From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 636CBC43334 for ; Mon, 20 Jun 2022 14:35:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S242363AbiFTOfe (ORCPT ); Mon, 20 Jun 2022 10:35:34 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:34798 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1344962AbiFTOeT (ORCPT ); Mon, 20 Jun 2022 10:34:19 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C7520C47 for ; Mon, 20 Jun 2022 06:50:19 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 326C3B811A5 for ; Mon, 20 Jun 2022 13:50:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 30BA7C341C5; Mon, 20 Jun 2022 13:50:15 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1655733017; bh=w17qTr5fFqxr6HlQFG2e6I2TiZlftaodApDuN8pAAJ4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=q7jeT5zqlo+TxDaSTToWTDy+MhFGgZpjwt/E7eO+bFYZukHQOljiZxcd+ZG4GRgSL a15xmYWQeYaW6j/jqRXl6nx6n42nFLA8Wcs4M5LoOGhHd/0U/RA8sElwdplTx3TL3F RLysfUU4p8CWLNjMjeKXnurpt/bcnqFJeUGKyw/O9AyUoPDyg3TTGdM/6AuSWysX0W Xbjg54/THOhlKgFX5Y4GUp5Q+5d2COhNYc4x/Bcmdbx8WrAnz1sslwID1/qEk8voS2 cEWk/Kgrk2eKJ9iiOc6NNZqOkDPhUxe+AVt63uMPRw8GQgBjtIsBSiDt2gKp+LpzC/ 4PiIP5w1lcINA== From: Christian Brauner To: Christoph Hellwig , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Seth Forshee Cc: Christian Brauner , Aleksa Sarai , Linus Torvalds , Al Viro Subject: [PATCH 7/8] security: pass down mount idmapping to setattr hook Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 15:49:46 +0200 Message-Id: <20220620134947.2772863-8-brauner@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20220620134947.2772863-1-brauner@kernel.org> References: <20220620134947.2772863-1-brauner@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=7161; h=from:subject; bh=w17qTr5fFqxr6HlQFG2e6I2TiZlftaodApDuN8pAAJ4=; b=owGbwMvMwCU28Zj0gdSKO4sYT6slMSRtqHrb+n6eBZf04QSPI6cWe2z683ZVTlM1A8uMDz063Tc/ Tna531HKwiDGxSArpsji0G4SLrecp2KzUaYGzBxWJpAhDFycAjCRo4cZGb6v3p7r2/z1fyHf4ew7Gy 2jv03T4Zg0v+4wU7JGYkFuezfDPyst5am15mW2XPM+5K/Yna9ex70iaeuesrzoXwG6t+50cAEA X-Developer-Key: i=brauner@kernel.org; a=openpgp; fpr=4880B8C9BD0E5106FC070F4F7B3C391EFEA93624 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Before this change we used to take a shortcut and place the actual values that would be written to inode->i_{g,u}id into struct iattr. This had the advantage that we moved idmappings mostly out of the picture early on but it made reasoning about changes more difficult than it should be. The filesystem was never explicitly told that it dealt with an idmapped mount. The transition to the value that needed to be stored in inode->i_{g,u}id appeared way too early and increased the probability of bugs in various codepaths. We know place the same value in struct iattr no matter if this is an idmapped mount or not. The vfs will only deal with type safe kmnt{g,u}id_t. This makes it massively safer to perform permission checks as the type will tell us what checks we need to perform and what helpers we need to use. Adapt the security_inode_setattr() helper to pass down the mount's idmapping to account for that change. Cc: Seth Forshee Cc: Christoph Hellwig Cc: Aleksa Sarai Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Al Viro CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) --- fs/attr.c | 2 +- fs/fat/file.c | 3 ++- include/linux/evm.h | 6 ++++-- include/linux/security.h | 8 +++++--- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 8 +++++--- security/security.c | 5 +++-- 6 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c index 2e180dd9460f..88e2ca30d42e 100644 --- a/fs/attr.c +++ b/fs/attr.c @@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ int notify_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, !gid_valid(i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode))) return -EOVERFLOW; - error = security_inode_setattr(dentry, attr); + error = security_inode_setattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, attr); if (error) return error; error = try_break_deleg(inode, delegated_inode); diff --git a/fs/fat/file.c b/fs/fat/file.c index 3dae3ed60f3a..530f18173db2 100644 --- a/fs/fat/file.c +++ b/fs/fat/file.c @@ -90,7 +90,8 @@ static int fat_ioctl_set_attributes(struct file *file, u32 __user *user_attr) * out the RO attribute for checking by the security * module, just because it maps to a file mode. */ - err = security_inode_setattr(file->f_path.dentry, &ia); + err = security_inode_setattr(&init_user_ns, + file->f_path.dentry, &ia); if (err) goto out_unlock_inode; diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h index 4c374be70247..aa63e0b3c0a2 100644 --- a/include/linux/evm.h +++ b/include/linux/evm.h @@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint); -extern int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr); +extern int evm_inode_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr); extern void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid); extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, @@ -68,7 +69,8 @@ static inline enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, } #endif -static inline int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) +static inline int evm_inode_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { return 0; } diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 7fc4e9f49f54..4d0baf30266e 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -353,7 +353,8 @@ int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry); int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, bool rcu); int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask); -int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr); +int security_inode_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr); int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path); int security_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, @@ -848,8 +849,9 @@ static inline int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) return 0; } -static inline int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, - struct iattr *attr) +static inline int security_inode_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct dentry *dentry, + struct iattr *attr) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index bcde6bc2a2ce..7f4af5b58583 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -755,7 +755,8 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); } -static int evm_attr_change(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) +static int evm_attr_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid; @@ -775,7 +776,8 @@ static int evm_attr_change(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature, * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature. */ -int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) +int evm_inode_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, + struct iattr *attr) { unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid; enum integrity_status evm_status; @@ -801,7 +803,7 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) return 0; if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE && - !evm_attr_change(dentry, attr)) + !evm_attr_change(mnt_userns, dentry, attr)) return 0; integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 188b8f782220..f85afb02ea1c 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1324,7 +1324,8 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask); } -int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) +int security_inode_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { int ret; @@ -1333,7 +1334,7 @@ int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr); if (ret) return ret; - return evm_inode_setattr(dentry, attr); + return evm_inode_setattr(mnt_userns, dentry, attr); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr); -- 2.34.1