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From: Greg KH <>
To: Daniel Axtens <>
Cc: Nayna <>,,,,
Subject: Re: [WIP RFC PATCH 0/6] Generic Firmware Variable Filesystem
Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 09:29:16 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <>

On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 04:04:32PM +1000, Daniel Axtens wrote:
> Hi Nayna,
> >> As PowerNV moves towards secure boot, we need a place to put secure
> >> variables. One option that has been canvassed is to make our secure
> >> variables look like EFI variables. This is an early sketch of another
> >> approach where we create a generic firmware variable file system,
> >> fwvarfs, and an OPAL Secure Variable backend for it.
> >
> > Is there a need of new filesystem ? I am wondering why can't these be 
> > exposed via sysfs / securityfs ?
> > Probably, something like... /sys/firmware/secureboot or 
> > /sys/kernel/security/secureboot/  ?
> I suppose we could put secure variables in sysfs, but I'm not sure
> that's what sysfs was intended for. I understand sysfs as "a
> filesystem-based view of kernel objects" (from
> Documentation/filesystems/configfs/configfs.txt), and I don't think a
> secure variable is really a kernel object in the same way most other
> things in sysfs are... but I'm open to being convinced.

What makes them more "secure" than anything else that is in sysfs today?
I didn't see anything in this patchset that provided "additional
security", did I miss it?

> securityfs seems to be reserved for LSMs, I don't think we can put
> things there.

Yeah, I wouldn't mess with that.

I would just recommend putting this in sysfs.  Make a new subsystem
(i.e. class) and away you go.

> My hope with fwvarfs is to provide a generic place for firmware
> variables so that we don't need to expand the list of firmware-specific
> filesystems beyond efivarfs. I am also aiming to make things simple to
> use so that people familiar with firmware don't also have to become
> familiar with filesystem code in order to expose firmware variables to
> userspace.

Why would anyone need to be writing new code to firmware variables that
makes it any different from any other kernel change?

> > Also, it sounds like this is needed only for secure firmware variables 
> > and does not include
> > other firmware variables which are not security relevant ? Is that 
> > correct understanding ?
> The primary use case at the moment - OPAL secure variables - is security
> focused because the current OPAL secure variable design stores and
> manipulates secure variables separately from the rest of nvram. This
> isn't an inherent feature of fwvarfs.

Again, why not just put it in sysfs please?

> fwvarfs can also be used for variables that are not security relevant as
> well. For example, with the EFI backend (patch 3), both secure and
> insecure variables can be read.

I don't remember why efi variables were not put in sysfs, I think there
was some reasoning behind it originally.  Perhaps look in the linux-efi


greg k-h

  reply	other threads:[~2019-06-03  7:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-05-20  6:25 [WIP RFC PATCH 0/6] Generic Firmware Variable Filesystem Daniel Axtens
2019-05-20  6:25 ` [WIP RFC PATCH 1/6] kernfs: add create() and unlink() hooks Daniel Axtens
2019-05-20  6:25 ` [WIP RFC PATCH 2/6] fwvarfs: a generic firmware variable filesystem Daniel Axtens
2019-05-20  6:25 ` [WIP RFC PATCH 3/6] fwvarfs: efi backend Daniel Axtens
2019-05-20  6:25 ` [WIP RFC PATCH 4/6] powerpc/powernv: Add support for OPAL secure variables Daniel Axtens
2019-05-20  6:25 ` [WIP RFC PATCH 5/6] powerpc/powernv: Remove EFI " Daniel Axtens
2019-05-20  6:25 ` [WIP RFC PATCH 6/6] fwvarfs: Add opal_secvar backend Daniel Axtens
2019-05-31  4:04 ` [WIP RFC PATCH 0/6] Generic Firmware Variable Filesystem Nayna
2019-06-03  6:04   ` Daniel Axtens
2019-06-03  7:29     ` Greg KH [this message]
2019-06-03 23:56       ` Daniel Axtens
2019-06-04 20:01         ` Nayna
2019-06-04 20:05           ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-05  8:13             ` Greg KH
2019-06-04 20:33       ` Nayna
2019-06-05  6:14         ` Greg KH

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