From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>, Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
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x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 6/8] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 12:27:13 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <47d0e5b1-ffee-d694-4865-8718619c1be0@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210518102424.GD82842@C02TD0UTHF1T.local>
On 18.05.21 12:24, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 09:47:32PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
>>
>> It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation
>> snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially
>> will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings.
>>
>> Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users.
>
> Have we thought about how this is going to work in practice, e.g. on
> mobile systems? It seems to me that there are a variety of common
> applications which might want to use this which people don't expect to
> inhibit hibernate (e.g. authentication agents, web browsers).
>
> Are we happy to say that any userspace application can incidentally
> inhibit hibernate?
It's worth noting that secretmem has to be explicitly enabled by the
admin to even work.
--
Thanks,
David / dhildenb
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-05-18 10:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-05-13 18:47 [PATCH v19 0/8] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47 ` [PATCH v19 1/8] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global Mike Rapoport
2021-05-14 8:27 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-13 18:47 ` [PATCH v19 2/8] riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU Mike Rapoport
2021-05-14 8:28 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-13 18:47 ` [PATCH v19 3/8] set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages Mike Rapoport
2021-05-14 8:43 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-16 7:13 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47 ` [PATCH v19 4/8] set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47 ` [PATCH v19 5/8] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2021-05-14 8:50 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-17 7:23 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-14 9:25 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-16 7:29 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-18 9:59 ` Michal Hocko
2021-05-18 10:06 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-18 10:31 ` Michal Hocko
2021-05-18 10:35 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-18 11:08 ` Michal Hocko
2021-05-19 7:13 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47 ` [PATCH v19 6/8] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users Mike Rapoport
2021-05-14 9:27 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-18 10:24 ` Mark Rutland
2021-05-18 10:27 ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2021-05-19 1:32 ` James Bottomley
2021-05-19 1:49 ` Dan Williams
2021-05-19 3:50 ` James Bottomley
2021-05-13 18:47 ` [PATCH v19 7/8] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant Mike Rapoport
2021-05-14 9:27 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-13 18:47 ` [PATCH v19 8/8] secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2) Mike Rapoport
2021-05-14 9:40 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-13 19:08 ` [PATCH v19 0/8] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas James Bottomley
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