From: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com> To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>, Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>, Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>, Daniel Colascione <dancol@dancol.org>, "Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@joelfernandes.org>, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kaleshsingh@google.com, calin@google.com, surenb@google.com, nnk@google.com, jeffv@google.com, kernel-team@android.com, Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>, Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>, Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>, Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>, Nitin Gupta <nigupta@nvidia.com>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>, Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>, Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Subject: [PATCH v5 0/2] Control over userfaultfd kernel-fault handling Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2020 23:24:54 -0700 Message-ID: <20201011062456.4065576-1-lokeshgidra@google.com> (raw) This patch series is split from [1]. The other series enables SELinux support for userfaultfd file descriptors so that its creation and movement can be controlled. It has been demonstrated on various occasions that suspending kernel code execution for an arbitrary amount of time at any access to userspace memory (copy_from_user()/copy_to_user()/...) can be exploited to change the intended behavior of the kernel. For instance, handling page faults in kernel-mode using userfaultfd has been exploited in [2, 3]. Likewise, FUSE, which is similar to userfaultfd in this respect, has been exploited in [4, 5] for similar outcome. This small patch series adds a new flag to userfaultfd(2) that allows callers to give up the ability to handle kernel-mode faults with the resulting UFFD file object. It then adds a 'user-mode only' option to the unprivileged_userfaultfd sysctl knob to require unprivileged callers to use this new flag. The purpose of this new interface is to decrease the chance of an unprivileged userfaultfd user taking advantage of userfaultfd to enhance security vulnerabilities by lengthening the race window in kernel code. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200211225547.235083-1-dancol@google.com/ [2] https://duasynt.com/blog/linux-kernel-heap-spray [3] https://duasynt.com/blog/cve-2016-6187-heap-off-by-one-exploit [4] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/06/exploiting-recursion-in-linux-kernel_20.html [5] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=808 Changes since v4: - Added warning when bailing out from handling kernel fault. Changes since v3: - Modified the meaning of value '0' of unprivileged_userfaultfd sysctl knob. Setting this knob to '0' now allows unprivileged users to use userfaultfd, but can handle page faults in user-mode only. - The default value of unprivileged_userfaultfd sysctl knob is changed to '0'. Changes since v2: - Removed 'uffd_flags' and directly used 'UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY' in userfaultfd(). Changes since v1: - Added external references to the threats from allowing unprivileged users to handle page faults from kernel-mode. - Removed the new sysctl knob restricting handling of page faults from kernel-mode, and added an option for the same in the existing 'unprivileged_userfaultfd' knob. Lokesh Gidra (2): Add UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY Add user-mode only option to unprivileged_userfaultfd sysctl knob Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst | 15 ++++++++++----- fs/userfaultfd.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h | 9 +++++++++ 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) -- 2.28.0.1011.ga647a8990f-goog
next reply index Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-10-11 6:24 Lokesh Gidra [this message] 2020-10-11 6:24 ` [PATCH v5 1/2] Add UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY Lokesh Gidra 2020-10-24 2:08 ` Andrea Arcangeli 2020-10-11 6:24 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] Add user-mode only option to unprivileged_userfaultfd sysctl knob Lokesh Gidra 2020-10-24 2:48 ` Andrea Arcangeli 2020-10-24 4:08 ` Lokesh Gidra
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