy can only be set if the user
has previously added the key, or has capable(CAP_FOWNER).

We tolerate that this problem will continue to exist for v1 encryption
policies, however; there is no way around that.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h |  3 +++
 fs/crypto/keyring.c         | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/crypto/policy.c          |  6 +++++
 3 files changed, 56 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
index 5f679ba32cece..a398383ae9e34 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
+++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
@@ -411,6 +411,9 @@ extern struct key *
 fscrypt_find_master_key(struct super_block *sb,
 			const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec);
 
+extern int fscrypt_verify_key_added(struct super_block *sb,
+				    const u8 identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE]);
+
 extern int __init fscrypt_init_keyring(void);
 extern void fscrypt_exit_keyring(void);
 
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyring.c b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
index 0a92f2998b437..92eadda419278 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keyring.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
@@ -562,6 +562,53 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_add_key);
 
+/*
+ * Verify that the current user has added a master key with the given identifier
+ * (returns -ENOKEY if not).  This is needed to prevent a user from encrypting
+ * their files using some other user's key which they don't actually know.
+ * Cryptographically this isn't much of a problem, but the semantics of this
+ * would be a bit weird, so it's best to just forbid it.
+ *
+ * The system administrator (CAP_FOWNER) can override this, which should be
+ * enough for any use cases where encryption policies are being set using keys
+ * that were chosen ahead of time but aren't available at the moment.
+ *
+ * Note that the key may have already removed by the time this returns, but
+ * that's okay; we just care whether the key was there at some point.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if the key is added, -ENOKEY if it isn't, or another -errno code
+ */
+int fscrypt_verify_key_added(struct super_block *sb,
+			     const u8 identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE])
+{
+	struct fscrypt_key_specifier mk_spec;
+	struct key *key, *mk_user;
+	struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
+	int err;
+
+	mk_spec.type = FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER;
+	memcpy(mk_spec.u.identifier, identifier, FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE);
+
+	key = fscrypt_find_master_key(sb, &mk_spec);
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(key);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	mk = key->payload.data[0];
+	mk_user = find_master_key_user(mk);
+	if (IS_ERR(mk_user)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(mk_user);
+	} else {
+		key_put(mk_user);
+		err = 0;
+	}
+	key_put(key);
+out:
+	if (err == -ENOKEY && capable(CAP_FOWNER))
+		err = 0;
+	return err;
+}
+
 static void shrink_dcache_inode(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	struct dentry *dentry;
diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c
index 3643156a511a7..8fb9f5ac5f8c0 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/policy.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c
@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ static int set_encryption_policy(struct inode *inode,
 {
 	union fscrypt_context ctx;
 	int ctxsize;
+	int err;
 
 	if (!fscrypt_supported_policy(policy))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -229,6 +230,11 @@ static int set_encryption_policy(struct inode *inode,
 		 */
 		pr_warn_once("%s (pid %d) is setting deprecated v1 encryption policy; recommend upgrading to v2.\n",
 			     current->comm, current->pid);
+	} else {
+		err = fscrypt_verify_key_added(inode->i_sb,
+					       policy->v2.master_key_identifier);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 	}
 
 	ctxsize = fscrypt_new_context_from_policy(&ctx, policy);
-- 
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-05-20 17:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-05-20 17:25 [PATCH v6 00/16] fscrypt: key management improvements Eric Biggers
2019-05-20 17:25 ` [PATCH v6 01/16] fs, fscrypt: move uapi definitions to new header <linux/fscrypt.h> Eric Biggers
2019-05-20 17:25 ` [PATCH v6 02/16] fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_ prefix for uapi constants Eric Biggers
2019-05-20 17:25 ` [PATCH v6 03/16] fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_* definitions, not FS_* Eric Biggers
2019-05-20 17:25 ` [PATCH v6 04/16] fscrypt: add ->ci_inode to fscrypt_info Eric Biggers
2019-05-20 17:25 ` [PATCH v6 05/16] fscrypt: refactor v1 policy key setup into keysetup_legacy.c Eric Biggers
2019-05-20 17:25 ` [PATCH v6 06/16] fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Eric Biggers
2019-05-20 17:25 ` [PATCH v6 07/16] fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl Eric Biggers
2019-05-20 17:25 ` [PATCH v6 08/16] fscrypt: add FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS ioctl Eric Biggers
2019-05-20 17:25 ` [PATCH v6 09/16] fscrypt: add an HKDF-SHA512 implementation Eric Biggers
2019-05-20 17:25 ` [PATCH v6 10/16] fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support Eric Biggers
2019-05-20 17:25 ` [PATCH v6 11/16] fscrypt: allow unprivileged users to add/remove keys for v2 policies Eric Biggers
2019-05-20 17:25 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2019-05-20 17:25 ` [PATCH v6 13/16] ext4: wire up new fscrypt ioctls Eric Biggers
2019-05-20 17:25 ` [PATCH v6 14/16] f2fs: " Eric Biggers
2019-05-20 17:25 ` [PATCH v6 15/16] ubifs: " Eric Biggers
2019-05-20 17:25 ` [PATCH v6 16/16] fscrypt: document the new ioctls and policy version Eric Biggers
2019-05-21  0:16 ` [PATCH v6 00/16] fscrypt: key management improvements Theodore Ts'o
2019-05-21  0:41   ` Eric Biggers
2019-05-21  3:29     ` Theodore Ts'o

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