From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-15.9 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 28961C48BE8 for ; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 21:28:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0CDF96100B for ; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 21:28:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234771AbhFNVaZ (ORCPT ); Mon, 14 Jun 2021 17:30:25 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([170.10.133.124]:42593 "EHLO us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234143AbhFNVaY (ORCPT ); Mon, 14 Jun 2021 17:30:24 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1623706100; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=RYZqV2QcVTGJp+9kQzTUW7d5kpFaSO22gkZ6p67dNno=; b=aLIK3ipvsB3feucopK7neHIbDEKmdVKlwOJDphmfMeW4RBq7XE5a5rTnt5pTdMVFwqr572 KQIrARY1kA/XmcE+Tgh1+ioHXPnXhB//iJ3xeaDEPeAXb/9dSeu5UeZokPIQXEeKvf1eQc 0ospH1GpoCBKXHtgvnnS9QXcgzDwawc= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-424-tK6Rfjv7NXWei7skeaJShA-1; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 17:28:17 -0400 X-MC-Unique: tK6Rfjv7NXWei7skeaJShA-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx03.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.13]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 368D68015D0; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 21:28:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: from horse.redhat.com (ovpn-114-174.rdu2.redhat.com [10.10.114.174]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 71CF960877; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 21:28:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: by horse.redhat.com (Postfix, from userid 10451) id DA07F22054F; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 17:28:08 -0400 (EDT) Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2021 17:28:08 -0400 From: Vivek Goyal To: Chirantan Ekbote Cc: Miklos Szeredi , Stephen Smalley , Stefan Hajnoczi , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, virtio-fs@redhat.com, Dylan Reid , Suleiman Souhlal , fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, selinux@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RESEND] [PATCHv4 1/2] uapi: fuse: Add FUSE_SECURITY_CTX Message-ID: <20210614212808.GD869400@redhat.com> References: <20200722090758.3221812-1-chirantan@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200722090758.3221812-1-chirantan@chromium.org> X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.13 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Jul 22, 2020 at 06:07:57PM +0900, Chirantan Ekbote wrote: > Add the FUSE_SECURITY_CTX flag for the `flags` field of the > fuse_init_out struct. When this flag is set the kernel will append the > security context for a newly created inode to the request (create, > mkdir, mknod, and symlink). The server is responsible for ensuring that > the inode appears atomically with the requested security context. > > For example, if the server is backed by a "real" linux file system then > it can write the security context value to > /proc/thread-self/attr/fscreate before making the syscall to create the > inode. > > Signed-off-by: Chirantan Ekbote Hi Chirantan, I am wondering what's the status of this work now. Looks like it was not merged. We also need the capability to set selinux security xattrs on newly created files in virtiofs. Will you be interested in reviving this work and send patches again and copy the selinux as well as linux security module list (linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org) as suggested by casey. How are you managing in the meantime. Carrying patches in your own kernel? Thanks Vivek > --- > Changes in v4: > * Added signoff to commit message. > > include/uapi/linux/fuse.h | 8 +++++++- > 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fuse.h b/include/uapi/linux/fuse.h > index 373cada898159..e2099b45fd44b 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/fuse.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/fuse.h > @@ -172,6 +172,10 @@ > * - add FUSE_WRITE_KILL_PRIV flag > * - add FUSE_SETUPMAPPING and FUSE_REMOVEMAPPING > * - add map_alignment to fuse_init_out, add FUSE_MAP_ALIGNMENT flag > + * > + * 7.32 > + * - add FUSE_SECURITY_CTX flag for fuse_init_out > + * - add security context to create, mkdir, symlink, and mknod requests > */ > > #ifndef _LINUX_FUSE_H > @@ -207,7 +211,7 @@ > #define FUSE_KERNEL_VERSION 7 > > /** Minor version number of this interface */ > -#define FUSE_KERNEL_MINOR_VERSION 31 > +#define FUSE_KERNEL_MINOR_VERSION 32 > > /** The node ID of the root inode */ > #define FUSE_ROOT_ID 1 > @@ -314,6 +318,7 @@ struct fuse_file_lock { > * FUSE_NO_OPENDIR_SUPPORT: kernel supports zero-message opendir > * FUSE_EXPLICIT_INVAL_DATA: only invalidate cached pages on explicit request > * FUSE_MAP_ALIGNMENT: map_alignment field is valid > + * FUSE_SECURITY_CTX: add security context to create, mkdir, symlink, and mknod > */ > #define FUSE_ASYNC_READ (1 << 0) > #define FUSE_POSIX_LOCKS (1 << 1) > @@ -342,6 +347,7 @@ struct fuse_file_lock { > #define FUSE_NO_OPENDIR_SUPPORT (1 << 24) > #define FUSE_EXPLICIT_INVAL_DATA (1 << 25) > #define FUSE_MAP_ALIGNMENT (1 << 26) > +#define FUSE_SECURITY_CTX (1 << 27) > > /** > * CUSE INIT request/reply flags > -- > 2.27.0.383.g050319c2ae-goog >