From: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:FILESYSTEMS (VFS and infrastructure)"
<linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Allow restricting permissions in /proc/sys
Date: Sun, 3 Nov 2019 21:24:27 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <226c6c2b-df7a-7eb1-e8c5-60fc23998f89@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191103175648.GA4603@mit.edu>
On 3.11.2019 19.56, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 03, 2019 at 04:55:48PM +0200, Topi Miettinen wrote:
>> Several items in /proc/sys need not be accessible to unprivileged
>> tasks. Let the system administrator change the permissions, but only
>> to more restrictive modes than what the sysctl tables allow.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
>
> Why should restruct the system administrator from changing the
> permissions to one which is more lax than what the sysctl tables?
>
> The system administrator is already very much trusted. Why should we
> take that discretion away from the system administrator?
That could make sense, in addition changing UID/GID would allow even
more flexibility. The current checks and restrictions which prevent
those changes were already present in original code in 2007. I didn't
want to change the logic too much. Perhaps loosening the restrictions
could be a follow-up patch, as it may give chance to use more of generic
proc or fslib code and thus a larger restructuring.
-Topi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-11-03 19:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-11-03 14:55 [PATCH] Allow restricting permissions in /proc/sys Topi Miettinen
2019-11-03 17:56 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-11-03 19:24 ` Topi Miettinen [this message]
2019-11-12 23:15 ` Kees Cook
2019-11-03 18:50 ` Eric W. Biederman
2019-11-03 19:38 ` Topi Miettinen
2019-11-04 15:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2019-11-04 17:58 ` Topi Miettinen
2019-11-04 23:41 ` Eric W. Biederman
2019-11-05 7:35 ` Topi Miettinen
2019-11-12 23:19 ` Kees Cook
2019-11-13 1:04 ` Luis Chamberlain
2019-11-12 23:22 ` Christian Brauner
2019-11-13 4:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-11-13 10:52 ` Topi Miettinen
2019-11-13 16:00 ` Jann Horn
2019-11-13 16:19 ` Topi Miettinen
2019-11-13 16:40 ` Jann Horn
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