From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Gao feng Subject: Re: [REVIEW][PATCH 1/2] userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2013 15:26:19 +0800 Message-ID: <5283299B.8080702@cn.fujitsu.com> References: <878uzmhkqg.fsf@xmission.com> <52749663.2000701@cn.fujitsu.com> <527C4D88.10907@cn.fujitsu.com> <87k3gigmgj.fsf@xmission.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: linux-fsdevel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, Linux Containers , Andy Lutomirski , linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org To: "Eric W. Biederman" Return-path: In-Reply-To: <87k3gigmgj.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: containers-bounces-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org Errors-To: containers-bounces-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org List-Id: linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org On 11/09/2013 01:42 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > Gao feng writes: > >> On 11/02/2013 02:06 PM, Gao feng wrote: >>> Hi Eric, >>> >>> On 08/28/2013 05:44 AM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >>>> >>>> Rely on the fact that another flavor of the filesystem is already >>>> mounted and do not rely on state in the user namespace. >>>> >>>> Verify that the mounted filesystem is not covered in any significant >>>> way. I would love to verify that the previously mounted filesystem >>>> has no mounts on top but there are at least the directories >>>> /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc and /sys/fs/cgroup/ that exist explicitly >>>> for other filesystems to mount on top of. >>>> >>>> Refactor the test into a function named fs_fully_visible and call that >>>> function from the mount routines of proc and sysfs. This makes this >>>> test local to the filesystems involved and the results current of when >>>> the mounts take place, removing a weird threading of the user >>>> namespace, the mount namespace and the filesystems themselves. >>>> >>>> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" >>>> --- >>>> fs/namespace.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ >>>> fs/proc/root.c | 7 +++++-- >>>> fs/sysfs/mount.c | 3 ++- >>>> include/linux/fs.h | 1 + >>>> include/linux/user_namespace.h | 4 ---- >>>> kernel/user.c | 2 -- >>>> kernel/user_namespace.c | 2 -- >>>> 7 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) >>>> >>>> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c >>>> index 64627f8..877e427 100644 >>>> --- a/fs/namespace.c >>>> +++ b/fs/namespace.c >>>> @@ -2867,25 +2867,38 @@ bool current_chrooted(void) >>>> return chrooted; >>>> } >>>> >>>> -void update_mnt_policy(struct user_namespace *userns) >>>> +bool fs_fully_visible(struct file_system_type *type) >>>> { >>>> struct mnt_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns; >>>> struct mount *mnt; >>>> + bool visible = false; >>>> >>>> - down_read(&namespace_sem); >>>> + if (unlikely(!ns)) >>>> + return false; >>>> + >>>> + namespace_lock(); >>>> list_for_each_entry(mnt, &ns->list, mnt_list) { >>>> - switch (mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_magic) { >>>> - case SYSFS_MAGIC: >>>> - userns->may_mount_sysfs = true; >>>> - break; >>>> - case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC: >>>> - userns->may_mount_proc = true; >>>> - break; >>>> + struct mount *child; >>>> + if (mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_type != type) >>>> + continue; >>>> + >>>> + /* This mount is not fully visible if there are any child mounts >>>> + * that cover anything except for empty directories. >>>> + */ >>>> + list_for_each_entry(child, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) { >>>> + struct inode *inode = child->mnt_mountpoint->d_inode; >>>> + if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) >>>> + goto next; >>>> + if (inode->i_nlink != 2) >>>> + goto next; >>> >>> >>> I met a problem that proc filesystem failed to mount in user namespace, >>> The problem is the i_nlink of sysctl entries under proc filesystem is not >>> 2. it always is 1 even it's a directory, see proc_sys_make_inode. and for >>> btrfs, the i_nlink for an empty dir is 2 too. it seems like depends on the >>> filesystem itself,not depends on vfs. In my system binfmt_misc is mounted >>> on /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc, and the i_nlink of this directory's inode is >>> 1. > > Yes. 1 is what filesystems that are too lazy to count the number of > links to a directory return, and /proc/sys is currently such a > filesystem. > > Ordinarily nlink == 2 means a directory does not have any subdirectories. > >>> btw, I'm not quite understand what's the inode->i_nlink != 2 here means? >>> is this directory empty? as I know, when we create a file(not dir) under >>> a dir, the i_nlink of this dir will not increase. >>> >>> And another question, it looks like if we don't have proc/sys fs mounted, >>> then proc/sys will be failed to be mounted? >>> >> >> Any Idea?? or should we need to revert this patch?? > > The patch is mostly doing what it is supposed to be doing. > > Now the code is slightly buggy. inode->i_nlink will test to see if a > directory has subdirectories but it won't test to see if a directory is > empty. Where did my brain go when I was writing that test? > > Right now I would rather not have the empty directory exception than > remove this code. > > The test is a little trickier to write than it might otherwise be > because /proc and /sys tend to be slightly imperfect filesystems. > > I think the only way to really test that is to call readdir on the > directory itself :( I don't like that thought. > > I don't know what I was thinking when I wrote that test but I definitely > goofed up. Grr! > > I can certainly filter out any directory with nlink > 2. That would be > an easy partial step forward. > > The real question though is how do I detect directories it is safe to > mount on where there will not be files in them. I can't call iterate > with the namespace_lock held so things are a bit tricky. > I know this problem is not easy to be resolved. why not let the user make the decision? maybe we can introduce a new mount option MS_LOCK, if user wants to use mount to hide something, he should use mount with option MS_LOCK. so the unpriviged user can't umount this filesystem and fail to mount the filesystem if one of it's child mount is mounted with MS_LOCK option otherwise he use MS_REC too. Thanks