From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 04/24] VFS: Add LSM hooks for filesystem context [ver #7]
Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2018 16:22:47 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <703.1524583367@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aca7e68c-022b-47ac-c249-59e042d431e8@tycho.nsa.gov>
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> Neither fsopen() nor fscontext_fs_write() appear to perform any kind of
> up-front permission checking (DAC or MAC), although some security hooks may
> be ultimately called to allocate structures, parse security options, etc.
> Is there a reason not apply a may_mount() or similar check up front?
may_mount() is called by fsmount() at the moment. It may make sense to move
this earlier to fsopen(). Note that there's also going to be something that
looks like:
fd = fspick("/mnt");
fsmount(fd, "/a", MNT_NOEXEC); // ie. bind mount
or:
fd = fspick("/mnt");
write(fd, "o intr");
write(fd, "x reconfigure"); // ie. something like remount
close(fd);
I guess we'd want to call may_mount() in fspick() too. But there's also the
possibility of using this to create a query interfact too:
fd = fspick("/mnt");
write(fd, "q intr");
read(fd, value_buffer);
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-04-24 15:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-04-19 13:31 [PATCH 00/24] VFS: Introduce filesystem context [ver #7] David Howells
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 01/24] vfs: Undo an overly zealous MS_RDONLY -> SB_RDONLY conversion " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 02/24] VFS: Suppress MS_* flag defs within the kernel unless explicitly enabled " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 03/24] VFS: Introduce the structs and doc for a filesystem context " David Howells
2018-04-23 3:36 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-05-01 14:29 ` David Howells
2018-05-01 15:31 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 04/24] VFS: Add LSM hooks for " David Howells
2018-04-19 20:32 ` Paul Moore
2018-04-20 15:35 ` David Howells
2018-04-23 13:25 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-04-24 15:22 ` David Howells [this message]
2018-04-25 14:07 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 05/24] apparmor: Implement security hooks for the new mount API " David Howells
2018-05-04 0:10 ` John Johansen
2018-05-11 12:20 ` David Howells
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 06/24] tomoyo: " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 07/24] smack: Implement filesystem context security hooks " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 08/24] VFS: Require specification of size of mount data for internal mounts " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 09/24] VFS: Implement a filesystem superblock creation/configuration context " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 10/24] VFS: Remove unused code after filesystem context changes " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 11/24] procfs: Move proc_fill_super() to fs/proc/root.c " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 12/24] proc: Add fs_context support to procfs " David Howells
2018-06-19 3:34 ` [12/24] " Andrei Vagin
2018-06-26 6:13 ` Andrei Vagin
2018-06-26 7:27 ` Andrei Vagin
2018-06-26 8:57 ` David Howells
2018-06-28 5:50 ` Andrei Vagin
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 13/24] ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 14/24] cpuset: Use " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 15/24] kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 16/24] hugetlbfs: Convert to " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 17/24] VFS: Remove kern_mount_data() " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 18/24] VFS: Implement fsopen() to prepare for a mount " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 19/24] VFS: Implement fsmount() to effect a pre-configured " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 20/24] afs: Fix server record deletion " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 21/24] net: Export get_proc_net() " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 22/24] afs: Add fs_context support " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 23/24] afs: Implement namespacing " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 24/24] afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount " David Howells
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