From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Subject: Re: RFC(v2): Audit Kernel Container IDs To: Paul Moore , James Bottomley Cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org, mszeredi@redhat.com, Andy Lutomirski , jlayton@redhat.com, Carlos O'Donell , API , Linux Containers , Linux Kernel , Viro , David Howells , Linux FS Devel , linux-audit@redhat.com, "Eric W. Biederman" , Simo Sorce , Development , Casey Schaufler , Eric Paris , Steve Grubb , trondmy@primarydata.com References: <20171012141359.saqdtnodwmbz33b2@madcap2.tricolour.ca> <75b7d6a6-42ba-2dff-1836-1091c7c024e7@schaufler-ca.com> <20171017003340.whjdkqmkw4lydwy7@madcap2.tricolour.ca> <2319693.5l3M4ZINGd@x2> <1508243469.6230.24.camel@redhat.com> <1508254120.6230.34.camel@redhat.com> <1508255091.3129.27.camel@HansenPartnership.com> From: Aleksa Sarai Message-ID: <49752b6f-8a77-d1e5-8acb-5a1eed0a992c@suse.de> Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2017 10:46:18 +1100 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: >> The security implications are that anything that can change the label >> could also hide itself and its doings from the audit system and thus >> would be used as a means to evade detection. I actually think this >> means the label should be write once (once you've set it, you can't >> change it) ... > > Richard and I have talked about a write once approach, but the > thinking was that you may want to allow a nested container > orchestrator (Why? I don't know, but people always want to do the > craziest things.) and a write-once policy makes that impossible. If > we punt on the nested orchestrator, I believe we can seriously think > about a write-once policy to simplify things. Nested containers are a very widely used use-case (see LXC system containers, inside of which people run other container runtimes). So I would definitely consider it something that "needs to be supported in some way". While the LXC guys might be a *tad* crazy, the use-case isn't. :P >> ... and orchestration systems should begin as unlabelled >> processes allowing them to do arbitrary forks. > > My current thinking is that the default state is to start unlabeled (I > just vomited a little into my SELinux hat); in other words > init/systemd/PID-1 in the host system starts with an "unset" audit > container ID. This not only helps define the host system (anything > that has an unset audit container ID) but provides a blank slate for > the orchestrator(s). > >> For nested containers, I actually think the label should be >> hierarchical, so you can add a label for the new nested container but >> it still also contains its parents label as well. > > I haven't made up my mind on this completely just yet, but I'm > currently of the mindset that supporting multiple audit container IDs > on a given process is not a good idea. As long as creating a new "container" (that is, changing a process's "audit container ID") is an audit event then I think that having a hierarchy be explicit is not necessary (userspace audit can figure out the hierarchy quite easily -- but also there are cases where thinking of it as being hierarchical isn't necessarily correct). -- Aleksa Sarai Senior Software Engineer (Containers) SUSE Linux GmbH https://www.cyphar.com/